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Abstract
This PhD thesis studies three aspects of competition in pharmaceutical 
markets using data from the EU, and recommends appropriate policies to address 
inefficiencies.
The first study examines the effect of patent expiry on originator drug prices 
in the presence of price regulation. Using econometric panel data methods, I find 
that neither generic entry nor generic market penetration affect the prices of 
originator drugs downwards. Instead, prices of originator drugs often appear to 
increase post-generic entry. Findings suggest that no savings to health services 
should be expected post-patent expiry if the originator product is dispensed, and any 
savings occur solely from generic uptake.
The second study examines whether generic entry leads to a switch in total 
consumption (both originator and generic) from an off-patent branded molecule to a 
different in-patent molecule of the same therapeutic class. Using panel data analysis, 
I find that a switch in consumption post-patent expiry took place for the first ACE 
inhibitor which went off-patent, and in some cases for the second and third product. 
Such a switch leads to increased costs because it removes any substitution power 
from health authorities.
The third study examines the effects of parallel trade on price competition. 
The topic is first approached from a game-theoretic point of view, predicting that 
parallel trade does not trigger price competition. Descriptive statistics demonstrate 
differences, if any, between prices of locally sourced and parallel traded products in 
the presence of different regulatory policies. Finally, the econometric analysis shows 
that there is upward price convergence in the presence of parallel trade. However,
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some regulatory interventions may lead to a spread between prices of locally 
sourced products and parallel traded products. Findings suggest that parallel trade 
should not always be considered a cost-containment mechanism and other ways to 
address rising pharmaceutical expenditures should be considered.
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Thesis Structure
This thesis follows the 3-paper format, as approved by the Department of 
Social Policy for dissertations in economics-related topics. The papers have to be 
thematically linked and tied together with an introduction and a conclusion.
The introduction consists of chapters 1, 2 and 3. The three papers of the 
thesis are chapters 4, 5 and 6, while chapter 7 concludes.
The second paper (switching effects post patent expiry) is single authored. 
The first and the third paper (the generics paradox revisited and the impact of 
parallel trade on competition) are primarily authored by the author of this PhD thesis 
and co-authored by Panos Kanavos, who provided the datasets, approved the 
methodology and critically reviewed the studies. Panos Kanavos also provided 
background information on legal issues surrounding parallel trade.
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1. Background and Motivation
1.1 Background
Poor health affects people’s lives and decreases their utility directly, but also 
from a financial perspective, addressing health problems accounts for a significant 
proportion of GDP in OECD countries1 (OECD Health Data 2009). In the context of 
their contribution to wealth and to overall health spending, pharmaceuticals play an 
important part in treatment of illnesses and their cost is a large part of health 
spending. In addition, pharmaceutical spending per capita has been constantly rising 
in OECD countries, making the analysis of these markets an important component in 
understanding efficiency and assessing what works in pharmaceutical policy and 
what does not.
Analyzing pharmaceutical markets is not straightforward. Pharmaceutical 
markets involve patients, physicians who act on patients’ behalf, pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, regulators, payers and (wholesale and retail) distributors among 
others2. The multiplicity of agents involved in the health care decision making 
makes the problem of understanding the drivers of pharmaceutical spending and the 
pursuit of efficiency a complex one.
The extent of regulation in pharmaceutical markets is not the same across 
European countries. Different regulatory measures apply to different health systems, 
and the combination of various policies makes it difficult to isolate the separate 
effects of each measure. Interventions apply both on the supply side, through direct 
or indirect controls of prices, and on the supply side, by diverting consumption
1 These data are discussed in section 1.2
2 In addition, other stakeholders may be involved, e.g. ministries of trade, industry, or, even, 
education.
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towards more cost-effective and efficient treatments. Insurers are seeking to cost 
contain and use resources optimally, while manufacturers are profit maximizers. 
Consequently, the market equilibrium depends heavily upon the nature and extent of 
intervention. However, assessment of the effects of various pharmaceutical policies 
remains scarce. Kanavos et al (2004) underline the importance of improving 
methodological issues before reaching definitive policy recommendations as use of 
inappropriate methodology may undermine the validity and reliability of any results.
1.2 Motivation
1,2.1 The special Nature o f Pharmaceutical Markets
Pharmaceutical markets differ from other types of markets and indeed 
present a number of peculiarities making the pharmaceutical market a special market 
(Mossialos et al, 1994). Prescribing doctors are often unaware of or not interested in 
prices of prescription medicines, unless they are affected by them through explicit 
financial or non-financial incentives. In addition, the market position of originator 
manufacturers is usually monopolistic due to intellectual property rights protection 
and can also result in them often retaining a large share of the market, even after 
generic entry. Patients have less information than their agents (the physicians). 
Patients seek advice from their physician and usually follow the treatment that is 
prescribed frequently without questioning the physician’s decision, due to lack of 
relevant medical knowledge. This often creates room for possible physician-induced 
demand. Given the presence of moral hazard, due to third party payment, this 
phenomenon can possibly become even more intense.
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A very important characteristic of the pharmaceutical market, predominantly 
in insurance-dominated markets, is the fact that the consumer of a pharmaceutical 
product and the payer are different agents. This occurs because most individuals are 
insured and have prescription medicines reimbursed either totally or partly3. This 
has two important implications: First, in this market where consumers and payers 
are different agents, moral hazard issues arise. Second, the consumer has a very low 
elasticity of demand with respect to price, which various studies have estimated to 
be between 0 and -0.3 (Gemmill et al. 2007, Grootendorst et al. 1997, Leibowitz et 
al. 1985, Johnson et al. 1997, Gardner et al. 1997, Hughes and McGuire 1995, 
Lavers 1989, O’Brien 1989, Ryan and Birch 1991, Smith and Watson 1990, 
Contoyannis et al. 2005). This suggests that the price of prescription medicines has, 
at best, a small effect on consumers’ purchasing decisions, particularly if large co­
payments are involved. In the absence of regulation, pharmaceutical producers 
would be setting the monopoly price.
Prescription medicines are fully or partially covered by health insurance in 
most EU countries (PPRI 2007). At individual level, in the presence of health 
insurance and with low or no co- payments, consumers have no incentive to limit 
their consumption. While individual consumers care little about the prices of 
prescription medicines, at aggregate level the behaviour of all consumers together 
may cause an upward shift to premiums due to increased medical costs that insurers 
have to pay out of pocket. Thus, the elasticity of demand remains low, which leads 
to high prices in the pharmaceutical market and the insurance market.
Patents (and other intellectual property rights, such as copyrights, market 
exclusivity periods and patent extension terms) play an important role in this market.
3 Health insurance is a feature in most developed countries, but is largely absent from a large number 
of middle- and low-income countries or/and significant sections of the population therein.
18
The granting of patents provides a commercial monopoly to right holders. Patent 
protection though does, in principle, provide right holders with the incentive to 
invest in research and development, as a monopolist’s price and quantity, hence also 
profits, are higher for a monopolist than in the presence of competitors (Mas-Colell, 
Whinston and Green 1995).The real amount spent on R&D over the 1980-2002 
period rose by an average rate of 8% per year (Aaron 2003). In 2007, $47.9 billion 
was spent by U.S. pharmaceutical companies on research and development of new 
pharmaceutical products (PhRMA 2009), while for the same year the expenditure on 
R&D in Europe was €26 billion (EFPIA 2010). In the absence of patent protection, 
little research would be done, as the innovator would be burdened by the large cost 
of R&D but would almost immediately face competition by generic producers who 
would not be subject to R&D costs.
Patent protection leaves a player in the market alone for 20 years, according 
to the WTO TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) 
agreement (WTO-OMC TRIPS fact sheet, 2006). However, the effective patent 
protection period is less than 20 years. Overall, patents keep competitors out of the 
market and prices higher than in competitive markets during the patent protection 
period. On the supply-side, pharmaceutical producers are profit maximizers. 
Consequently, during the patent protection period and in the absence of regulation, 
pharmaceutical manufacturers can act as monopolists, the outcome being higher 
prices and lower quantities than the social optimum and therefore a decrease in 
social welfare (Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green 1995). In order to underwrite the 
latter, there is increased political pressure to exercise control on prices and, 
indirectly, on profits of the pharmaceutical sector.
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Regulation is introduced, among other things, to control prices, which could 
be very high in the presence of inelastic demand and monopoly power. Markets are 
regulated4 due to the absence of the normal forces of competition and because 
medicines are paid for in part out of public expenditure. (Mossialos et al 1994, 2004).
Regulation distorts markets though, because it moves the market equilibrium 
away from the level at which the market clears. As a result, the pharmaceutical 
market still behaves in a different way than regular free markets. All these factors 
(low price elasticity and monopoly power, regulation, health insurance and third 
party payers) move the pharmaceutical market away from what is known in 
economic theory as a competitive market (Mas -  Colell, Whinston, Green 1995).
1.2.2 The Challenge o f Increasing Health and Pharmaceutical Costs
The motivation for this thesis stems from the challenging health care 
environment in OECD countries and the contribution of pharmaceuticals to that 
environment. Key trends include the increase in population over 65 years of age as a 
percentage of total population, an increase in health expenditure both as a percentage 
of GDP and as total expenditure per capita, and an increase in total pharmaceutical 
expenditure per capita (OECD Health Data, 2009).
Despite price and other regulation, pharmaceutical expenditure has been 
rising (OECD Health Data, 2009), causing many concerns about sustainability. This 
underlines the fact that supply - side regulation is only in part effective in addressing 
this problem, so demand - side measures may also be needed.
4 Regulation in the pharmaceutical market focuses largely on prices, by intervening in the supply 
side. However, demand side measures (such as generic substitution and regressive pharmacy 
markups) also apply, in an effort to achieve more efficient spending.
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Population in Europe is ageing. As shown in Figure 1.1, the percentage of 
people over 65 years old as a fraction of the total population has been increasing 
steadily across Europe since the early 1970s. In the United Kingdom, this figure 
increased from 13% to 16% in 37 years, from 1970 to 2007. In Germany, this 
increase was even steeper, from 13.2% to 20.2%. Similar increases in the over 65 
ratio appear in the Netherlands (from 10.2% to 14.6%), France (from 12.9% to 
16.4%), Denmark (from 12.3% to 15.5%), Sweden (from 13.7% to 17.4%) and 
Norway (from 12.9% to 14.6%) (OECD Health Data 2009). Ageing populations 
burden health budgets and lead to increasing costs due to increased demand for 
health care arising from chronic illnesses (Heller 2004).
Figure 1.1 Population: 65 years old and over, % of total population
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Source: OECD Health Data 2009, November 2009
Total expenditure on health as a percentage of GDP, which demonstrates a 
significant rise across Europe over the 1990 -  2007 period, is shown in Figure 1.2.
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Health expenditure increased from 5.9% of GDP to 8.4% in 17 years (1990- 2007).
10.4%. Similar developments are observed in Denmark (from 8.3% to 9.8%), 
Sweden (from 8.2% to 9.1%), Norway (from 7.6% to 8.9%) and the Netherlands 
(from 8% to 9.8%) (OECD Health Data 2009).
Total per capita expenditure on health has been increasing steadily in real 
terms in the European Union since the early 1990s (Figure 1.3). In the United 
Kingdom, total per capita health expenditure doubled over 17 years, as it increased 
from US$1,228 (PPP) in 1990 to US$2,529 (PPP) in 2008. Over the same period, 
expenditure increased in Germany from US$2,091 to US$2,936 (PPP). In France, 
expenditure rose from US$1,813 to US$3,010 per capita. Health expenditure also 
increased steadily in Denmark, Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands over the same 
period(OECD Health Data 2009).
Figure 1.2 Total expenditure on health, % gross domestic product
In France expenditure increased from 8.4% to 11% and in Germany from 8.3% to
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Figure 1.3 Total expenditure on health, /capita, US$ at 2000 PPP rates
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Per capita pharmaceutical expenditures have been rising steeply in Europe. 
In just 17 years (1990-2007) per capita pharmaceutical expenditure rose from 
US$134 (PPP) to US$365 (PPP) in the United Kingdom, from US$159 (PPP) to 
US$448 (PPP) in France, from US$184 (PPP) to US$352 (PPP) in Germany and 
from US$92 (PPP) to US$ 393 (PPP) in Sweden (Figure 1.4). Nevertheless, 
pharmaceutical expenditure as a percentage of total health expenditure has not had a 
particular trend in Europe and seems to be relatively stationary (Figure 1.5). This 
has varied between 7% and 20% of total health expenditure across all countries 
included in the study. France demonstrates the highest proportion, ranging from 
17% in 1990 to 16% in 2007, and Norway demonstrates the lowest proportion, 
ranging from 7% in 1990 to 8% in 2007. Figures in all other countries are within this 
range (WHO HFA 2010). Faced with the challenge of increasing health costs, in 
some cases decentralization has been selected as a possible route towards more 
efficiency in the health care sector. However, the problem of coordination may still 
remain (Lopez-Casasnovas 2002).
23
Figure 1.4 Total pharmaceutical spending per capita, US$ purchasing power
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Figure 1.5 Total Pharmaceutical Expenditure as % of Total Health
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1.2.3 Optimal Use o f Resources
An important source of savings for health insurance is generic medicines, as 
they are significantly cheaper than originators. Their clinical efficacy is the same as 
that of originators (thus a bioequivalent), making them more cost effective. 
Therefore, every monetary unit spent on generics is used in a more efficient way 
compared to if it was spent on originators, due to the price difference. Hence the 
importance of generic market shares in achieving greater efficiency in the use of 
resources. The price difference between originators and generics -  ranging from 
marginal to very large depending on the setting - is a result of either free market 
dynamics (in countries where generic prices are not regulated) or of explicit price 
regulation, where this is present.
Generic policies are introduced, both from the demand and the supply side, 
in order to encourage generic use, and through that, achieve more optimal use of 
pharmaceutical budgets. The pharmaceutical market in the EU in 2005 and 2006 
accounted for US$138.6 billion, while the generic market in the same group of 
countries was US$31.1 billion (EGA 2007). Evidence from the literature suggests 
that the average generic penetration for a sample of 12 high selling products up to 
three years after first generic entry in the United Kingdom is 55%, while the 
potential maximum generic market share is 95%; generic uptake appears to be less 
swift in Germany and France, where generic penetration for the first three years is 
45% and 10-20% respectively (Kanavos 2008). The average price difference 
between branded and generic price for the same sample of medicines was 80% in the 
United Kingdom, between 30 and 40% in France and between 25 and 40% in 
Germany.
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In the United Kingdom, the market shares of generics by value rose from 
8.6% in 1994 to 20.1% in 2004 (Simoens and Coster 2006). In Germany, generic 
volume as a fraction of the maximum potential volume of generic volume increased 
from 60% in 1992 to 75% in 2003 (Busse and Riesberg, 2004). This indicates that 
there is still space for further savings from generic prescribing and dispensing.
Total generic market shares in Europe, both in terms of value and volume, 
can be found in Figure 1.6. In the United Kingdom, market share in volume exceeds 
60%, while in value it is just above 20%, reflecting the significant price gap between 
generics and originators. In the Netherlands, generics have half the market in terms 
of volume, and a fifth in terms of value. Generics account for almost 60% of the 
market volume and just over a fifth of market value. Generic penetration is low but 
increasing in France compared with the UK or Germany. The volume is less than a 
fifth of the whole market and the value does not exceed 10% (EGA 2007).
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Figure 1.6 Generic M arket Shares, 2006
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Source: Adapted from EGA, 2007.
1.2.4 Regulating Pharmaceutical Markets
Regulating pharmaceutical markets presents significant challenges for policy 
makers. On one hand, research and development is very important in order to 
maintain progress in the health sector and ultimately provide better health care for 
people (Cutler et al 2006, Cutler et al 2007, Cutler and McClellan 2001, Kanavos 
2005, Lichtenberg 1996, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004). On the other hand, medical 
technology often leads to an increase in health expenditure, directly at least, as 
calculating indirect effects is more complicated. However, a study has shown that 
every dollar spent on using new pharmaceutical products (as opposed to older 
medicines) saves approximately $7 in other health care costs (Lichtenberg 1996). 
Further, the public good nature of health care (assuming health care is a public good), 
in combination with information asymmetries, create moral hazard issues. Patients
27
may not know exactly what treatment is best for them and rely on their physician 
and health care provider to receive the appropriate treatment. The insured though 
may abuse insurance and get higher levels of treatment than necessary, causing a 
rise in health expenses in general, and pharmaceutical expenses in particular. 
Tackling increasing health expenditure is a challenge for governments. Containing 
pharmaceutical expenditure could have an impact on technology uptake, leading to a 
slower rate of improvement of treatment, while increasing levels of expenditure may 
cause problems to the insurance funds, particularly in Europe, which has a growing 
elderly population (WHO HFA 2010). Faced with increasing costs in the health care 
sector, government policies aim to reallocate resources and increase welfare by 
intervening in healthcare markets.
Because pharmaceuticals are a significant component of the health care 
budget, payer interventions are common practice in pharmaceutical markets. Such 
interventions aim both at containing costs as well as ensuring access to those who 
need them. In order to achieve this goal, government policies are introduced.
Outside pharmaceutical markets, the main source of price reductions is the 
presence of competition. In in-patent pharmaceutical markets there is no direct 
competition from homogenous products, except for parallel trade, which is a special 
type of competition and is analyzed thoroughly in chapter 6 of the dissertation. To 
address this issue, supply-side regulation is often introduced. Naturally, savings may 
occur by controlling prices of products which account for pharmaceutical 
expenditure, medicine prices in particular.
In pharmaceutical markets, initially the product is in-patent, although facing 
indirect competition by other products of the same therapeutic class. Even in this 
situation, price competition is unlikely (Kanavos, Costa-font, McGuire 2007). At
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patent expiry, there is a transition effect, as generics move into the market. At the 
same time though, there may be a switch within the same therapeutic class, from the 
off-patent molecule to an on-patent one. Parallel trade is another factor influencing 
market dynamics. All these dynamics are included in the dissertation, making it an 
in-depth analysis of competition in regulated prescription markets.
1.3 Focus of the thesis
The above sections provide the rationale for the focus of this thesis. In 
particular, the thesis focuses on three specific aspects of pharmaceutical market 
competition where there are indications that there is possible room for improvement 
in optimal resource allocation and efficient resource use The markets studied are 
subject to government intervention in the form of supply-side (and often also 
demand side) regulation.
There are two ways to improve efficiency in pharmaceutical markets from 
the supply side: Competition and regulation. Competition can reduce prices of 
prescription medicines. In in-patent markets, monopoly power allows a single 
supplier to set a higher price than in the presence of competition (Mas-Collel, 
Whinston and Green 1995). Apart from the supply side, measures may also focus on 
the demand-side by encouraging efficient prescribing and dispensing.
As already discussed earlier in this chapter, competition in pharmaceutical 
markets does not function in the same manner as in other markets. Third party 
payers, patent protection and low elasticity levels in in-patent markets may prevent 
competition from reducing prices as in other markets. Regulation steps in to address 
this problem and to make medicines affordable. In in -  patent markets, negotiations 
between producers and health insurance, price caps and profit controls aim at
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containing medicine prices below their monopoly level. Competition though exists 
in off-patent markets, so the originator producer has less market power, but the 
market is still far from perfectly competitive. Reference pricing, price caps are 
among the most common regulatory measures in off - patent markets. However, 
regulation may not always lead to the desired outcome, as this is only one of many 
factors which influence prices and market shares.
Studying pharmaceutical markets may reveal possible weaknesses in 
regulation or competition. Higher levels of efficiency can be reached by identifying 
areas in which there is room for improvement and suggesting interventions which 
can tackle any inefficiency.
Rising health care and pharmaceutical costs and the special nature of 
pharmaceutical markets make the study of competition in pharmaceutical markets a 
compelling subject. The behaviour of firms and the consumption patterns give 
important insights for policy makers to design appropriate policies in order to 
achieve the dual goal of cost containment and efficiency.
In the three studies of this PhD dissertation, I investigate (a) the effect of 
generic entry on prices of originators, (b) the switch in consumption from the off- 
patent branded product to an in-patent product with different chemical substance but 
of the same therapeutic category after generic entry, and (c) competition between 
patented products in the context of parallel trade. The subject of the research is the 
retail market, whereas the in-patient and OTC markets are excluded. The first study 
investigates post-patent competition, the second one investigates the transition at 
patent expiry and the third study investigates in-patent competition.
Figure 1.7 shows the three phases of pharmaceutical markets that are studied 
in this dissertation, considering both in- and off- patent products. These three phases
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determine different levels of competition, which lead to different evolution of prices 
and market shares. The originator product (product A) faces competition from 
parallel trade5 when in- patent. We assume no other competition exist in this phase. 
This is competition from an identical (perfectly homogenous) product, often down to 
the same formulation and dose. In phase 2, medicines of a different chemical 
substance, but within the same therapeutic class and with similar therapeutic effects 
entering the market (product B). These are known as “me -  too” medicines. In this 
phase the manufacturer also faces within- class competition from other originator 
products6. Finally, when product A loses its patent, generic medicines enter the 
market (generics A l, A2, A3). These are of the same chemical substance as product 
A and therefore bioequivalent to it. Products A, A l, A2, A3 are homogenous. 
However, some consumers do not perceive them as homogenous products due to the 
fact that they are produced by different producers. In this phase, the manufacturer 
faces competition from generic alternatives, and is also faced with demand-side 
policies implemented by health insurance, encouraging generic prescribing and 
dispensing.
5 Parallel trade occurs due to the European single market. Significant medicine price differences are 
present across EU countries because of differences in policies targeting medicine prices. Parallel 
trade involves the purchase of medicines by traders in low-price countries, which are then exported 
and sold in high-price countries.
6 In this case there is some differentiation, which often concerns different side effects.
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Figure 1.7 The Three Phases of Competition in Pharmaceutical Markets 
Studied towards Improving Efficiency
Originator A Originator B
In patent Phase 1
In patent Phase 2
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Originator A 
Parallel 
V Import
The first study (generics paradox) shows that prices of originator products 
across several therapeutic classes are likely to increase rather than decrease post 
patent expiry. This indicates that competition does not necessarily lead to lower 
originator prices. As a result, in order to achieve more optimal use of scarce 
resources, the vast majority of consumption should be diverted towards cheaper 
generics.
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Findings from the second study (switching effects post patent expiry) suggest 
that within a particular therapeutic class comprising interchangeable brands, there is 
a switch in consumption from a brand which loses its patent towards other 
medicines within the same therapeutic category which are still in- patent. This 
happens despite supply-side and demand -side generic policies, thus revealing the 
weak enforcement of regulatory practices. Given that in- patent molecules have no 
(cheap) generic alternative, prescribing them instead of the off- patent molecule 
burdens the health budget with unnecessary costs which could have been avoided. 
Optimising consumption can lead to savings which can be used to improve health 
services.
Finally, as parallel trade has been perceived as a source of price cuts via 
enhanced price competition, the third study (on parallel trade) analyses whether 
parallel trade does indeed trigger competition. If not, this practice should not be 
perceived as a cost containment mechanism and other policies should be brought in 
to contain costs. Findings suggest that parallel trade does not promote price 
competition.
1.4 Thesis Studies
The thesis comprises 3 studies on competition and regulation in 
pharmaceutical markets.
• Study 1: “The generics paradox revisited: Evidence from regulated 
markets”
• Study 2: “Switching effects post patent expiry: Empirical evidence from 
the European Union”
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• Study 3: “The im pact of parallel trade on pharm aceutical competition:
A game theoretic approach and empirical evidence from the European 
Union”
34
2. Literature Review and Contribution of the Thesis
2.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses previous research which is relevant to this thesis and 
the contribution of these three studies to the literature. Section 2.2 reviews the 
literature, including how the relevant literature was identified. Literature on different 
aspects of pharmaceutical markets, such as different types of competition and 
regulation, are studied separately. Section 2.3 discusses the importance of the multi­
country aspect of research on pharmaceutical markets. Section 2.4 outlines the 
contribution of the thesis to the literature and includes all areas in which this 
contribution is made. Finally, section 2.5 provides a summary of the three studies.
2.2 Literature Review
This section reviews the literature relevant to the study objectives of this thesis 
in order to determine what has been established by previous research as well as 
identify the gaps in the literature of competition in regulated pharmaceutical markets. 
The literature is also discussed in more detail in each of the relevant studies 
(chapters 4, 5 and 6). In order to identify previous studies on topics analysed and 
discussed in this dissertation, literature searches were performed with the use of 
electronic resources. Searches of keywords and key phrases were conducted. The 
keywords and key phrases included: “pharmaceutical markets”, “pharmaceutical 
regulation”, “pharmaceutical policy”, “pharmaceutical policies United Kingdom”, 
“pharmaceutical policies Germany”, “pharmaceutical policies Sweden”, 
“pharmaceutical policies Netherlands”, “pharmaceutical policies France”,
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“pharmaceutical policies Norway”, “pharmaceutical policies Denmark”, “generics”, 
“generics paradox”, “in-patent competition”, “off-patent competition”, “cross-border 
trade”, “parallel trade”, “parallel imports”, “generic entry”, “competition”, 
“reference pricing”, “advertising”, “enalapril and captopril comparison”, “captopril 
and lisinopril comparison”, “lisinopril and enalapril comparison”, “ACE inhibitor 
substitutability”. Electronic resources included Econlit, PubMed, the LSE Library 
online catalogue and Google Scholar. Finally, standard textbooks in the field of 
Economics, Industrial Organization and Game Theory were used, such as Mas -  
Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), Tirole (1988), Tirole and Fundenberg (1991) 
and Gibbons (1992). In order to conduct the empirical analysis, apart from studies 
published in scientific journals on Econometrics, standard econometrics textbooks 
were also used, such as Greene (2003), Hsiao (2003) and Verbeek (2005).
Section 2.2.1 discusses how the literature shows that pharmaceutical market 
dynamics are different to regular markets. Section 2.2.2 presents relevant literature 
on generic markets and the generics paradox; section 2.2.3 outlines the literature on 
regulation and pricing post patent expiry; section 2.2.4 introduces advertising and 
section 2.2.5 provides the literature on in-patent competition. Section 2.2.6 
introduces the literature on parallel trade.
2.2.1 Competition and Pharmaceutical Markets
Economic Theory suggests that the number of competitors in a market and 
prices are negatively correlated. The implications of that are that oligopoly prices are 
lower than monopoly prices and competitive prices are lower than that of any other 
free market (Mas -  Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995, Tirole 1988). An important 
corollary of the above is that when a second player enters a monopoly market, prices
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will drop. This is not necessarily the case in pharmaceutical markets, possibly due to 
the presence of brand loyalty and low price elasticity (Frank and Salkever 1993 and 
1997), or because competitors compete in terms of quantities rather than prices 
(Kanavos et al. 2007). However, the factors that influence pricing and the prices of 
prescription medicines are complex and have been investigated within the context of 
both pre-patent and post-patent expiry (Kanavos et al. 2008, Frank and Salkever 
1997, Grabowski and Vernon 1992, Kanavos et al 2007). Factors influencing the 
nature of competition in pharmaceutical markets include the effect of patent 
protection and patent expiry, advertising, purchasing by third party payers and price 
or volume regulation.
The existing literature clearly shows that pharmaceutical markets have their 
own dynamics, which differentiate them from other markets. This generates the 
rationale for this dissertation, as competition in ordinary non- price regulated 
markets has been widely covered by the literature. However, this special nature of 
pharmaceutical markets underlines the gap which this thesis will cover.
2.2,2 Generic Markets and the Generics Paradox
Generics are medicines of the same chemical substance as the originator 
product, which are bioequivalent to the originator molecule and enter the market 
post patent expiry. They are identical to the branded product, but are produced by 
other manufacturers. Usually, many generic producers gradually enter the market 
post patent expiry. Their price is lower than that of the originator, but generic price 
levels and the discounts off the medicine vary across countries. Their prices are 
influenced heavily by regulation. In some countries, price cap regulation is used. 
This type of regulation sets a price ceiling for generic products, as a proportion of
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the originator price. Another common policy measure targeting generic prices is 
internal reference pricing or clustering, which sets a maximum ceiling on 
reimbursement, usually by taking into account a price basket of the cheapest 
products (either of the same molecule or the same price, depending on the country). 
Apart from generic pricing regulation, there are also policies encouraging generic 
market penetration, because they lead to savings for health insurance due to their 
relatively low price (compared to originators). Such policies include compulsory 
generic prescribing, generic substitution at the pharmacy level, flat pharmacy fees 
per script, regressive pharmacist margins, physician budgets and clawbacks.
An important potential determinant of pricing of prescription medicines 
relates to the study of market developments post-patent expiry. Empirical evidence 
from the United States suggests that generic entry leads to higher originator prices 
and that a necessary condition for such price increases is that entry leads to a decline 
in the own-price elasticity of reduced-form brand-name demand (Frank and Salkever, 
1997). This is known as the “generics paradox”. Further empirical evidence from the 
USA suggests that innovator firms do not attempt to deter generic entry through 
their pricing strategies and this may lead to a significant reduction in market share of 
the originator medicine post generic entry (CBO 1998; Grabowski and Vernon, 1992; 
Grabowski and Vernon, 1986). Rather, innovator firms have continued to increase 
their prices at the same rate as prior to entry. Rizzo and Zeckhauser (2005) found 
that producers of brand-name products do not decrease prices after generic entry, 
whereas Caves et al (1991) concluded that generic entry only leads to a slow-down 
in the increase of originator medicine prices. Danzon and Chao (2000a) show that 
generic competition lowers prices in less-regulated regimes, while Kanavos et al
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(2008) suggest that regulation in pharmaceutical markets results in prices of generic 
medicines not declining fast enough.
The literature has provided evidence that originator prices do not decrease 
post patent expiry in unregulated markets. This generates the question whether the 
same holds in regulated markets, or does regulation lead to a decrease in originator 
prices. This will be answered by study 1 (the generics paradox) of the dissertation.
2.2.5 Regulatory Environment and Medicine Prices Post Patent Expiry
Supply-side regulation plays a principal role in pharmaceutical markets, at 
least in most EU countries. The goal of regulation is to contain costs, while 
safeguarding access and affordability. Pharmaceutical expenditure is rising, but there 
is still space for more efficient use of resources. For example, generics offer the 
same treatment as originators, but at a lower price, meaning that they are more cost- 
effective. Encouraging consumption of more cost-effective medicines is one aspect 
of regulation. The other aspect is controlling the prices of medicines available. 
Originator prices are determined after negotiating with health insurance or are 
subject to rate of return regulation. Generic prices are heavily regulated by price 
caps or reference pricing. Regulation does not only target prices, but also influences 
market shares. Various policies encouraging generic prescribing and dispensing are 
implemented across Europe, in an effort to encourage generic uptake and contain 
costs.
Recent studies have emphasized the importance of pharmaceutical regulation 
whether on the supply- or the demand-side (Caves et al 1991, Kanavos et al 2008; 
Kanavos et al 2005, Danzon and Chao 2000, Kyle 2007). A significant part of health 
expenditure continues to be allocated to pharmaceuticals while governments have
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been making efforts to contain the rate of growth in pharmaceutical costs. This 
includes policy measures aiming to maintain medicine prices stable, decrease them, 
or contain their rate of increase. Further, on the demand side, interventionist policies 
encourage prescribing and dispensing of more cost-effective medicines.
Some studies suggest that regulation leads to lower prices of medicines, 
while others conclude exactly the opposite. Comparing them and the validity of their 
results is not an easy task due to differences in data and methodologies used. 
However, a brief overview of these studies is included below.
Regulation affecting the off-patent market segment may have an adverse 
effect on generic price reduction and generic market penetration over time. Several 
studies have shown different results concerning the impact of regulation on generic 
medicine prices. One study suggests that countries with strict price regulation have 
lower prices than countries with less strict regulation (Jonsson 1994). However, 
policy interventions do not lead to lower prices in all cases. For example, recent 
findings indicate that the use of price controls has a statistically and quantitatively 
important effect on the extent and timing of the launch of new medicines and that 
price regulation in one country affects entry into other countries, and may affect the 
strategies of domestic firms (Kyle, 2007). Imposing price ceilings in regulated 
markets may even lower prices in other unregulated markets (Mujumdar and Pal, 
2005).
Internal reference pricing, one form of regulation that affects products or 
therapeutic classes characterized by patent expiries, has attracted considerable 
attention in the past fifteen years (Aaserud et al, 2007); in the Swedish context it has 
been shown to lead to a decrease in the market shares of particular originator 
products, suggesting higher levels of competition (Aronsson, Bergman and Rudholm
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(2001)). Grootendorst and Stewart (2006) found that in the case of British Columbia, 
although the cost per day of therapy dispensed declined following the introduction 
of internal reference pricing, part of this reduction could be attributed to factors 
other than reference pricing. However, according to Ioannides-Demos, Ibrahim and 
McNeil (2002), it is difficult to reach safe conclusions about the impact of internal 
reference pricing on expenditure, because these effects are difficult to isolate due to 
the variety of potential factors influencing total pharmaceutical expenditure. Also, 
prices and diffusion of generics differ across countries after patent expiry 
(Magazzini, Pammolli, Riccaboni, 2004), making general conclusions concerning 
the impact of reference pricing on pharmaceutical expenditure difficult to reach.
Some studies have concluded that competition has kept prices low in markets 
with less regulation, particularly in markets with patent-expired molecules. At least 
two studies provide empirical evidence that generic competition is more effective in 
such countries (Kanavos et al, 2008; Danzon and Chao, 2000a). Nevertheless, 
Danzon and Chao (2000a) state that comparing prices of pharmaceutical products 
across countries gives uncertain results due to the differences in products, prices and 
volumes. Based on empirical evidence from Norway, the introduction of a price 
index that aimed in lowering entry barriers actually helped increase the market 
shares of generics and helped trigger price competition by reducing overall market 
power. (Dalen, Strom, Haabeth, 2006). This policy measure may offer consumers 
the alternative of cheaper medicines (generics) and therefore help reduce spending. 
At times, the presence of regulation, for instance in the form of a price index used in 
price setting, may indeed skew the market, leading to different effects than in the 
absence of regulation.
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Overall, evidence from the literature is inconclusive on the impact of 
regulatory measures on medicine prices. This creates space for a study that combines 
the joint effect of regulation and generic entry on medicine prices.
2.2.4 The Effect o f  Advertising
Advertising is used by producers as a means of promoting the benefits of 
products, ultimately resulting in increased sales or market share. Apart from 
informing consumers, it also lowers price elasticity and creates product 
differentiations which would not have been perceived as such by consumers in its 
absence (Tirole 1988). Consequently, this degree of (perceived) product 
differentiation makes consumers more reluctant to purchasing another product.
Advertising and advertising intensity also influence the choice of 
pharmaceutical products in an environment of product differentiation pre-patent 
expiry, where products are considered to be broadly comparable or direct substitutes. 
Direct-to-consumer advertising is not permitted in the European Union (while it is 
common in the United States). Therefore advertising targets the agent (physician) 
rather than the patient. Empirical evidence suggests that advertising, by means of 
detailing, has a powerful effect and systematically lowers price sensitivity because it 
increases brand loyalty, in addition to the effect of increasing a product’s sales 
(Rizzo, 1999), as well as having spillover effects, such that advertising by one firm 
in a therapeutic category can increase demand for other medicines in the same 
category (Bemdt el al, 1995). Empirical evidence from detailing (sales 
representatives’ visits to physicians) suggests that total promotion effects on 
medicine utilization are positive and that promotion of new medicines leads to an
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increase in their market share, which is also negatively affected by promotion of old 
medicines (Bemdt, Danzon and Kruse, 2007).
Brand loyalty is expressed in pharmaceutical markets as avoiding to switch 
to generic substitutes when a product loses its patent and to continue consuming the 
branded product, despite its higher price. Patients or physicians (who act as patients’ 
agents) are often reluctant to switch to a generic substitute, despite the therapeutic 
equivalence. This, combined with regulation, triggers market dynamics which lead 
to surprising results in the pharmaceutical market, such as the “generics paradox”, a 
phenomenon which suggests that generic entry (hence more competition) leads to 
higher originator prices. This is discussed in the first study of the dissertation, “The 
generics paradox revisited: Empirical evidence from regulated markets”. Brand 
loyalty is a substantial asset for producers (Cunningham 1956). Brand loyalty varies 
across consumers, but is often present even if there is no difference between 
products apart from their brand (Tucker 1964). Higher brand trust leads to positive 
outcomes for producers, such as market shares (Chaudhuri and Holbrook 2001). In 
pharmaceutical markets, physicians may become brand loyal as a result of 
prescribing a particular brand only while the product is in- patent (Grabowski and 
Vernon 1992). The authors find that branded product producers do not try to deter 
generic entry through pricing strategies.
As promotional expenditure accounts for a significant part of the total 
pharmaceutical industry expenditure (US$12 billion were spent on promotional 
activities in 2006 according to the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America based on an IMS study, while R&D spending in 2007 was US $ 58.8 billion 
(PhRMA 2008), it appears to be a very important contributor to market dynamics.
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Nevertheless, figures on promotional expenditure by the pharmaceutical industry 
have been disputed by Gagnon and Lexchin (2008).
The existing literature on advertising indicates that, for the case of medicines 
of the same therapeutic class (which are considered to be subject to some degree of 
substitutability), a decrease in advertising efforts by one of the competitors will 
affect market shares. This is the idea upon which the second study (switching effects 
post patent expiry) is based.
2.2.5 Competition in In- Patent Markets
In the context of this dissertation, branded medicines are innovative 
medicines which are patent protected. The main cost for the producer of innovative 
medicines is R&D costs. The per- unit cost of production is relatively small. In order 
to protect the value of innovation and to encourage future research, innovative 
products are patent protected.
Medicines are grouped in therapeutic classes, e.g. simvastatin, atorvastatin 
and pravastatin all belong to the “statins” class. The first entrant in the therapeutic 
class establishes the class, and other manufacturers usually follow with similar but 
not identical molecules. Grouping is important, as it indicates medicines with some 
level of substitutability. Further, a practice leading to savings is reference pricing at 
the class level (rather than the molecule level), which forces branded off-patent 
products to face competition from generics of another molecule but of the same class. 
Therapeutic classes discussed in this thesis are statins, ACE I, ACE II inhibitors, 
proton pump inhibitors, antidepressants and antipsychotics.
Competition in pharmaceutical markets may involve two different branded 
products of the same therapeutic class, a branded product versus its generic
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alternatives, or generics versus generics. In the first case, products are differentiated, 
while in the two latter cases the product is homogenous, as it is of the same chemical 
substance. However, in the branded versus generics case, the product may be 
perceived as differentiated by some consumers. Therefore competition is different in 
in-patent and off-patent markets, as in the first case the product is differentiated and 
both products are branded, while in the second case there is no differentiation, but 
not all products are branded.
Little empirical evidence exists on competition between products of the same 
therapeutic category. A study on competition between statins in France, UK, 
Germany and the Netherlands showed that price competition is present and has an 
impact on the first three entrants (Kanavos, Costa-Font and McGuire (2007). 
Danzon and Chao (2000) found no evidence of price competition within therapeutic 
class in the US, but small negative effect on originator prices in France, Italy, 
Germany and the UK. In another study, the same authors got inconclusive results 
about the effect of substitution across therapeutic class and the first-mover 
advantages on product price. In the case of cephalosporins7, Ellison et al (1997) 
found significant cross-price elasticities between therapeutic substitutes. In order to 
study competition between different medicines of the same therapeutic class, there 
has to be evidence that there is a high degree of substitutability between them as, by 
grouping medicines in the same therapeutic class, it is recognised that there is at 
least some substitutability. Clinical evidence can be used for this purpose, which can 
compare molecules to see whether they have similar effects on patients. For example, 
in the case of ACE I Inhibitors, numerous studies support the view that there is very 
high substitutability across products in this therapeutic class (Vlasses et al. 1986,
7 Cephalosporins are antibiotics meant for the treatment of bacteria infections.
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Rumboldt et al. 1988, Foy et al. 1994, Zannad et al. 1992, Dews et al. 1989, Enstrom 
et al. 1992, Rumboldt et al. 1993, Morisco et al. 1997).
Research on different aspects of competition (price volume etc) between 
branded medicines is limited. However, there is evidence that competition is present 
between medicines of the same therapeutic category. Clinical evidence also provides 
support in favour of the view that ACE I Inhibitors demonstrate similar effectiveness 
in the treatment of hypertension. These findings provide the framework for the 
second study (switching post patent expiry), as this study analyses competition 
between branded products and how this evolves after one of the products faces 
patent expiry.
2.2.6 Parallel Trade
Significant differences occur in prices of medicines across Europe. This is 
mostly a result of different supply-side regulatory practices. Usually prices tend to 
be higher in northern European countries compared to southern European countries, 
although this is also dependent on other aspects such as exchange rates and demand- 
side regulation on addition to supply-side regulation.. Given the presence of a Single 
Market allowing free trading of goods, arbitrage opportunities occur. This is known 
as Parallel Trade (PT), Parallel Imports (PI) or as Cross- Border Trade (CBT). 
Parallel trade is a legal practice and the European Court of Justice has ruled on many 
occasions on different aspects of parallel trade over the past 20 years.
The product is perfectly homogenous, as the parallel traded product and the 
locally sourced product are marketed by the very same pharmaceutical firm 
(packaging may differ on many occasions). The parallel trader is subject to 
transportation costs, but realises a rent due to the difference in prices between the
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acquisition and selling country. Parallel traders buy products in the low- price 
country and sell it in the high- priced EU country. This leads to lower profits for the 
manufacturer, as for him this practice is equivalent to selling the product in the 
highly- priced market at the price of the low- price market. Hence, parallel trade 
lowers the net present value of innovation, as it decreases the expected future flows 
of an innovative pharmaceutical product and makes investing in R&D less profitable. 
Policy makers in importing countries often perceive parallel trade as a means for 
cost containment and implement policies in order to encourage this practice because 
they believe that they can capitalise on the lower prices of exporting countries.
Previous studies on Parallel Trade have reached different conclusions on the 
impact of this practice on competition and prices. Evidence from Sweden suggests 
that parallel trade triggered competition, leading to lower prices (Ganslandt and 
Maskus 2004), but other studies associate competition with generic entry rather than 
parallel trade (Kanavos and Costa-Font 2005, Linnosmaa et al. 2003). A study 
taking into account dynamic effects does not find any evidence on downward 
convergence of prices of locally sourced medicines (Kanavos and Vandoros 2010).
Evidence exists that PT would lead to welfare losses in the long run, due to 
its effects on innovation (Bordoy and Jelovac 2003; Danzon 1998; Ganslandt and 
Maskus 2004; Rey 2003; Szymanksi and Valletti 2005), suggesting that parallel 
trade is a “threat” to innovation.
Although some studies have examined the potential savings to health 
systems from parallel trade (West and Mahon 2003; Kanavos and Costa-Font 2005; 
Enemark et al. 2006), little evidence is available on the presence or not of a price 
gap between originator and parallel imported prices in destination countries. 
Furthermore, very limited evidence exists on whether locally-sourced originator
47
prices decrease as a result of parallel trade and no evidence exists on the impact of 
policies targeting parallel trade on market dynamics.
Previous research on parallel trade has shown the effect of cross-country 
price difference and competition in the supply chain on parallel trade prices. Also, 
some limited evidence (for particular countries only) exists on whether competition 
is triggered in branded markets as a result of parallel trade. A holistic approach to 
addressing the competition effects of parallel trade on medicine prices is missing. 
This gap provides the ground for a game theoretic approach indicating the 
predictions of theory for how prices would evolve as a result of parallel trade. This 
theoretical approach can be supported by empirical evidence from the main parallel 
importing European markets, showing whether there is a price gap between locally 
sourced and parallel traded products, and whether prices of locally sourced products 
decrease as a result of parallel trade.
2.2.7 Summary o f  gaps in the literature
In summary, the existing literature of competition in pharmaceutical markets 
has a number of gaps, which this thesis addresses. It is not known how originator 
prices evolve post patent expiry when originator products face generic competition. 
This is also important from a policy perspective, as rising originator prices suggest 
that genericization should take place as swiftly as possible post patent expiry.
Further, a switch in consumption from a product which has lost its patent to 
other products of the same therapeutic class has not been explored at all. From a 
policy perspective, such a switch in consumption shows that generic policies are not 
always sufficient as there are ways for producers to increase originator market 
shares even post patent expiry.
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Finally, there is no complete approach to the effects of parallel trade on 
competition and originator prices in the literature. Also, the effect of policies 
targeting parallel trade has not been addressed in the literature. One way forward is 
a game theoretic model with findings supported by empirical evidence, showing 
whether there is a price gap between locally sourced and parallel traded products and 
whether the price of the locally sourced product remains unaffected by parallel trade. 
The policy implications are clear, so as parallel trade does not trigger competition, it 
should not be viewed as a cost -  containment mechanism by regulators, who should 
focus on other means to control costs.
2.3 The need for a multi-country analysis: Cross country comparisons
For the purpose of the PhD data from seven different European countries are 
used, namely Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom. The reason why different countries are considered is that 
prices vary significantly across Europe as a result of different pricing and other 
regulatory policies. A comparative analysis is necessary in order to demonstrate the 
different dimensions of pricing and competition in pharmaceutical markets. Klein 
(1991) underlines the importance of a comparative cross -  country analysis. Putting 
health care in an international context is an “antidote to the dangers of ethnocentric 
overexplanation” and the only way to identify what is important for a country is to 
compare it to other countries (Klein 1991).
Cross country variations in the prices of prescription medicines are of great 
importance, hence the attention this issue has attracted recently in the literature 
surrounding pharmaceutical markets (Danzon and Furukawa, 2003; Danzon and 
Towse, 2003; Danzon and Chao, 2002). Recent research has examined regulatory
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practices, such as price controls and patent policy affecting launch dates of new 
pharmaceuticals among developed countries (Danzon et al, 2005; Kyle, 2007; 
Danzon and Furukawa, 2003; Desiraju et al, 2004) and developing countries 
(Lanjouw, 2005) and their overall effect. Kanavos and Vandoros (2010) also find 
significant pharmaceutical price differences across OECD countries.
This evidence on cross-country variability demonstrates the differences in 
pharmaceutical markets across countries. Such differences underline the importance 
of the consideration of various countries in the analysis, instead of limiting research 
to one country. Therefore, for the purpose of this PhD dissertation, a number of 
European countries have been included in the analysis. This becomes even more 
important as little evidence exists on the determinants of pharmaceutical prices 
across different regulatory settings. The existing literature does not fully explore the 
effect that factors, such as competition pre- and post-patent expiry, the type of price 
regulation, the age of product, and the type of cross-country price differences, put 
together might have on cross-country price differences in prescription medicines.
2.4 Understanding Pharmaceutical Markets
The over-arching theme of this PhD is an investigation of the determinants of 
prices of branded prescription medicines across different regulatory settings and 
health care systems, taking into account the patent status, market dynamics and the 
regulatory context in which they diffuse. In order to do this, price levels are 
analyzed for a basket of prescription medicines and their differences are investigated 
in a number of European countries; in addition, the impact of generic entry on public 
prices is studied, and the extent to which innovation, by means of introducing newer
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classes of medicines, contributes to price formation across countries is explored. In 
pursuing this analysis, we also understand the factors that contribute to the existing 
differences in (retail) prices of prescription medicines across countries.
2.4.1 The three aspects o f  competition
Three different aspects of competition in pharmaceutical markets are 
analyzed in this dissertation. Forms of competition discussed originate from: first, 
generic entry post-patent expiry of the originator; second, medicine intra-class 
competition; and, third, competition from parallel imported versions of originator 
products.
Competition between the originator (branded) medicine and its generic 
substitutes post patent expiry is expected to be the main source of price reductions, 
according to Economic Theory. Economic Theory would suggest that generic 
market entry would transform a monopoly market into an oligopoly, or a type of 
market that could resemble perfect competition, at least with regards to the number 
of producers, given the homogenous nature of the product (as the originator and 
generics are of the same chemical substance). The important feature here is that of 
brand loyalty, which may lead to outcomes other than expected, i.e. an increase in 
originator prices when the number of competitors increases.
Findings on the impact of generic entry on the prices of originator products 
would indicate whether originators compete against generics in terms of price. If not, 
no savings should be expected by dispensing originators post patent expiry due to 
possible competition effects on originator prices, and the only way for health 
insurance to benefit from patent expiry is generic dispensing.
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Another aspect of competition analyzed in this thesis is competition within a 
therapeutic class. Products which belong to the same therapeutic class are different 
molecules, but are similar, and target the same disease. Due to a certain degree of 
substitutability, it is reasonable to assume that there is within-class competition 
present. When a product goes off-patent, its producer loses a large part of the market 
and gains significantly lower profits. Further, any advertising efforts have a spillover 
effect on generic products. Thus, the producer limits his advertising and promotion 
efforts for this product and focuses on other products from in its portfolio, which are 
still patent protected. This could be observed by a switch in consumption from a 
product which faces generic entry towards other products of the same class which 
are still in- patent.
Finally, parallel trade could influence pricing dynamics in branded medicine 
markets. Parallel traded products may act as a competitor for the manufacturer of 
these products. In order for competition to be triggered, two things need to occur. 
The parallel trader must set the price at a lower level than that of the locally sourced 
product and the manufacturer must have an incentive to lower his price in response 
to it. Alternatively, list price is the same and the competition game is played at the 
discount-to-final-distributor level. It is not certain how markets with parallel trade 
evolve, although this is a very important aspect, given the possible savings which 
may occur, the impact on prices and the effects on innovation.
2.4.2 Efficiency and optimal resource allocation
Lessons learnt from research on pharmaceutical competition and regulation 
can lead to efficiency savings and optimal resource allocation by health insurance. 
The particular nature of these savings would improve social welfare, but would not
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make every agent in an economy better off, while some (particularly producers) end 
up being worse off For example, more competition in the generic market and a 
lower price of generics makes generic producers forego rents, although it leads to 
relatively high savings and higher levels of welfare for patients. Enhancing 
competition between interchangeable medicines of the same therapeutic class will 
lead to higher savings and a space for allocation of resources to more health inputs, 
but will decrease any higher rents that are captured by the industry due to the 
monopoly that the patent grants. Finally, reducing parallel trade may lead to the loss 
of some savings, but will increase the present value of resources invested in R&D 
and, therefore, will encourage the development of new medicines; parallel traders 
will be made worse off.
Implementing the policy recommendations would help distribute resources in 
a more equitable and efficient way and would remove some inefficiencies that 
monopolies, imperfect competition or information asymmetry create. Nevertheless, 
there are no improvements in terms of Pareto efficiency, as in order to achieve 
further savings, a party (a provider in particular), has to become worse off.
2.5 The Contribution of this PhD Thesis
This PhD thesis studies the determinants of prices of branded prescription 
medicines across different regulatory settings and health care systems, taking into 
account the patent status, market dynamics and the regulatory context in which they 
diffuse.
By studying and understanding how the pharmaceutical market works, the 
source of price increases or price cuts can be identified, as well as how demand is 
allocated to different competitors. The different regulatory measures, market
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structures due to patent protection and third- party payers make the investigation of 
these markets more complicated than regular markets, and findings that hold for 
regular markets do not necessarily hold for pharmaceuticals.
Given the rise in health costs and pharmaceutical expenditure, studying the 
industrial organization of pharmaceutical markets is of great importance. Industrial 
Organization is the sub-discipline of Economics which studies the economics of 
markets. The core of Industrial Organization is competition, and the evolution of 
prices and market shares. The number of providers is crucial to the outcome of a 
market. Theory studies the predictions of Empirical Industrial Organization, 
empirically tests the predictions of theory and provides empirical evidence on how 
prices and market shares evolve under various competition environments. 
Theoretical and empirical findings are the result of the behaviour of rational agents, 
which include providers and consumers. Industrial Organization is of great 
importance for pharmaceutical markets. Findings suggest how prices and market 
shares evolve as a result of the degree of competition and regulation. This leads to 
valuable policy recommendations.
Based on the above, this thesis studies three areas of competition in 
pharmaceutical markets and advances the literature in a number of ways. All three 
studies provide answers to policy-related topics which have not been studied before 
in a particular context. Conclusions are met with regards to whether particular types 
of competition exist in pharmaceutical markets, and also how policy makers can 
respond to pharmaceutical market agents’ behaviour, in order to contain costs and 
spend scarce resources more efficiently.
The contribution of the thesis is both empirical and theoretical. This 
contribution is discussed in the next two sections.
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2.5.1 The theoretical contribution
In general, theoretical models are used to predict the outcomes of a situation 
in a market and empirical data are used to test the hypothesis. Further, the 
comparative element of research in pharmaceutical markets is also very important, 
as this allows to compare health systems and policies across countries and identify 
towards which directions various policies lead.
With regards to study 1 (the generics paradox in regulated markets), the 
theoretical contribution is a framework which captures the likely effects of brand 
loyalty on prices. The model includes two players, an originator producer and a 
generic manufacturer. Patients demonstrate different levels of brand loyalty (which 
is expressed as an aversion to generics), depending on which they are willing to pay 
a different price for the branded product rather than the generic. The more brand 
loyal a patient is, the higher the price he is willing to pay for the branded product. 
This leads to a price gap in the market, and the originator product is priced at a 
higher level than the generic. This shows how brand loyalty works and how, despite 
the fact that the product is homogenous, some consumers are willing to pay a higher 
price for a perceived product differentiation, which is nothing more than the brand 
name itself.
With regards to study 2 (switching post patent expiry), the theoretical 
contribution is a theoretical mathematical framework showing how promoting 
efforts drop post patent expiry, triggering this switch in consumption. The 
theoretical model shows the returns of advertising for an originator medicine 
manufacturer, before and after patent expiry. Before patent expiry the returns for 
each monetary unit invested in advertising are larger than post patent expiry, due to 
the lack of generic competitors, and any spill-over effects towards them.
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Consequently, the manufacturer gains larger returns from funds invested in products 
which are still patent protected. Therefore he decreases efforts in the off-patent 
market. This gives the opportunity to other branded competitors of other products of 
the same therapeutic class to step in and attract part of the consumption of that 
particular molecule, both branded and generic. Thus the predictions of theory 
suggest that the switching behaviour may indeed take place as a result of less 
advertising.
With regards to study 3 (the effects of parallel trade on pharmaceutical 
competition), the theoretical contribution is the introduction of game theory in 
pharmaceutical market research. Although game theory is a common 
methodological tool in industrial organization, it had not been used to predict the 
outcomes of competition in the pharmaceutical market. This is a significant gap, 
given that game theory is a very important methodology when studying competition 
due to the close interdependency of all parties involved. This tool has surprisingly 
not been used in this field, and previous studies have used only empirical methods 
and conceptual frameworks, but not game theory, which is one of the main tools to 
pursue research on competition, known as industrial organization in the economics 
literature. The move of one competitor influences the behaviour of other 
competitors when there is at least some market power. In perfectly competitive 
markets this is not the case, but in pharmaceutical markets all producers usually 
have some degree of market power, and in in- patent markets market power is strong 
due to limited sources of competition. This interaction makes game theory a 
necessary tool in many cases. The study on parallel trade uses game theory to show 
that prices of locally sourced products do not respond to competition originating 
from parallel trade with price reductions. Prices remain constant and the parallel
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traders have the incentive to price their products at the same price as the locally 
sourced product. The game that is included in the analysis shows that this is a 
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. These predictions provide the results of the 
theoretical analysis and set the grounds for the empirical analysis.
2.5.2 The empirical contribution
The thesis makes an important empirical contribution for each of the 3 areas 
of pharmaceutical competition undertaken.
With regards to study 1 (the generics paradox in regulated markets), 
industrial organization theory suggests that as the number of competitors increases, 
prices decline (Mas - Collel, Whinston and Green 1995, Tirole 1988). Frank and 
Salkever (1997) suggested that in the pharmaceutical market prices of originators 
may increase post-generic entry, rather than decrease. While this is a finding from 
the US market which does not regulate prices, there is no evidence as to whether this 
holds in markets that do regulate prices of pharmaceutical products. Study 1 studies 
this aspect of competition in regulated markets, by drawing on data from six 
European countries (Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, Norway and the 
United Kingdom). Pharmaceutical market regulation gives policy makers the 
flexibility to intervene in order to correct any dynamics leading to an increase in 
costs, or withdraw any policies which contribute to increased expenditure. In this 
context, the first study on the generics paradox in regulated markets provides an 
answer to the question of whether branded product prices respond to generic entry in 
regulated markets. Econometrics control for important regulatory measures. Results 
suggest that the generics paradox is indeed present in regulated pharmaceutical 
markets, as originator prices increase post patent expiry. In the country specific
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regressions, findings show that originator prices increase in Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. Generic entry has no effect on originator prices in 
Denmark, while there appears to be a decrease in prices in Germany. This is the core 
of the empirical contribution, as the generics paradox had not been studied in 
regulated markets. The findings provide valuable information to policy makers. It is 
shown that unless generic uptake takes place, no savings occur for health insurance 
post patent expiry.
With regards to study 2 (switching post patent expiry), little is known about 
within- therapeutic class competition between medicines. Patented markets have not 
attracted much attention and the literature is limited to competition among in-patent 
statins (Kanavos, Costa-Font McGuire 2007) and cephalosporins (Ellison et al. 
1997). Furthermore, the effect of patent expiry on the market shares of the molecules 
of the therapeutic class was unknown. Study 2 contributes to the literature by 
exploring within- class competition of ACE I inhibitors, focusing on the effect of 
generic entry on relative volumes of the off- patent molecule and the in- patent 
molecules and whether there is a switch in consumption towards other products of 
the same therapeutic class. In addition, data were used for a long time period (1991- 
2006, on a quarterly basis), which allow for an in-depth exploration of the topic. 
Such long datasets (in terms of time) have seldom been used in research on 
pharmaceutical competition. Findings suggest that there is indeed a switch in 
consumption from a product which goes off- patent towards other products of the 
same therapeutic category in the case of ace inhibitors. This switch in consumption 
may burden health insurance with increased costs of dispensing branded products 
with no generic alternatives rather than off- patent molecules with generic 
substitutes with which, in the presence of generic prescribing and substitution
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policies, lower costs would occur. As the findings show that health insurance is 
burdened by this switch, policy implications are included, as well as suggestions 
about what regulatory measures can be implemented in order to address this problem.
With regards to study 3 (the effects of parallel trade on pharmaceutical 
competition), the predictions of the game theoretic approach are confirmed by the 
combination of the descriptive statistics and econometric analysis. This study does 
not only look at whether there is price convergence between locally sourced and 
parallel traded products but also, if any, it is upward or downward. This is why this 
combination of methods provides a complete view of the effects of parallel trade on 
pharmaceutical markets. For example, in the case of the absence of policy measures 
promoting parallel trade, the game theoretic approach predicts that there will be 
upward price convergence; descriptive statistics show that in practice there is 
convergence and the econometric analysis confirms that the convergence is upward. 
Further, this study provides information on the legal aspects surrounding parallel 
trade and the rulings of the European Court of Justice on this important issue. 
Findings give rise to crucial policy implications. Parallel trade does not trigger 
competition in any case. Also, it should not be considered as a cost containment 
mechanism as in many cases prices are the same as that of the locally sourced 
product, which does not deviate from its initial price in the presence of parallel trade. 
Any savings that occur have been proved to be very small compared to the threat it 
poses to R&D. Consequently, parallel trade should not be considered as a means to 
cost containment and authorities should seek to contain costs by generic uptake, 
efficient prescribing and health technology assessment rather than parallel trade.
However, the great contribution of this study is that parallel trade has never 
been studied in a multi-dimensional way. The combination of game theory,
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descriptive statistics and econometrics provide a solid insight and concrete evidence 
of market dynamics in the presence of parallel trade. Parallel trade is an important 
issue as it undermines R&D, but it has been perceived as a means for cost- 
containment by regulators. Previous studies on this issue were mostly empirical and 
no solid theoretical approach existed on the predicted evolution of prices of 
medicines. By using a game theoretical approach the basis for a concrete industrial 
organization analysis of the market is set. Insight is given into why prices evolve the 
way they evolve and what aspects of the market trigger competition or not. Without 
this game theoretical approach questions would remain with regards to why prices of 
locally sourced products do not respond to competition from parallel traders.
2.5,3 Summary o f  the contribution o f  this PhD dissertation
In summary, this thesis contributes to the literature: first, by studying aspects 
of the pharmaceutical market that had not been studied or not studied adequately 
before; second, by introducing a game theoretical perspective in the analysis of 
pharmaceutical markets (in particular for study 3); and third, by providing a 
multidimensional analysis of competition and regulatory issues of the 
pharmaceutical market, in which a combination of theoretical and empirical methods 
are used in order to provide a better understanding of competition and regulation. 
All findings are followed by implications for stakeholders and recommendations for 
policy makers.
The policy recommendations arising from the research conducted in this 
thesis relate to improvements in efficiency and resource allocation. This thesis 
shows that there are inefficiencies arising from poor genericisation, or from 
switching towards more expensive products, or from ill-targeting of competition.
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Savings achieved by the dispensing of generics rather than originators or by 
enhancing within class competition can fund the reimbursement of in- patent 
medicines which are not covered due to high costs and the relative scarcity of 
resources.
2.6 Summary of the three studies in this PhD dissertation
2.6.1 The generics paradox revisited: empirical evidence from  regulated markets
This study examines the impact of generic entry on originator prices and, in 
particular, aims is to investigate whether the “generics paradox” holds in regulated 
markets. A previous study has shown that this paradox does hold in the relatively 
unregulated U.S. pharmaceutical market.
Following an extensive literature review of regulation and competition in 
pharmaceutical markets, a conceptual framework is developed in order to 
demonstrate how brand loyalty may lead to higher prices even in markets subjected 
to some regulation. Brand loyalty and price elasticity are discussed and indicate that 
a paradox may indeed hold in pharmaceutical markets: Increased competition, 
expressed via generic entry, does not always lead to lower originator prices. As 
generics enter the market, most consumers switch to generics and only the most 
price- inelastic patients continue to consume the branded product. Given that these 
consumers are inelastic to changes in prices, an increase in the price on behalf of the 
branded producer will lead to an increase in his profits. Regulation encourages 
generic market penetration and may lead to even lower generic prices, hence leaving 
only the even more price- inelastic consumers to stick to the branded product.
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Therefore it is reasonable to expect that the “generics paradox” does hold in 
regulated markets.
For the econometric analysis, prices, market share and regulation data are 
used from Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. The results of the instrumental variable panel data econometric analysis 
show that, overall, there is an increase in originator prices post generic entry, which, 
in principle, is counter-intuitive because of the regulation in most of these countries. 
At individual country level, the generics paradox appears to be present in Germany, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. However, in some 
countries it is expressed through a one-off effect, while in other countries it takes 
some time to materialise, and takes place gradually with generic market penetration. 
This finding provides valuable policy implications, as it indicates that generic entry 
does not trigger price competition between the originator and generics. Thus savings 
do not occur from the dispensing of originator products. Generic uptake must be 
swift in order for patent expiry to lead to savings for health insurance.
2.6.2 Switching effects post patent expiry
Little evidence exists on whether there is competition across medicines 
within the same therapeutic class. This study examines a possible switching in the 
consumption of a medicine when it loses its patent towards other medicines of the 
same therapeutic class.
A conceptual framework is developed, showing that the producer of a 
medicine which goes off- patent has the incentive to reduce his advertising and 
promotional efforts for the particular medicine and focus on other medicines which 
are still patented, leaving space for other medicines of the same class to attract part
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of the total market share of the particular molecule (including both originator and 
generic volume).
The study draws upon the use of ACE inhibitors in six European countries, 
notably Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. An econometric model is set up in order to determine whether patent 
expiry affects the volume of the product which goes off patent, as well as the 
volume of the other medicines of the same class which remain in- patent. Volume of 
the product which goes off patent, volume of all other products of the therapeutic 
class which remain in- patent and the ratio of volumes are used as dependent 
variables in the three different models which are estimated. Explanatory variables 
include generic entry, regulatory variables and time dummies.
Results indicate a switch in consumption when a medicine goes off patent in 
Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. No evidence exists that 
this holds in Germany or Sweden. The consumption is diverted to other medicines of 
the same therapeutic class, as there is sufficient substitutability. This practice 
increases pharmaceutical spending. Policy makers can face this by making the off- 
patent molecule first- line treatment or introducing reference pricing at the class 
level, rather than the molecule level.
2.6.3 Does parallel trade trigger competition? A game theoretic approach and
empirical evidence from  the European Union
This study analyses the market dynamics of parallel trade and examines 
whether it triggers competition in pharmaceutical markets. Parallel trade is a legal 
practice that takes place in the European Union due to significant differences in 
medicine prices across EU countries. These differences occur due to different
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regulatory measures and create arbitrage opportunities. Governments in importing 
countries have perceived parallel trade as a cost- containment mechanism, hence 
providing explicit or implicit incentives for parallel trade. As parallel trade is a 
threat to R&D of future medicines, this study investigates whether this practice 
triggers competition, leading to lower prices of the locally sourced product.
The study provides insight into the behaviour of rational agents by using a 
game theoretic approach. The Perfect Sub Game Nash Equilibrium of the game is 
that the price of the locally sourced product does not respond to parallel trade. In 
other words, parallel trade does not trigger competition. In the absence of policies 
promoting parallel trade, the parallel trader will price his product at the same level as 
the locally sourced product. Some policy measures though may force the price of the 
parallel imported product to deviate downwards from the locally sourced product.
Further, empirical data are used from the main parallel importing countries 
(Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom) over years 2003- 
2006 in order to see whether there is a difference in prices of locally sourced 
medicines and the corresponding parallel traded products, and whether the price of 
the locally sourced product is pushed downwards by parallel trade competition or 
not.
The descriptive analysis shows that in the absence of policies promoting 
parallel trade (United Kingdom) there is no difference between prices of the locally 
sourced products and parallel traded products. The presence of policies though may 
cause larger (the Netherlands, Sweden) or smaller (Germany) spreads in prices. 
Price differences also occur when the product is off patent and parallel traders 
choose to compete against generics.
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Finally, an instrumental variable panel data econometric model is used to 
estimate the effects of parallel trade on prices of locally sourced medicines. The 
results show that there is no downward price convergence and that prices of locally 
sourced medicines remain unaffected by parallel trade.
Findings show that no indirect savings occur through parallel trade due to 
any competition effects, as prices of locally sourced medicines do not drop. 
Regarding parallel imported products, in the absence of regulation targeting parallel 
trade (United Kingdom), there is no price difference between locally sourced and 
parallel traded products. When such regulation is present, parallel traded product 
prices may be lower than locally sourced ones, leading to direct savings for health 
insurance. Given the fact that parallel trade is a threat to R&D, policy makers should 
be careful when choosing to encourage parallel trade as a means to cost containment.
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3. Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
In order to pursue the analysis data from the Intercontinental Medical 
Statistics (IMS) pharmaceutical sales database was used. The accuracy of the data 
ranges between 98 and 99% (IMS, 2002). Collected and reported data are based on 
actual invoiced prices and sales. Within the European context, list prices of 
prescription medicines are actually reimbursed by health insurance. The sample of 
countries and molecules are carefully selected for each study, depending on the 
research question, as outlined below.
The European countries included in the studies are chosen in order to reflect 
the different regulatory environments. Various national policies are implemented 
both on the supply and the demand side in order to regulate pharmaceutical 
expenditure, and this is partly reflected on prices, hence the cross-country price 
differences. The United Kingdom has a relatively free pricing type of market 
environment, subject to limitations, such as profit controls (PPRS) and value-based 
pricing for in-patent products, whilst generic pricing is free. Germany, Denmark, the 
Netherlands and France apply a variety of policies on in-patent products, ranging 
from free pricing (Germany) to value-based pricing (the Netherlands). Different 
variations of reference pricing for off-patent products are applied in Germany, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and France, while Norway and Sweden abolished 
reference pricing in 2001 and 2002, respectively. In France the price of a generic is 
by regulation at least 30-40% lower than the price of the corresponding originator. 
Regulation differs across countries included in the sample with regards to value-
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based pricing and health technology assessment, generic substitution policies, 
clawback policies as well as funding of the health system, among others. In addition, 
there are policy changes within countries during the period studied, which would 
also allow to control for changes in the same market.
Data for study 1 (generics paradox in regulated markets) were obtained for 
the 1997-2002 period on a quarterly basis for 12 medicines from four product 
categories: Plain ACE inhibitors (Captopril, Enalapril, Quinapril, Ramipril); atypical 
anti-psychotics (Clozapine); proton pump inhibitors (PPIs) (Lansoprazole, 
Omeprazole, Pantoprazole); and serotonin selective reuptake inhibitors8 (SSRIs) 
(Citalopram Fluoxetine, Paroxetine, Sertraline) in six European countries (Germany, 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Denmark) for the retail 
(pharmacy) market in each country.
The sample of medicines studied includes leading selling prescription 
medicines for conditions with high prevalence which, therefore, have an impact on 
total pharmaceutical spending. The time period studied is a period during which 
certain products of every therapeutic class included in the analysis lost their patent 
protection and faced generic entry. In addition, some of the medicines included were 
patent protected throughout the period examined, allowing to control for differences 
between medicines which lost their patent and medicines which were patent 
protected for the whole period studied. Data were available for originator and 
generic versions of each molecule. Generics are present in the market for at least one 
medicine in each therapeutic category in at least one country in the sample in the 
time period considered for the analysis.
8 A class of products used for the treatment of depression.
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For study 2 (switching behaviour post patent expiry), data are quarterly and 
cover period 1991-2006 for 14 Plain ACE inhibitors (Captopril, Enalapril, Lisinopril, 
Quinapril, Ramipril, Trandalopril, Periodinopril, Moexipril, Fisinopril, Benazepril, 
Cilazapril, Zofenopril, Imidrapril, Spriapril), in six European countries (Germany, 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, France, Denmark) for the retail 
(pharmacy) market in each country. Both originator and generic versions of each 
molecule were used. Plain ACE Inhibitors were chosen because they are a common 
treatment for hypertension (NICE hypertension guidelines 2006, HAS hypertension 
clinical practice guidelines 2005), which is a highly prevalent condition in 
developed countries (Kearny et al 2005). Further, there is a certain degree of 
substitutability between different Plain ACE Inhibitors, which indicates that 
competition across medicines in this therapeutic class is indeed possible, as various 
studies suggest that ACE inhibitors have similar antihypertensive effects and 
mechanisms (Vlasses et al 1986, Salvetti 1990). This study could not have included 
medicines which are not proven to have some degree of substitutability, as 
competition would not be present.
The study period is long enough to capture the market dynamics from an 
early stage of ACE inhibitors’ introduction in the market, until very recently, with 
14 competitors in this therapeutic class. This would allow the entire range of market 
dynamics to be studied, including the evolution of volume in the presence or not of 
generic competitors for the three first market entrants.
The data used in study 3 (the impact of parallel trade on pharmaceutical 
competition) concerned the retail market in four countries (notably Germany, 
Sweden, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), which faced parallel trade and 
whose price level for prescription pharmaceuticals was above the European average
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during the study period and therefore the potential for parallel trade from lower- 
priced countries would in principle be significant. Observations are annual and 
concern the 2003-2006 period. A segment of the market, comprising six therapeutic 
(product) categories was selected. In total 18 molecules were considered, which 
were chosen because of their high volume and high price. The product categories 
were proton pump inhibitors (PPI) (lansoprazole, omeprazole, pantoprazole), HMG 
CoA reductase inhibitors (statins) (atorvastatin, pravastatin, simvastatin), 
Angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors (ACE I) (captopril, enalapril, quinapril, 
ramipril), Angiotensin II receptor antagonists (ACE II) (losartan, valsartan), 
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRI) (citalopram, paroxetine, sertraline), 
and atypical antipsychotics (AAP) (clozapine, olanzapine, risperidone).
Data included prices and sales for each product in each country, and sales 
and prices of locally sourced and parallel traded products are clearly distinguished. 
Market shares were calculated based on sales for the originator and the parallel 
trader. Prices are presented in Euros.
3.2 Methodology
In this thesis both theoretical analyses and empirical methods are used. 
Theory provides a framework of how agents behave, predicts market behaviour and 
sets the hypotheses to be tested. Empirical methods use real data in order to define 
and test the causal relationship between variables and the magnitude of changes of 
dependent variables due to a certain change in independent variables. Theory and 
empirics are complementary in this respect and show a complete image of market 
dynamics.
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3.2.1 Theoretical Modelling and Game Theory
Theory sets the foundations and discusses the core of the research question. 
It analyzes the dynamics and the expected behaviour of rational agents. Further, 
theory predicts the outcomes of a model or a game and provides a hypothesis, 
indicating the expected direction of changes in a variable as a result of a change in 
another factor. Also, theory sets the outline and determines the equations which will 
be tested empirically in order to see whether the hypothesis holds or not.
Game theory is a very useful tool for market analysis. Producers of goods 
which aim at the same group of consumers as potential buyers are de facto 
competitors. This means that actions of one producer (also known as “player” in 
game theory) influences other competitors’ quantities sold and profits, making the 
affected competitors react by adjusting their behaviour in order to maximize their 
profits given the actions of other producers. There is close interaction between 
players and actions are not only based on observed actions of other players but also 
on expected actions, assuming that other players are rational agents aiming at 
maximizing their profits. Each competitor creates his “reaction function” (Cournot 
1838), which demonstrates his strategy for each action of other competitors. This 
close interaction is why markets are considered as games and the theory of industrial 
organization is based on game theory. Game theory predicts the outcomes of 
markets based on the profit maximizing behaviour of firms. As this thesis studies 
pharmaceutical market competition and market outcomes and dynamics, game 
theory is a very important tool for the purpose of study 3.
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3.2. L I Conceptual framework Study 1
In study 1, a conceptual framework is introduced to discuss and show the 
impact of brand loyalty on purchasing decisions of patients or physicians, the latter 
acting as agents for the former. The model exhibits a market with an originator and a 
generic product. The key role in this model is played by brand loyalty (or otherwise 
considered as “aversion towards generics”), which is assumed to differ across 
patients. There are some who insist on purchasing branded products and others who 
are not so loyal. Brand loyalty is included in the model because it is a core aspect on 
consumer choice between originators and generics. Generics are of the same 
chemical substance as originators, so it is actually a homogenous product. However, 
some consumers are reluctant to either switch from an originator to a generic or, if 
they are newly introduced to a molecule, to start using a generic. The reason is that 
generics are (falsely) perceived as a product of lower quality than the originator. 
This is why some people are willing to pay more out-of-pocket to purchase the 
originator rather than the generic. This willingness to pay and low price elasticity on 
behalf of certain consumers keeps the originator price from decreasing post patent 
expiry. In general, when demand is inelastic, providers can increase revenue by 
increasing their price. This leads to what is known as the “generics paradox”. The 
model shows that the stronger brand loyalty is, the higher the price of the product.
3.2.1.2 Conceptual Framework for Study 2
Study 2 introduces a conceptual framework which shows how the 
manufacturer of a branded product may reduce promotion activities after his product 
loses its patent. This framework suggests that returns of a monetary unit invested in 
an off-patent medicine are lower than a monetary unit invested in a patented product.
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Further, any investment on advertising for an off-patent molecule creates a positive 
spill-over towards generics. Therefore, advertising activities decrease and the 
producer invests resources in other products, of other classes which are still in -  
patent. This underlines the importance of advertising and sales promotion activities 
on the determination of market shares. As increased advertising efforts lead to 
higher sales, and more advertising from a competitor decreases rivals’ sales 
(Bagwell 2005), it follows naturally that decreased advertising efforts from the 
manufacturer of the off- patent originator product will decrease sales volume of this 
particular molecule (both originator and generic) and increase competitors’ sales (in 
-  patent products of the same therapeutic category). Weaker advertising efforts 
allow branded competitors of the same therapeutic class to attract part of the demand 
which was previously attracted by the in - patent product. The expected result is that 
sales volume of the off -patent molecule decrease, and volume of other in -  patent 
products of the same therapeutic class increase.
3.2.1.3 Conceptual Framework for Study 3
Study 3 uses a game theoretical approach to provide insight of how medicine 
prices evolve in the presence of pharmaceutical parallel trade. The manufacturers 
and the parallel traders act as rational profit maximizers. Based on this assumption 
we can foresee the moves each agent will make, based on the expectations of the 
move the other player will make in order to reach a strategy which will maximize his 
profit. In a market without parallel trade -  targeted regulation the Nash Equilibrium 
is that the price of the parallel traded product is the same as the locally sourced 
product. The Folk Theorem would suggest infinite equilibria between the per-unit 
cost and the initial price of the locally sourced medicine. Nevertheless, each player 
observes that a price war will make both worse off. The manufacturer would have to
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set his price at the parallel trader’s break-even point. This would be the price level of 
the exporting country plus the per-unit cost that the parallel trader would be 
burdened with to import the product (transportation costs). This is significantly 
lower than the price of the locally sourced product, while the manufacturer would 
gain only the part of the market that the parallel trader had, which in most cases is 
up to 20%. The parallel trader knows that a price war would lead him out of the 
market, so he prices the product at the level of the locally sourced medicines. 
Another reason why he sets the price at the same level as the locally sourced product 
is that he manages to sell all quantities he imports (due to the limited quantities he 
can buy in exporting countries), so any price lower than that price would generate 
lower profits. In a different case, a price war could be triggered that would make him 
lose his market share and the profits he gains from parallel trade. Therefore, we 
reach the conclusion that in such an infinitely repeated game, rational agents observe 
market dynamics and understand that a price at the level of the monopolist price 
would make them both better off. This will make them adopt a price at the level of 
the locally sourced price before parallel trade entry. In any case, the price of the 
parallel imported product will equal the price of the locally sourced product. 
Regulation though may lead to different outcomes. There is a number of regulatory 
measures in the six European countries of the sample which affect the market 
equilibrium in the presence of parallel trade. Patient co-payments create pressure for 
the price of the parallel imported product to deviate downwards from the price of the 
locally sourced product, creating a price gap. The same happens when health 
insurance shares any saving occurring from dispensing parallel imported products 
with pharmacists. Clawbacks and quotas have the opposite effect. Thus, we have 
different market equilibria in the presence of different types of regulation.
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3.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics help provide a general impression about trends for a 
variable or a series of variables. They show a general picture of a particular issue 
and how it evolves over time. Graphs and figures expressing these descriptive 
statistics may make the trends even clearer. Nevertheless, they do not control for 
other factors and they only allow for univariate analysis. Consequently, they do not 
reveal underlying issues or exhibit any causal relationships.
Descriptive statistics are used in all three studies in this dissertation. In the 
first study (generics paradox) they have been used to show originator price trends 
before and post patent expiry. Graphs are used for each off patent molecule included 
in the study in each of the six countries discussed. The objective is to show how 
originator prices evolve and whether there is some visible change in price post 
patent expiry. In most cases originator prices do not seem to change significantly 
after generic entry, while in some cases prices increase. Therefore, evidence from 
the descriptive analysis is inconclusive. This is why econometric analysis is 
employed, which clearly shows that originator prices often increase post patent 
expiry.
In the second study (switching behaviour post patent expiry) descriptive 
statistics are used to show how the ratio of volumes of off-patent products and in­
patent products of the same therapeutic class evolve before and after patent expiry of 
one of the molecules. Graphs show a decrease in the ratio of volumes post patent 
expiry. This is somehow consistent to the findings of the econometric analysis, 
which show that there is a switch in consumption from the off patent molecule to in 
patent molecules.
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Descriptive statistics are crucial for the analysis of the third study (the impact 
of parallel trade on pharmaceutical competition). The analysis and the descriptive 
statistics provided have four goals: First, to show whether there is an incentive for 
the parallel trader to set a price different from that of the locally sourced product; 
second, to examine if the manufacturer will change its pricing behaviour due to the 
presence of parallel traders; third, to show if there is a price gap between the locally 
sourced and the parallel traded product; and, finally, to examine whether there is 
upward or downward price convergence between locally-sourced and parallel traded 
product. The third goal is achieved using descriptive statistics. The price gap 
between locally-sourced and parallel traded product appeared to be positive for 
Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands, and mostly zero for the United Kingdom.
3.2.3 Econometric analysis
When conducting multivariate analysis, descriptive statistics may not show 
the whole picture, as they ignore the joint effect of factors and do not reveal causal 
relationships. For example, in study 1 (the generics paradox), descriptive analysis 
shows how originator medicine prices evolve over time, before and after generic 
entry, but do not control for the effect of regulation or generic market shares. In 
study 2 (switching behaviour post patent expiry), graphs show the evolution of the 
ratio of off patent ACE Inhibitors volume over in patent ACE inhibitors volume. 
However, the graph does not control for regulatory measures and the number of 
competitors. This is why our empirical analysis is based on multivariate econometric 
analysis. Therefore, the use of descriptive statistics in studies 1 and 2 is only 
indicative and is used as an introduction to the empirical analysis of the study, as the
75
main source for drawing conclusions are the estimation results of the econometric 
model.
Econometric analysis is a critical part of all three studies. Econometric 
methods let us examine the relationship among dependent and explanatory variables. 
The results of the econometric analysis show the direction of a change in a variable 
as a result of a change in another variable, as well as the magnitude of the change, 
ceteris paribus. Most importantly, econometric analysis provides greater insight than 
descriptive analysis because it allows for multivariate analysis. While descriptive 
statistics and graphical analysis show the effect of one parameter on the dependent 
variable, without taking into account that a change may be due to other factors, 
econometrics allow to control for many factors. Results show the effect of the 
change in one factor while all other factors remain constant.
Pharmaceutical markets are influenced by many factors. Prices and volume 
of pharmaceuticals depend on the structure of the market and the volume and nature 
of competition. But unlike other markets, regulation and policy interventions, as 
well as patent protection, make pharmaceutical markets even more complicated. 
These factors have to be taken into account in the analysis, as they jointly determine 
prices and volume.
Econometric analysis is used in all three studies of the dissertation, as all 
studies examine the impact of a number of factors on competition in pharmaceutical 
markets. The nature of the data provided allowed the use of panel data econometric 
analysis. Panel data is a combination of cross section and time series data. Indeed, it 
is a combination of time series over the same time span for different sections. In this 
dissertation, the panel identifier is each medicine in each country. Hence differences 
across countries and molecules are taken into account in the empirical model. The
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main advantage of panel data is that it allows to analyse changes at the individual 
level (Verbeek 2005). In some country- specific regressions, there are not enough 
observations at the time level nor at the individual level to satisfy the asymptotic 
properties of panel data analysis. In these cases, ordinary least squares are used.
For some variables, past behaviour may influence future behaviour. This 
may be the case for prices, so in study 3 we also include a dynamic model, apart 
from the static one. The dynamic panel data method used is that of Blundell-bond 
(1998). This is preferred to the Arellano-bond estimator (1991), because the latter 
may not perform well if the autoregressive parameters are too large.
In study 1, results of the econometric analysis show that the generics paradox 
does indeed exist in regulated markets. In study 2, the results of the regressions 
show that there is a switch in consumption towards in patent molecules of the same 
therapeutic class when another product in the class loses its patent. Finally, in study 
3, the results show that there is upward price convergence between locally sourced 
and parallel imported products.
Of course, appropriate control variables have been used and any endogeneity 
problems have been addressed with the use of instrumental variables. Finally, robust 
standard errors have been used to address any autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity 
problems.
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4. The Generics Paradox Revisited: Evidence from Regulated 
Markets
4.1 Introduction
Patent protection grants originator medicines exclusivity in the market of the 
particular molecule for a nominal period of twenty years according to the WTO 
TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) agreement (WTO- 
OMC TRIPS fact sheet, 2006), though the actual protection period is shorter. When 
the patent for a particular molecule expires, generic products may enter the market, 
turning a monopolistic market (for that molecule) into a more competitive one. The 
generics paradox is a phenomenon whereby, following generic entry, prices of 
originator products increase despite generic competition (Frank and Salkever, 1997). 
This finding is significant because it contradicts the prediction of economic theory, 
according to which prices decline when competitors for the same product enter the 
market (Mas -  Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995, Tirole 1988). The generics 
paradox has been proven to be present in the US market, which is largely 
unregulated. In this study we test empirically whether it also holds in European 
Markets in the presence of intervention in pharmaceutical markets, such as reference 
pricing, price cuts and cost-effectiveness.
Pharmaceutical markets do not operate in the same way as regular markets 
and the predictions of economic theory often do not apply due to the special nature 
of this market. Insurance and third party payers, information asymmetry and agency 
relationships make this market special, and it is reasonable to expect that they lead 
to low levels of elasticity of demand. Numerous studies of the pharmaceutical 
market have shown that the price elasticity of demand is low and ranges between 0
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and -0.3. (Gemmill et al. 2007, Grootendorst et al. 1997, Leibowitz et al. 1985, 
Johnson et al. 1997, Gardner et al. 1997, Hughes and McGuire 1995, Lavers 1989, 
O’Brien 1989, Ryan and Birch 1991, Smith and Watson 1990). In addition to 
providing prescription medicine insurance coverage, the inelastic nature of demand 
has led some governments to introduce regulatory measures in order to control 
pharmaceutical prices.
Regulatory regimes differ significantly across countries. In the United States, 
markets are largely unregulated and prices are determined through negotiations 
between manufacturers and insurers. In Europe, markets are significantly more 
regulated, as there is government intervention in pharmaceutical pricing and 
reimbursement. Some countries though do have in principal free medicine pricing. 
Different interventions apply to in- patent and off- patent markets. For example, in 
the United Kingdom, originator medicine prices are free from direct regulatory 
intervention, subject only to rate of return regulation, also known as profit controls 
(OFT 2007, DoH 2008). However, the generic market is free of price fixing, and 
prices are determined based on competition between generic producers. Reference 
pricing is the most common intervention in off- patent markets in EU countries. 
Countries which use reference pricing for off- patent markets include Germany, the 
Netherlands, France, Denmark, Spain and Italy (PPRI 2008, Kanavos and Gemmill 
2005). This measure was abolished in Norway in 2001 and in Sweden in 2002. Price 
caps particularly for generic medicines are also present in some European countries, 
such as France and Italy. In this case, generic prices are set at a maximum 
percentage of branded prices. Finally, managed competition is used by Austria, 
whereby there is competition subject to a general framework in which prices can 
evolve, as generic and originator prices have to gradually decrease in the first years
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of generic entry, according to regulation. These different regulatory environments 
create different market dynamics and cause price differentiation across Europe. Thus, 
what pricing dynamics may occur in each country, and in particular how the 
originator price will evolve, may heavily depend on the interventions applied.
4.2 Objectives
Whereas previous research has shown that the generics paradox exists in 
largely unregulated markets, such as the USA, there is no evidence of whether it 
would also be present in regulated or interventionist markets, and, if so, how it 
would manifest itself. In principal, it does seem counter-intuitive to assume that the 
generics paradox will be present in regulated markets because interventionist 
policies typically provide a tight control for price movements. However, the breadth 
of regulatory practices ranging from explicit price controls in in-patent and off- 
patent markets, to milder interventions, such as reference pricing, suggests that the 
generics paradox could also be present in some regulated markets. Frank and 
Salkever (1997) studied the generics paradox using US data. A question that remains 
is whether their findings would be the same in regulated markets, among them many 
the European ones. Thus, the objective of this study is to determine whether the 
generics paradox still holds in the presence of regulation and analyse the effect of 
price changes and overall price behaviour in the presence of different regulatory 
interventions. Further, this chapter will explore the impact of the findings on the 
ability of generic policies in different countries to deliver savings post patent expiry.
In order to achieve this we set up and test an empirical model, to test the 
joint effects of generic entry and regulation and other parameters on the prices of the 
originator products in a market. Quarterly data from 6 European Countries are used
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over the period 1997-2002 in order to examine the behaviour of prices of originators 
(branded medicines) after generic entry.
Section 4.2 discusses the background on regulation and the generics paradox; 
section 4.3 provides a framework of the issues of brand loyalty and market dynamics, 
while section 4.4 provides a descriptive analysis. Section 4.5 introduces data and 
methods of the econometric analysis, whose results are in section 4.6. Section 4.7 
discusses policy implications and section 4.8 concludes.
4.3 Regulation in Pharmaceutical Markets and the Generics Paradox
4.3.1 Empirical Evidence on the Generics Paradox
Several studies have empirically shown evidence of the existence of the 
generics paradox. The first study addressing this issue was written by Caves, 
Whinston and Hurwitz (1991). The authors conclude that generic entry only leads to 
a slow-down in the increase of originator medicine prices. Frank and Salkever (1997) 
suggest that the introduction of generic products on the market leads to price 
increases in brand name pharmaceuticals. They point out that a necessary condition 
for such price increases is that entry leads to a decline in the own-price elasticity of 
reduced-form brand-name demand. Grabowski and Vernon (1992) found empirical 
evidence that pioneering firms did not attempt to deter entry through their pricing 
strategies. Rather, in most cases, firms continued to increase their prices at the same 
rate as prior to entry. Rizzo and Zeckhauser (2005) also find empirical evidence that 
producers of brand-name products do not decrease prices after generic market entry. 
All four studies used US data in order to show the existence of the generics paradox.
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4.3.2 Regulatory Environment and Medicine Prices Post Patent Expiry
Some studies suggest that regulation leads to lower prices, while others 
conclude exactly the opposite. Comparing them is not an easy task due to 
differences in data and methodology.
The most common measure which aims at containing costs in European 
countries (as well as elsewhere) is reference pricing. Reference pricing sets a 
maximum reimbursement price for prescription medicines. It is the average of the 
lowest prices of a group of products of a particular molecule, or therapeutic class.
According to Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig (2000), the goal of reference 
pricing is not the limitation of overall pharmaceutical expenditure, but the control of 
third-party expenditure on prescription medicines. They argue that “by limiting the 
level of public reimbursement, reference pricing aims to reduce the price of 
referenced products, either through (i) a relative decrease in demand for highly- 
priced products (a demand-sided approach) or (ii) cutting medicine prices by 
encouraging self restraint (supply side approach) once manufacturers face the threat 
of losing markets” (Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig 2000).
Nevertheless, there are concerns about how efficient this measure is: Does 
reference pricing relax competition between suppliers of pharmaceuticals? In some 
cases there is not enough competition in pharmaceutical markets, since some 
competitive products enter the market simultaneously at the same price. This could 
either be the outcome of market equilibrium or a result of some form of tacit 
collusion and a cooperative game between competitors.
Reference pricing systems can also be challenged in that they only address 
one side of the efficiency equation, the cost side, while ignoring the effectiveness 
side. Also, when addressing the cost issue they focus only on price instead of
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including the total cost of treatment. Another challenge is that in such a reference 
price system the laws of a free market, where high competition leads to lower prices, 
may not apply. Therefore, we aim to address these concerns, namely that suppliers 
have no strong incentive to set a price lower than the reference price.
Empirical work by Aronsson, Bergman and Rudholm (2001), suggests that in 
the case of Sweden, reference pricing leads to a decrease in the market shares of 
particular originator products, which means higher levels of competition. Further, 
they suggest that reference pricing is an important determinant of price paths. 
Grootendorst and Stewart (2006) found that in the case of British Columbia, 
although the daily cost of treatment declined following the introduction of reference 
pricing, part of this reduction is likely due to factors other than reference pricing. 
Ioannides-Demos, Ibrahim and McNeil (2002) also suggest that other factors 
influencing total pharmaceutical expenditure have often occurred simultaneously to 
reference pricing and make it difficult to isolate its specific effects. They propose 
that further investigation is required before any valid conclusions can be drawn 
about the net effect of reference pricing on healthcare costs.
Another study concludes that competition has kept prices low in markets 
with less regulation: Danzon and Chao (2000) find empirical evidence that generic 
competition is more effective in such countries. Nevertheless, the authors state that 
comparing prices of pharmaceutical products across countries gives uncertain results 
due to the differences in products, prices and volumes.
It is difficult to draw general conclusions from these studies due to 
methodological differences in the range of products considered, the extent to which 
generics were included or not and other such factors (Kanavos and Mossialos 1999, 
Kanavos and Srivastava 2008). Furthermore, there seems to be heterogeneity across
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countries concerning the prices and diffusion of generics after patent expiry 
(Magazzini, Pammolli, Riccaboni, 2004).
Consumers’ behaviour also plays a role in pricing. Despite the low levels of 
price elasticity (due to insurance, as consumers pay less or nothing out of pocket) 
and the presence of brand-loyalty, consumers’ purchasing behaviour may lead to a 
decrease in the originator’s prices. An interesting finding by Rizzo and Zeckhauser 
(2005) refers to consumer choices and how they affect prices of originator medicines. 
They find that a 10% increase in the consumers’ generic script share is associated 
with a 15.6% decline in the average price paid for originator medicines by 
consumers.
Price regulation affecting the generic market may have an adverse effect in 
generic price reduction over time. Various studies have shown different results 
concerning the impact of regulation on generic medicine prices. Some studies 
suggest that countries with strict price regulation have lower prices than countries 
with less strict regulation (Jonsson 1994).
According to evidence from Norway, the introduction of a price index that 
aimed in lowering entry barriers actually lead to an increase in generic market shares 
and helped trigger price competition by reducing overall market power. (Dalen, 
Strom, Haabeth, 2006). This policy measure may offer consumers the alternative of 
cheaper medicines (generics) and therefore help reduce spending. The last finding 
though, concerning price competition, is the opposite of what the generics paradox 
suggests. The presence of regulation, such as the price index may indeed distort the 
market, leading to different effects than what would happen in the absence of 
regulation.
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On the other hand, Razzolini (2004) examined a demand model which takes 
into account the effect of the age of a medicine in the market. The model examines 
the non-mandatory substitution reform that took place in Norway in 2001. His 
model assumes Bertrand competition and he suggests that the reform has a negative 
effect on generic demand. The author also suggests that his findings support the 
hypothesis that competition does take place between generics.
There are many different findings concerning the impact of regulation on 
competition and prices. In this study, we will attempt to fill in a gap by examining 
whether the phenomenon that originator prices increase post patent expiry (known 
as the generics paradox) holds in regulated markets. Results may give insight into 
the pricing behaviour of firms in the presence and absence of these two important 
factors, and therefore help policy makers make policy decisions concerning 
prescription, reimbursement and pricing of pharmaceuticals.
4.4 Theoretical Background
4. 4.1 Sequential Market Entry
After having reviewed the literature on regulation and competition in off- 
patent markets, we proceed to study market dynamics. Generics affect the market of 
a medicine through the impact they have on competition. Generic entry transforms 
the market from a regulated monopoly to a regulated oligopoly, or monopolistic 
competition, since some consumers perceive differences between brand name and 
generic products. It is useful to see how market structure affects prices and 
quantities in the pharmaceutical market.
85
Wiggins and Maness (2004) found that the relationship between 
pharmaceutical prices and the number of sellers is more like that found in other 
industries. A negative relationship is therefore assumed. Mark Boyer and Michel 
Moreaux (1987) suggest that “whatever the role (leader, follower, Nash competitor), 
it is always more profitable to be a quantity (price) setter if the goods are substitutes 
(complements)” (Boyer and Moreaux 1987). In other words, it is better to fight in a 
quantity space when goods are substitutes, which is the particular case we are 
examining in this study, because generics are substitutes of the originator product. 
This would lead us to the hypothesis that the nature of competition in the 
pharmaceutical market follows the Stackelberg Model. There is a price leader, which 
is the producer of the originator product, which is initially patent protected. After 
patent expiry, generics enter the market. As the producer of the originator has 
already set his price, generics are price followers.
Although R&D involves significant costs, it does not enter the profit 
maximizing function, so it does not affect the equilibrium quantity or price. This is 
due to the fact that it is a sunk cost.
The solution of the Stackelberg model shows that the leader has higher level 
of sales than each of the followers separately. The model also suggests that the price 
is the same for all competitors. Empirical data though is not in support of such 
behaviour. There are explanations for this. Empirical data and previous studies 
(discussed in section 4.4) have shown that the market share of the originator 
medicine falls constantly after patent expiry, but a small market share remains, 
despite the fact that its price is significantly higher than generic prices. This is a 
consequence of brand loyalty. Although band-name products and generics have the 
same chemical substance, some consumers may believe that the brand-name product
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is better, so products cannot be considered as perfectly homogenous, not because of 
their actual nature, but because of the perception of some consumers. There is 
evidence from European countries indicating that generic medicine substitution for 
some patients is not considered an equal alternative to branded medicines, and these 
patients may need additional information and support (Kjoenniksen et al, 2006). 
Alternatively, it is usually the physician (who acts as the patient’s agent) who makes 
decisions on their behalf regarding the medicine which will be consumed. 
Physicians may be influenced by direct promotional activities by the industry, 
influencing the his decision regarding which product will be prescribed. Pharmacists 
also play a role in demand and supply, since in some countries (such as Germany 
and Denmark) legislation gives them incentives to substitute originator products 
with generics, in order to reduce government spending for pharmaceuticals (PPRI 
country profiles 2008).
Market shares of the originator product fall after patent expiry. Mrazek and 
Frank (2004) suggest that although residual loyalty remains after generic entry, it 
does not deter generic competition. After patent expiry, prices of generic products 
fall to a fraction of the originator medicine price. Evidence on prices of generics 
indicates that they are significantly below those of originator products. Kanavos and 
Srivastava (2008) point out that the average generic price was 25 percent lower than 
the originator price at the point of generic entry in the United States, and that as the 
number of generic competitors increased the price fell to about one-fifth of the initial 
average generic price. Kanavos, Costa-Font and Seeley (2008) have also illustrated 
the gradual decrease in generic prices as competition increases.
Although the product is in practice homogenous, the Stackelberg model of 
sequential entry is possibly not appropriate for the analysis of competition in the
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pharmaceutical market post patent expiry. In contrast to the predictions of the 
Stackelberg Model, prices differ across products due to brand loyalty, the originator 
product being priced at a higher level than generics. The originator product keeps 
only a part of the market and does not engage in price war with the generics.
The special nature of pharmaceutical markets make it necessary to set up a 
conceptual framework that captures the likely effects of brand loyalty and the extent 
to which it leads to different prices across products in the same market, this 
framework is outlined in the section that follows.
4.4.2 A prescription medicine market model with (perceived) product
differentiation: The importance o f  Brand Loyalty
The pharmaceutical market is a market of sequential entry, due to patent 
protection. While the product is in patent, only the branded product is in the market. 
Post patent expiry, generic competitors enter. Economic theory explains behaviour 
in markets with sequential entry using the Stackelberg model. The outcome of the 
Stackelberg model suggests that prices across producers are the same, while the first 
entrant has a larger market share than the second entrant (Stackelberg 1952). This 
Model though cannot explain the function of the pharmaceutical market post patent 
expiry, due to the presence of brand loyalty, which upsets the assumption of a 
homogenous product, due to consumer perceptions, at least for a significant part of 
consumers. For this reason we set up a different theoretical model in order to 
understand how the market works for branded and generic products. This will serve 
as a framework for the empirical model which will follow. Frank and Salkever’s 
pioneering study on this topic did not provide a theoretical model on the effects of 
brand loyalty on prices. A discussion on how generic entry could affect branded
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prices was provided instead. In our model, the branded product is perceived by 
purchasing decision makers (patients or physicians) as a differentiated product. 
Consumers obtain higher levels of utility when consuming the branded than a 
generic (although in practice they have the same chemical substance and therefore 
are identical). This reflects brand loyalty by consumers or physicians, who act as 
their agents.
Suppose there is a market of a certain chemical substance. There is a branded 
product, which has gone off- patent, allowing for generic competitors to enter the 
market. For simplicity, we assume there is only one generic present. The total 
quantity of medicines sold is fixed and does not depend on prices (we assume fixed 
demand). It is therefore assumed that all patients will be treated, but they have the 
choice between the branded and the generic product. This assumption follows 
universal health coverage in the EU. Thus the total quantity is fixed, but the 
breakdown among different medicines is not. Whether the branded medicine or a 
generic is dispensed depends on a number of factors.
Brand loyalty and perceived quality differences influence purchasing 
decisions. These decisions may be taken either by the physician, which is the one 
that prescribes the medicines, or the consumer, if he or she is aware of the products 
available and has a strong preference for the branded medicine. The insurer though 
may also make this decision, by announcing whether the originator will be 
reimbursed or not, or whether a co-payment will occur when the branded product is 
dispensed. The insurer has an incentive to do so as he is interested in paying for the 
lowest cost medicine, given that they are of the same chemical substance, thus the 
therapeutic outcomes are the same. Assume there is a density of consumers, which 
are uniformly distributed among points a and /?, as it appears in Figure 4.1. This
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distance represents the utility of consumers at each point of the line that is gained 
from consuming the generic. /? > a, meaning that the utility of people consuming 
generics increases as we move to the right. In other words, the distance between a 
and p  represents aversion to generics, revealing how brand-loyal each consumer is: 
Consumers at point /? are less averse towards the use of generics, so they are not as 
brand loyal as patients closer to a. They obtain the maximum possible utility from 
generic consumption. Consumers at point a are the most averse towards generic use; 
therefore they are the most brand-loyal. On the right of point p  is point y, which 
represents the (perceived) utility from using the branded product.
Figure 4.1 Consumer Utility 
a x  p
Umin Gen Umax Gen U brand
There is a point x  between a and p, where the population of consumers is 
split into two parts and consumers on the left hand side of x consume the branded 
product, while the consumers on the right hand side of x  consume the generic. The 
demand for the generic is P~x and the demand for the branded medicine is x-a.
x  is the point where consumption switches from the branded to the generic. 
At that point utility must be the same for purchasing the generic or the branded. 
Thus:
I - p G+x = I - p B+ r  m
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=> x = p G- p B+ Y  (2)
where I  is income, p G and p B are prices of the generic and the branded
respectively, and x and y are the utility originating from consuming the generic and 
the branded respectively.
Profits of generic producer are:
n  c  = P g ( P ~ x )
= P g ( P - P g + P b - Y )  (3)
The first order conditions for profit maximization are: 
n  c = P - 2 p G- y +  p B = 0  
So the price of the generic is:
p 0 = \ \ P + p f - r ]
2 (4)
Similarly, profits of branded producer are:
n 5 = P b ( x ~ a )
= P b ( P g - P b + Y-<X) ^
The first order conditions for profit maximization are: 
n  b = Pq ~ Y~ cx — o 
So the price of the branded is:
P b = \ \ P g + Y - o \
1 (6)
Substituting equation (6) into (4) gives us:
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Similarly, substituting equation (4) into (6) gives us 
1 [1 i
Pc = r I- b>s + r -  <*) + iS -  r|
= \ \ P + Y - l a \
3 (8)
Differentiating (7) and (8) with respect to brand loyalty (y) gives us:
^ = I > 0
dy 3
andf ^  = _ I < 0
d y  3
As y increases, the price of the branded medicine increases and the price of 
the generic decreases. The reason for this is that y represents the (perceived) utility 
from consuming the branded medicine. An increase in this utility moves point x 
(which is the point at which consumers switch from the branded to the generic) to 
the right, thus increasing the fraction of consumers purchasing the branded medicine. 
Therefore the price increases. The effect on the generic is exactly the opposite, 
meaning that brand loyalty leads to higher prices of the originator products and 
lower prices of the generics. This is reflected in pharmaceutical markets, where 
branded products are indeed more expensive than generics.
The market share of the branded product is:
M S b  =  x - cL  = Z 2 o ± £ + 1  
p - a  3{P-  a)
dMSB _ p ~ a  >Q 
d y  3
The market share of the generic product is:
p - a  3 ( a - p )  (10)
dMSa _ a - p  <Q 
d y  3
The first derivative of the branded product’s market share with respect to y is 
positive, showing that the market share of the branded product increases with brand 
loyalty. The opposite happens to the generic product, as the first derivative is 
negative.
This analysis gives us results which are in accordance with what we expected. 
Prices and market share of branded products increase with brand loyalty, while this 
has exactly the opposite effect on generics (decrease of price and market share).
In a market with insurance, it can be argued that prices do not play a 
(significant) role in purchasing decisions, so the model discussed previously does 
not apply to such markets, unless co-payments are present. Nevertheless, even in 
these markets, there are factors that make prices play a role in dispensing patterns: 
First, regarding physicians, policies can include penalizing over-spending or 
rewarding under-spending. These incentives encourage generic prescribing in order 
to control expenses. Second, in some countries pharmacists are able (or obliged) to 
substitute a branded for a cheaper generic, if this is available. Pharmacists are
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typically remunerated by health insurance. If regressive margins are implemented, 
these may provide an incentive to dispense the cheapest medicine in some cases. 
Hence, this remuneration scheme encourages generic dispensing.
We have showed how brand loyalty leads to higher prices, which is the 
underlying factor and a necessary condition for the hypothesis in the empirical 
model (which follows in section 4.5.2) that prices of branded medicines may keep 
on increasing after generic entry. Regarding the direct effect of generic entry on 
originator prices, consider a branded medicine that has been in the market for a time 
period equal to its patent. When generics enter the market, they attract a large 
proportion of the market, while the originator’s market share drops continuously 
(since many consumers or their agents are not brand loyal and do not mind 
consuming generics), ending up in controlling a small fraction of the market. This 
small market fraction concerns brand loyal consumers. Since sales have dropped so 
steeply, the firm’s profits decrease. We can assume that the originator’s remaining 
consumers’ behaviour is inelastic regarding the originator’s price, due to the 
aversion they have towards generics. This means that total revenue increases with a 
moderate increase in its price. Hence, increasing prices post patent expiry can be an 
originator producer’s way to gain back part of lost profits.
Unfortunately, this framework cannot be tested empirically, as brand loyalty 
is unobservable and it is difficult to be quantified. Nevertheless, this model sets a 
firm background for the very important issue of brand loyalty in pharmaceutical 
markets and shows how it can lead to higher prices of branded originator products 
and mirrors other empirical analysis in the field (Frank and Salkever 1997).
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4.4.3 Brand loyalty and price elasticity
According to Cunningham (1956), brand loyalty is a “substantial asset” for 
producers. Its main characteristic is that it varies widely across consumers, but it 
may be present even if there is no difference between products apart from their 
brand (Tucker 1964). Higher brand trust leads to positive outcomes for producers, 
such as market shares (Chaudhuri and Holbrook 2001). In pharmaceutical markets, 
physicians may become brand loyal as a result of prescribing a particular brand only 
while the product is in- patent (Grabowski and Vemon 1992).
Some patients prefer branded to generic products, for two reasons. First, they 
may have the mistaken impression that branded products are better than generics, 
meaning that they perceive the product as differentiated. Second, their physician, 
who acts as their agent, may prescribe the branded product, and they follow the 
physician’s decision. It is this particular part of the population that is critical for the 
originator manufacturer’s pricing decisions.
The producer of the originator product is a monopolist for the particular 
molecule until patent expires and generic competitors enter the market. Generics 
enter the market at a lower price than the originator product. The producer of the 
originator has paid for R&D, hence the relatively high prices while the product is in 
patent. R&D costs are high when compared to the per-unit cost of production. 
Generic producers however are not subject to R&D costs and the per-unit cost of 
production of their product is low compared to R&D costs and this allows them to 
set a lower price than the originator product and still have the possibility to have 
positive profits. R&D does not play a role in determining prices for either producers 
post patent expiry due to the fact that R&D is a sunk cost.
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Prices of generics enter at a lower price than the branded product due to the 
absence of a brand name. However, regulatory interventions aiming at generic prices 
may cause a further decrease in generic prices. This would lead to an even larger 
difference between the originator product and generic competitors.
If the originator producer chooses to lower his price as a response to generic 
prices reduction, this will lead generic producers to further lower their prices, as the 
per-unit cost is very small for pharmaceuticals. If the originator producer follows, 
they will again lower their prices and this will carry on until the point where generic 
producers make zero supernormal profits. This price war is not in favour of the 
branded product producer.
By lowering their prices, the generic producers gain part of the market share 
of the branded product. This will leave the branded product with a smaller market 
share, but this part of consumers are now on average even more brand loyal than 
before. For this part of the consumers it is reasonable to believe that demand is 
inelastic. Consequently, by increasing its price, the branded product increases its 
total revenue, as well as total profits (as total production costs are lower for 
producing lower quantities of product).
The conclusion is that regulatory measures targeting generic prices will have 
an indirect effect of an increase in the branded price. This is known as the generics 
paradox in the United States, where price regulation is not present.
Consumers do not pay for medicines out-of-pocket, as long as the price is 
what health insurance agrees to pay for. Any difference usually has to be paid out- 
of-pocket by the consumer. Thus, the approach explained previously does not 
change in the presence of third-party payers. The higher the out-of-pocket payment 
(due to the price difference between the generics and the originator), the more
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consumers will choose the generic instead of the branded product, leaving a smaller 
and more brand-loyal part of consumers choosing the branded product. Demand 
originating from these consumers is inelastic, thus increasing the originator’s price 
leads to higher profits for the producer of the originator product.
4.4.4 Why Reference Pricing may reduce Competition Levels
In this section we discuss internal reference pricing, which refers to using 
prices of other products marketed in the same market as a benchmark, as opposed to 
international referencing, which includes prices of other countries and is usually 
applied to in-patent products.
Reference pricing has been implemented as a cost- containment mechanism 
in generic markets. The reference price takes into account a basket of relatively low 
prices and set a price at which products of the same molecule (or same class of 
molecules in certain countries such as the Netherlands) will be reimbursed by health 
insurance. At a first glance, this appears to be a measure which helps decrease 
medicines prices post patent expiry and leads to savings. Nevertheless, this 
regulatory measure may not lead to the most efficient allocation of resources.
According to economic theory, competition reduces prices. The more players 
participating in the market, the higher competition is and the lower prices are 
expected to be.
Reference pricing is usually set at the average of the cheapest products of a 
group. Any product priced at the reference price or at a lower level is reimbursed by 
health insurance. Products which are priced lower than the reference price have the 
incentive to increase their prices to the level of the reference price because they will 
not lose part of their market share since consumers will not be subject to any higher
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price burden. New market entrants also have no incentive to price at a level lower 
than the reference price.
Products which are priced at a higher level than the reference price may 
adjust their prices and converge at the reference price level. This does not lead to 
any savings for health insurance, since there are other products available in the 
market at a lower price, which would be the ones reimbursed, and consumers would 
have to pay the price difference for any products which are more expensive.
This price level works as an equilibrium from which generic producers will 
not deviate. Lowering the price will lead to lower profits, as the market share will be 
the same (due to reimbursement) but the price will be lower. Although this may 
influence the price basket which determines the reference price, there is still no 
incentive to deviate, especially since other competitors will follow and a new - 
lower- reference price will be set. Deviating upwards will lead to a co-payment on 
behalf of consumers. A generic company would not be better off doing so if it does 
not have any advantage (from a consumer’s point of view) compared to other 
generics.
Generic prices tend to decrease steadily in the years following patent expiry 
(Kanavos, Costa-Font, Seeley 2008). The presence of reference pricing though may 
prevent this from happening, as reference pricing makes prices rigid downwards. 
Although reference pricing leads to price cuts in the short run, in the long run it may 
actually keep prices at a relatively high level.
The originator producer does not follow generic prices and does not set its 
price at the reference price level. Brand loyalty makes some consumers be willing to 
pay a co- payment in order to get the branded product rather than the generic, due to 
perceived product differentiation. Besides, lowering its price at the reference price
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level would make generics lose a great part of their market share, so they would 
force their prices down, making the reference price also decrease. Such a price war 
could keep pushing prices down and eventually the originator price would have to 
drop to a fraction of the initial price in order to sustain a large market share. This 
would lead to lower profits than previously, so the originator producer would chose 
not to involve in a price war and keep the price at relatively high levels.
However, reference pricing has an indirect effect on originator prices. In the 
short run, if reference pricing reduces generic prices further, this could lead even 
more consumers to consume generic products rather than the originator, due to the 
larger price difference. Therefore, at least in the short run, reference pricing may 
have a spillover effect on originator prices.
The short run is a very important and critical period for cost containment and 
savings from genericization, as in the first years of generic presence generic uptake 
is not always large. The originator product may sustain a significant part of the 
market, so its price has an impact for health insurance spending.. Reference pricing 
may lead to higher prices and a lower market share for originator products, but also 
a higher price for the latter. The aggregate effect on savings is ambiguous, as these 
effects are towards different directions.
In the long run though, the effects of reference pricing on originator 
medicines are opposite: Generic prices do not decrease further (as they may in the 
absence of reference pricing) so the market share of the originator will not decrease 
as rapidly and the patients consuming originators will not be the most averse to 
generics. Therefore, the originator price will also not increase as steeply.
Nevertheless, there are a number of other parameters that affect prices of 
pharmaceuticals apart from reference pricing and the number of suppliers.
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Advertising and promoting the product may be effective and may lead to price 
differentiation. Furthermore, cost of production and the presence of other measures 
of regulation are also very important.
4.5 Descriptive Analysis
4.5.1 Stylized Facts on Generic Entry
Market shares of the originator product fall after patent expiry. Mrazek and 
Frank (2004) suggest that although residual loyalty remains after generic entry, it 
does not completely deter generic competition. After patent expiry, prices of generic 
products fall to a small fraction of the originator medicine price. Evidence on prices 
of generics indicates that they are significantly below those of originator products. 
(Kanavos and Srivastava 2008, Kanavos 2008). The effect of patent expiry on sales 
and prices of captopril in UK, the Netherlands and Germany have been 
demonstrated in a study by Kanavos and Srivastava (2008). Originator sales drop 
dramatically, as generic products move in. Sales drop by 69% in Germany, 51% in 
the Netherlands and 74% in the UK. Originator prices increase in the UK by 30% 
following generic entry, but the opposite happens in the Netherlands and Germany, 
where originator prices drop by 14% and 61% respectively. Data from the UK show 
that the average difference between branded price and generic price up to 3 years 
after first entry is 80% and that the average generic penetration up to 3 years after 
first entry is 55% (Kanavos 2008). Under the reasonable assumption that demand for 
the branded product is inelastic, the price of the branded product would have to 
decrease by 80% in order to regain a maximum of 55% of the total generic market, 
in other words to roughly double its market share (if the originator would regain the
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whole market back by decreasing its price down to the level of generics). In 
Germany, the originator price would have to decrease by 25-40% in order to regain 
45% of the market (Kanavos 2008), but generics could potentially respond to this by 
lowering prices even more, and regain part o f the market. Therefore, in the UK and 
possibly also in Germany, total revenue if deciding to go into price war would be 
lower than in the case in which the price would remain at high levels, and this 
strategy would make the originator producer worse off.
4.5.2 Graphical Representation o f  Originator Prices Before and After Generic 
Entry
A graphical analysis is the first step to see how the prices of originator 
products change as a result of generic entry. In Figure 4.2, the price (in real terms) 
each originator in each country is plotted, while a vertical line indicates the point of 
generic entry.
Figure 4.2 Originator Price Evolution Before and After Generic Entry
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In some cases, the price of the originator appears to rise after generic entry. 
Such examples are omeprazole in Germany and clozapine in the UK. In other cases, 
prices appear to rise not with generic entry, but with generic penetration (clozapine 
in Norway). This suggests that the generic paradox may be present. In some other 
cases, the price of the originator medicine appears to fall after generic entry. Such 
cases are enalapril in the UK and paroxetine in the Netherlands. In general, markets 
do not seem to follow a particular pattern after generic entry. Some medicines 
demonstrate price increase post generic entry and others drop, while in most cases
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there is no price change at all. In most cases though, changes are marginal and it is 
difficult to observe the changes graphically. Furthermore, these graphs do not allow 
controlling for other factors which influence prices and may be the main reason for 
changes. Graphs only provide a univariate approach which does not show the whole 
picture and may be misleading. In other words, a change that graphically 
demonstrates a negative effect of generic entry on prices, could actually be positive 
when the factors that affect prices are controlled for. Thus, multivariate econometric 
analysis is more insightful and will provide more specific and accurate information 
regarding the causes of the changes of the originators’ prices.
4.6 Data and Methods
4.6.1 Data
In order to pursue the analysis we used data from the Intercontinental 
Medical Statistics (IMS) pharmaceutical sales database. The accuracy of the data 
ranges between 98 and 99% (IMS 2002). Prescription medicines’prices are actually 
reimbursed by health insurance. Data were obtained for the 1997-2002 period for 12 
medicines from four product categories: Plain ACE inhibitors (Captopril, Enalapril, 
Quinapril, Ramipril); atypical anti-psychotics (Clozapine); proton pump inhibitors 
(Lansoprazole, Omeprazole, Pantoprazole); and antidepressants (Citalopram 
Fluoxetine, Paroxetine, Sertraline) in six European countries (Germany, United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Denmark) for the retail (pharmacy) 
market in each country. Data was available for originator and generic versions of 
each molecule. Generic competitors enter the market during the time period
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examined for at least on medicine in each therapeutic category in at least one 
country in the sample.
We have a range of variables in the dataset used in the analysis. All data are 
reported quarterly. The variables that are most important are the price of the 
originator and generic penetration and entry (market share and dummy for presence 
respectively), p  is the price of each originator product in each country, measured in 
logs. Prices are in Euros, deflated, genms is the market share of generic products, 
which indicates market penetration. Market shares are calculated based on actual 
invoiced sales as a proportion of total sales of the particular molecule, both branded 
and generic, generic is a dummy variable for generic penetration in a country (i) on 
quarterly basis. The dummy takes the value of 1 when generic entry occurs for a 
product (j) in a country (i); 0 elsewhere. Generic entry is identified and confirmed by 
(a) patent records for brand product and (b) separate entries of sales, volumes and 
prices of generics by firms other than holders of the original patent (generic 
companies).
Further, there are a number of policy dummy variables included in the model. 
rp is a dummy variable for the presence of reference pricing in a country. The 
dummy takes the value of 1 when reference pricing is present and 0 when there is no 
such measure in the country. Reference pricing is present in Denmark, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Sweden over the whole period examined and in Norway until the 
second quarter of 2001. hsys is a dummy variable for health system organized as an 
NHS-type or an insurance-based system. NHS-type systems have gatekeeper 
arrangements in place through general practitioners and potentially restrict demand 
for health services, including pharmaceuticals, compared with social insurance- 
based systems where access to specialists is still safeguarded. The dummy takes the
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value of 1 for the UK, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway (NHS-type system) and 0 for 
Germany and the Netherlands (insurance-based systems), pcut is a dummy variable 
for price cuts or price freezes. These are command-and-control regulatory measures 
often implemented by health insurance in order to contain costs, after a product has 
been introduced; these policies always affect the entire pharmaceutical market in a 
particular country. This dummy takes the value of 1 in Denmark (from Q l, 1998 to 
Q l, 2002), and the UK (from Q l, 1999 to Q2, 2001). All 12 products in our sample 
are affected in the above two countries and for the periods specified. The dummy 
takes the value of 0 elsewhere, cap is a dummy variable indicating the presence of 
price caps for generics. This takes the value of 1 in Norway for the last two quarters 
of 2002, in Sweden, in the United Kingdom from the second quarter of 2000, and 
the value of 0 elsewhere, preg is a dummy variable for price regulation. Price 
regulation defined as the intervention of third party payer (national insurance 
company) or the government in terms of setting price of each product (j). Price 
regulation takes value of 1 in Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands from Q l, 1997 
onwards; and for Denmark from Q l, 2001 onwards, ror is a dummy variable 
referring to rate of return regulation. This policy is known as ‘profit controls’. When 
this is present, the manufacturer is allowed to make profits up to a certain rate of the 
capital invested. Any profits exceeding this must be paid back to health insurance. 
This policy is present in the United Kingdom. Thus, this variable is 1 for the UK and 
0 elsewhere, clawb is a dummy variable for introduction of clawbacks. Clawbacks 
are a policy tool whereby health insurance is aware of discounting practices taking 
place at pharmacy level and retain a proportion of that discount. The dummy takes 
the value of 1 in the UK and the Netherlands over the 1997-2002 period, and 0 in the 
other four countries, er is the exchange rate, that converts currencies into Euros.
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The following variables are used as instruments in the analysis (explained in 
section 4.5.2): age is a measure of time (in quarters) since generic entry for the 
particular product, sub is a policy dummy. It is 1 when obligatory or optional 
generic substitution policies are present (Denmark, Germany from Q2, 2002, the 
Netherlands, Norway from Q2, 2001, Sweden, UK from Q3, 2002) and 0 elsewhere. 
When such policies are present, the pharmacist can or must substitute the branded 
product mentioned in a prescription with the corresponding generic product, if 
available. Summary statistics of all variables are in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 Summary Statistics
Observations: 1728
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
P -0.711 1.697
generics 0.278 0.448
Igenms 19.389 28.443
rp 0.199 0.399
cap 0.250 0.433
pcut 0.139 0.346
preg 0.444 0.497
ror 0.167 0.373
hsys 0.667 0.472
clawb 0.500 0.500
er 1.147 0.964
sub 0.093 0.290
age 2.343 4.933
4.6.2 The Emprical Model
4.6.2.1 Conceptual Framework
The originator producer is a profit maximizing firm. In order to set profit- 
maximizing prices, it takes market parameters into account. Before generic entry, 
the firm acts like a monopolist, as there is not other medicine with exactly the same 
chemical substance in the market. During this period of patent protection, the
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constraint that the firm faces is demand. In European markets, where health 
insurance is present, the consumer is not the payer. The consumer also has a 
decision-making agent (the physician). Further, regulation affects pricing and the 
reimbursement list also affects dispensing of the product, as if  it is not covered by 
health insurance, the patients will have to pay out-of-pocket, which would affect 
sales. Thus the monopolist sets the price as
P° -  f  (D, R, ins) (11)
where D  is demand, R is regulation and ins indicates insurance coverage of the 
particular medicine.
Things change post patent expiry with generic entry. The originator producer 
is no longer a monopolist as there are other firms which produce and sell the very 
same chemical substance. Therefore competition is now present in the market due to 
the presence of generics. In regular markets, the presence of competitors enhances 
competition and leads to lower prices and the price of an oligopolist is expected to 
be lower than the price of the monopolist. This has been proven not to happen in the 
US pharmaceutical market (Frank, Salkever 1993) and is known as the “generics 
paradox”. Whether generic entry and penetration affect originator prices in regulated 
European markets will be examined in the empirical section of the study. The 
hypothesis is that prices of the originator decreases after generic entry, as economic 
theory suggests. Further, prices are affected by regulation, such as reference prices.
P°  = f(comp,D,R)  (12)
where comp indicates the level of competition (generic entry or generic penetration), 
D is demand, and R indicates regulatory measures.
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4.6.2.2 The Ecomometric Model
We consider two empirical models to examine the effect of generics on 
originator prices. The first empirical model has the following form:
Put + f i0 + f t  genericsi t + ft2rpit + ft3capi t + ft4pcuti t + ft5pregil
34
+ ft6rorit + ft1hsysil + p %clawbit + f t9erit + £ ftjim e , (13)
n=I0
where i indicates the specific product in the specific country and t indicates time. In 
equation (13) the variable capturing the effect of generics on the originator price is 
generics, which is a dummy variable indicating the presence or not of generic 
alternatives to the originator product. The second empirical model is equation (14):
Pu = a i +fto+ftigenm sit + f i2rpit + fticapil + f t4pcutil + f t5pregi<t
34
+ ft6rorit + ft1hsysit + ft%clawbut + ft9erit + ftjim e, + uit (14)
10
where i indicates the specific product in the specific country and t indicates time. In 
equation (14) the variable capturing the effect of generics on originator prices is 
genms, which represents generic penetration.
hsys, rp , cap, pcut, preg, ror and clawb are policy dummy variables for the 
nature of the health system (how it is financed), the presence of reference pricing, 
price caps, price cuts, price regulation, rate-of-retum regulation and clawbacks 
respectively, er is the exchange rate and is used as a control variable, time represents 
all time dummy variables, one for each quarter.
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Generics market share is endogenous in this model because it affects the 
price of the branded medicine, but the price of the originator also affects generics 
market share. In order to address this problem we use two instrumental variables: 
age and sub. Age does not impact originator drug prices directly, because it does not 
relate to the overall age of the originator product, but only relates to time post-patent 
expiry. There is no apparent reason why originator drug prices should drop post­
patent expiry other than the introduction of policy/regulatory measures that might 
influence them. For instance, the implementation of a statutory requirement to 
reduce originator drug prices post-patent expiry will affect originator prices 
downwards, but is related to that particular measure of regulation rather than timing 
since patent expiry. As a result, time since patent expiry, captured by the age 
dummy is unrelated to the originator drug price. Similarly, sub is unrelated to the 
originator drug price post-patent expiry. The originator drug price would be 
impacted by another regulatory measure, notably reference pricing: should the 
originator drug wish to maintain a (nominal) market share post-patent expiry, the 
introduction of a reference pricing system would impact it downwards. By contrast 
substitution policies do not affect nominal originator drug prices.
For both models we estimate two specifications: Specification 1A and 2A, 
which include only generic entry or generic penetration, the exchange rate and time 
dummies, and specifications IB and 2B which also include all policy dummies as 
explanatory variables. Generic entry is used to capture a one-off effect of generics 
on originator prices, while generic market penetration is used to show the gradual 
effects of generic entry on prices over a period of time.
We use Panel Data analysis in order to estimate the model. Panel data is used 
because it can give “more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among
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variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency” (Gujarati 2003). Thus, 
having a different intercept for each country may allow us to have a better and more 
efficient model. The constant term, a, is different for each country i. The Hausman 
test suggests that we follow the random effects approach. The chi-squared statistic is 
0.22 with a p-value of 1.00, indicating that coefficients estimated by the efficient 
random effects estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the consistent fixed 
effects estimator, so it is safe to use random effects, which are a more efficient 
estimator than fixed effects. The random effects approach assumes that the 
intercepts of the individuals are different but that they can be treated as drawings 
from a distribution with mean \i and variance ca . The essential assumption here is 
that these drawings are independent of the explanatory variables. (Verbeek 2005).
The panel identifier in this model is the pharmaceutical product per country. 
In this way we can distinguish both between countries and between medicines. This 
is useful since there can be differences not only across countries but also across 
medicines within the same country.
4.6.3 Relationship between Variables
From economic theory, we expect that competitor entry into the market leads 
to lower prices. In a regular market, we would expect a negative coefficient for the 
variables capturing generic entry or penetration. The special nature of the 
pharmaceutical market though may lead to opposite results. According to the 
generics paradox, we would expect that generic entry will either not affect the price 
of the originator products, or that it will push them upwards. Therefore we would 
expect the coefficient to be statistically insignificant (which would be in accordance 
to research (Grabowski and Vernon (1992)), or, if statistically significant, to have a
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positive value, according to Frank and Salkever (1993), and Rizzo and Zeckhauser 
(2005). Nevertheless, the data used in this analysis concerns regulated markets (in 
contrast to the less regulated US market used in previous studies concerning the 
generics paradox), so our findings could be different.
We use two specifications in order to consider the generics paradox: The 
market share of generics -  or generic penetration (genms) and a dummy variable 
indicating the presence or not of generics on the market -  or generic entry {generics). 
We use each variable separately in different models. The results of the regressions 
for there coefficients will be very interesting for policy makers.
4.7 Results
Table 4.2 shows the results of the regressions for using generic entry or market 
share in order to test the presence of the generics paradox. Two different random 
effects models are used. Model 1 uses generic entry (generics) in order to capture 
the effect of generic competition and Model 2 uses generic market share (genms). In 
Model 2, age and sub are instrumental variables for endogenous variable genms. 
Reference pricing, price caps, price regulation, price cuts, the type of funding of the 
health system and clawbacks are used in order to explain changes in prices. Both 
models include two specifications. One with only generics or genms, er and time 
dummies as explanatory variables (A) and one also including all policy variables (B).
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Table 4.2 Random Effects - all countries
Dependent Variable: p
Model 1A Model 2A Model IB Model2B
generics 0.030*** 0.050***
(0.008) (0.014)
genms 2.67e-04 6.6e-05
(3.90e-04) (4.21e-04)
rp -0.027* 0.015
(0.015) (0.011)
cap 0.021** 0.014
(0.011) (0.011)
pcut -0.022** -0.027***
(0.009) (0.009)
preg -0.016 -0.021*
(0.011) (0.012)
ror 0.182 0.168
(0.678) (0.680)
hsys -0.210 -0.243
(0.680) (0.682)
clawb -0.354 -0.414
(0.569) (0.571)
er -0.264*** -0.252*** -0.236*** -0.267***
(0.043) (0.044) (0.053) (0.053)
constant term -0.398** -0.411** -0.138 -0.050
(0.196) (0.202) (0.747) (0.750)
Observations 1728 1728 1728 1728
Wald x sq 290.04 277.75 310.18 295.75
R-squared within 0.152 0.149 0.161 0.155
R-squared between 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005
R-squared overall 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005
standard errors in parenthesis.
(***). (**) and (*) refer to significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
Instruments for genms: age and sub
In Model 1A generics has a positive and statistically significant coefficient. 
Prices of originators that face generic competition are on average 3% higher than 
originators that do not face generic competition. In Model IB, that includes all other 
explanatory variables, findings are similar. Prices of originators are 5% higher in 
markets in which generic products are present (statistically significant at a=l%). cap 
has a positive coefficient that is statistically significant at the 5% level. Originator 
products sold in markets where generic price caps are present have higher prices by
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2.1% compared to those without such policies. The presence of reference pricing 
leads to lower branded prices by 2.7% compared to those in markets without 
reference pricing (statistically significant at a=10%). preg, ror, hsys and clawb are 
statistically insignificant.
In Model 2A, the coefficient of genms is positive but has a statistically 
insignificant effect on the prices of the originator medicine. This means that as 
generic penetration increases, there is no effect on the price of the originator product. 
The coefficient of genms is also positive but insignificant in Model 2B, in which 
other explanatory variables are included, pcut has a statistically significant negative 
coefficient. The presence of price cuts leads to lower originator prices by 2.7% on 
average. Originator medicine prices are lower by 2.1% on average when price 
regulation is implemented, rp, cap, ror, hsys and clawb are statistically insignificant.
These findings suggest the presence of the generics paradox in regulated 
markets. Generic entry has a positive and statistically significant effect on originator 
prices and generic penetration has a positive but insignificant effect. There appears 
to be a one-off effect of generic entry that pushes originator prices up. In any case, 
we do not find any evidence that originator prices decrease as a result of generic 
competition. This suggests that the generics paradox is present in regulated markets.
Regarding the effect of policies, results are robust. Price caps have a positive 
effect on originator prices. This can be explained. Price caps lead to significant price 
reductions of generic products. This makes more patients switch to generic products, 
leaving only the most brand loyal ones buying the originator product, whose demand 
is inelastic. This gives the originator producer the incentive to increase the 
medicine’s price in order to increase his revenue. This does not hold for reference 
pricing because this particular policy measure prevents the “race to the bottom”,
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preventing generic prices from declining further, hence the negative coefficient of rp 
(Reference pricing appears to lead to lower originator prices in both models). Price 
cuts have a statistically significant negative coefficient in both models, showing that 
direct price cuts on originator products lead to lower originator prices. Coefficients 
of price regulation are also negative but not as statistically significant.
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Table 4.3 Random Effects -  country-specific regressions
Dependent Variable: p
Model 1A Model 2A Model IB Model2B
Denmark
generics -0.025
(0.020)
-0.024
(0.020)
genms -0.002
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
Observations 288 288 288 288
Wald x sq 136.6 136.08 134.29 134.75
R-squared within 0.348 0.351 0.349 0.353
R-squared between 0.196 0.587 0.196 0.574
R-squared overall 0.008 0.143 0.008 0.134
Germany
generics 0.013
(0.026)
0.012
(0.026)
genms -0.004***
(0.001)
-0.004***
(0.001)
Observations 288 288 288 288
Wald x sq 17.54 33.24 19.01 34.58
R-squared within 0.065 0.009 0.065 0.009
R-squared between 0.063 0.001 0.063 0.001
R-squared overall 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Netherlands
generics 0.113***
(0.017)
0.113***
(0.017)
genms -0.001*
(0.001)
-0.003***
(0.001)
Observations 288 288 288 288
Wald x sq 250.65 169.13 250.65 218.87
R-squared within 0.498 0.374 0.498 0.408
R-squared between 0.185 0.217 0.185 0.005
R-squared overall 0.024 0.030 0.024 0.003
Norway
generics 0.038*
(0.022)
0.038*
(0.022)
genms 0.049
(0.051)
-0.183
(0.511)
Observations 288 288 288 288
Wald x sq 75.3 20.42 73.28 1.77
R-squared within 0.221 0.054 0.221 0.017
R-squared between 0.137 0.054 0.137 0.122
R-squared overall 0.005 0.122 0.005 0.115
Sweden
generics -0.008
(0.020)
-0.052
(0.019)
genms 0.004***
(0.001)
0.002***
(0.001)
Observations 288 288 288 288
Wald x sq 51.07 44.04 15.96 62.27
R-squared within 0.168 0.057 0.049 0.143
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R-squared between 0.020 0.022 0.021 0.028
R-squared overall 0.001 0.012 0.007 0.009
United Kingdom
generics 0.041***
(0.015)
0.018***
(0.014)
genms -3.24e-05
(0.001)
-4.71e-04
(0.001)
Observations 288 288 288 288
Wald x sq 53.83 46.56 18.4 50.21
R-squared within 0.180 0.148 0.060 0.106
R-squared between 0.413 0.194 0.413 0.121
R-squared overall 0.079 0.001 0.052 0.026
standard errors in parenthesis.
(***), (**) and (*) refer to significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
Instruments for genms: age and sub
After having considered all countries together, we proceed to examine each 
country separately (Table 4.3). The models estimated for each country separately are 
the same as the ones used for the aggregate regressions, but only the coefficients of 
generics and genms are reported in Table 4.3.
In the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom, generic entry has a 
positive and statistically significant effect, indicating that prices of originator 
products are higher post patent expiry. In Denmark, Germany and Sweden this is 
statistically insignificant. Generic penetration {genms) has a positive and statistically 
significant effect at the a=l% level in Sweden. In Norway and the United Kingdom 
it is statistically insignificant. In Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands genms has 
a negative and statistically insignificant coefficient. Thus generics paradox is present 
in the United Kingdom and Norway and is materialized upon generic entry, 
indicating a one-off effect. In Sweden, the generic paradox takes place gradually, as 
it is generic penetration rather than generic entry that leads to an increase in 
originator prices. In the Netherlands, generic entry leads to an upward shift of 
originator prices, but generic penetration offsets part of this increase. Neither generic
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entry nor penetration have any effect on originator prices in Denmark. In Germany, 
generic entry does not have any effect on originator prices, but generic penetration 
leads to marginal decreases in originator prices. A 1% increase in generic market 
share leads to a decrease in originator prices by 0.004%.
4.8 Policy Implications
The findings of studies on the generics paradox are important for policy 
makers as they provide evidence that price competition (following generic entry) 
does not necessarily lead to a decrease in the prices of originator products in 
environments where prices of medicines are not explicitly regulated. As generic 
presence does not trigger price competition with the originator product, no direct 
savings occur for health insurance by dispensing originator products. Thus, for 
generic policies to be effective, genericization needs to be swift and a switch to 
generic alternatives (generic substitution) must take place immediately after patent 
expiry, otherwise it is likely that continued use of a genericized originator is in itself 
unable to deliver savings to health insurance. In regulated pharmaceutical markets, it 
is possible that the generics paradox may be called into question and it is also 
possible that regulation may cause prices of originator medicines to decline, rather 
than increase, although this is dependent on market dynamics, the extent of 
regulation and the nature of competition within the product therapeutic class.
4.9 Concluding Remarks
This study examined whether the generics paradox holds in European 
markets with some level of regulation. A conceptual model was outlined in order to
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explain how brand loyalty influences the price of originator products. Market 
dynamics were explained and elasticity of demand was taken into account to explain 
why prices of originators do not decline post patent expiry. The empirical model 
demonstrated empirical evidence that the generics paradox holds in markets with a 
considerable degree of regulation. When including all 6 countries in panel data 
models, we find strong evidence that prices of originators rise with generic entry. 
When considering each country separately, we find evidence that the generics 
paradox is present in the United Kingdom, Norway and Sweden, as originator prices 
increase post patent expiry. In Sweden prices increase post patent expiry but part of 
this increase is offset as generic penetration takes place, while in Denmark generic 
entry does not affect originator prices. The only country in which generics lead to 
lower originator prices is Germany.
The findings of studies on the generics paradox are important for policy 
makers as they provide evidence that competition due to generic entry does not 
necessarily lead to a decrease in the prices of originator products in environments 
where prices of medicines are regulated.
The results of this study are subject to limitations: The countries considered 
in the analysis have a relatively more regulated pricing for pharmaceuticals, in 
contrast to the United States, which was the market considered by Frank and 
Salkever in the main study in the literature concerning the Generics Paradox. 
Nevertheless, there are some elements of flexible pricing arrangements, since the 
price may increase after permission from the authorities in all countries of the 
sample (in some other EU countries prices cannot increase in any way). Therefore, 
the results concern markets with these particular properties and cannot be 
generalized for all countries. Also, Brand loyalty is difficult to be quantified, so the
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effect of this important variable on originator prices could not be empirically tested, 
although it was included in the theoretical framework. Instruments were used in the 
econometric analysis to address endogeneity problems. Although they appear to be 
good instruments, is it difficult to say for sure that an instrumental variable works 
perfectly well.
Another limitation of this study is that the study period is probably too short 
to allow dynamic effects. Further research could use a longer time period with a 
longer period of post-genericization in order to observe the long-term dynamics of 
pricing of originator products and how the prices evolve until they reach their long­
term steady state. Further research could also consider countries with strict 
regulation such as France and Spain, which regulate very strictly increases in prices, 
to determine wheather the generics paradox would hold under strict regulation.
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5. Switching Behaviour Post Patent Expiry: Empirical Evidence 
from the EU
5.1 Background
Patent expiry is typically associated with generic entry, and the market share 
of the branded product declines as generic uptake takes place (Kanavos et al. 2008). 
This leads to a significant drop in the branded product’s producer’s revenue and 
could make him lose interest in that particular market. He may then focus on other 
patented products from other therapeutic classes which generate higher profits. This 
could be expressed by abandoning promotion and advertising of the product whose 
patent has expired and focusing these promoting efforts on other newer, patented 
products, in the market of which the firm acts like a monopolist.
This “abandonment” of a product produces an opportunity for the 
introduction of indirect patented substitutes, which are products with different 
chemical substance but within the same therapeutic category, to attract part of the 
off-patent molecule’s market share. The efforts of the indirect competitor (whose 
product has gone off-patent) concerning advertising is much weaker, so the other 
branded product that is still on patent with the same or less advertising efforts can 
secure higher sales.
Advertising intensity influences the choice of pharmaceutical products in an 
environment of product differentiation pre-patent expiry, where products are 
considered to be either broadly comparable or simply substitutes. Empirical 
evidence suggests that advertising, by means of detailing, has a powerful effect and 
systematically lowers price sensitivity because it increases brand loyalty, in addition
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to the effect of increasing a product’s sales (Rizzo, 1999), as well as having spillover 
effects, such that advertising by one firm in a therapeutic category increases demand 
for other medicines in the same category (Bemdt el al, 1995). In a study conducted 
by Bemdt, Danzon and Kruse (2007), it is empirically concluded that total 
promotion effects on medicine utilization is positive. The authors also suggest that 
promotion of new medicines positively affects their market share, which is also 
negatively affected by promotion of old medicines.
Dispensing dynamics of the market are of great importance for this analysis. 
There are policy elements that affect these dynamics. The more generic dispensing is 
encouraged, the lower the profits for the off-patent branded medicine and therefore 
the more likely is its producer to focus promotion efforts on other products.
Generic substitution policies targeting pharmacists aim to control costs. In 
some countries pharmacists are able to substitute a branded for a cheaper generic, if 
this is available. Pharmacists are typically remunerated by health insurance through 
fixed fees per prescription, progressive margins or regressive margins. The first two 
do not encourage generic dispensing, because in the case of the fixed fee they 
receive the same amount of money, no matter what is dispensed, while in the case of 
progressive margins they clearly have an incentive to dispense the most expensive 
medicine. It is regressive margins that may provide an incentive to dispense the 
cheapest medicine. Hence, this remuneration scheme encourages generic dispensing. 
Discounts provided to pharmacists from wholesalers though must not be neglected. 
These give an incentive to dispense the medicine that offers the highest discount to 
them and are beyond government control.
Policies targeting patients may also be present. Such policies are co­
payments and reference pricing. Co- payments that are a flat fee per prescription do
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not promote generic use. This can be promoted by percentage co-payments, though 
these are very modest in Europe. Reference pricing leaves the choice to the 
consumer, as under reference pricing the cheaper medicine is reimbursed, while 
patients willing to purchase the more expensive medicine will have to pay the 
difference.
Previous research has focused on competition between different molecules 
prior to generic entry or generic competition within the same molecule, but not on 
the effect generic entry has on the switch from one branded product to another. 
Studies suggesting the presence of competition within a therapeutic category give an 
indication that the switch effect may take place because they show that the chemical 
substances of the branded products are substitutes. Since generics of each product 
have the same chemical substance as the branded product, this switch in 
consumption may be encouraged by generic entry.
Kanavos, Costa-Font and McGuire (2007) studied competition between in­
patent statins in France, UK, Germany and the Netherlands. They examined the 
volume and price patterns of pravastatin and simvastatin, which were the first to 
enter the market, followed by the effects of entry of atorvastatin, cerivastatin and 
fluvastatin. Empirical evidence showed that price competition is present and has an 
impact on the first three entrants.
Danzon and Chao (2000) found no evidence of competition within 
therapeutic class in the US, but small negative effect on the price in France, Italy, 
Germany and the UK. In another study, the same authors got inconclusive results 
about the effect of substitution across therapeutic class and the first-mover 
advantages on product price. Finally, Ellison et al (1997) found small and not
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universally significant elasticities between therapeutic substitutes for the case of 
cephalosporins.
Regarding generic entry dynamics, empirical evidence from the USA 
suggests that innovator firms do not attempt to deter generic entry through their 
pricing strategies and this may lead to a significant reduction in market share of the 
originator medicine post generic entry (Grabowski and Vernon, 1992; Grabowski 
and Vernon, 1986). Frank and Salkever found empirical evidence from the United 
States that prices of originator products increase post patent expiry. Another study 
(Rizzo and Zeckhauser, 2005) provides empirical evidence that producers of brand- 
name products do not decrease prices after generic market entry. Finally, Caves, 
Whinston and Hurwitz (1991) conclude that generic entry only leads to a slow-down 
in the increase of originator medicine prices.
5.2 Objectives
Most studies concerning pharmaceutical competition has focused on the 
impact of generics on prices, market shares and sales. Significantly fewer studies 
have looked into competition on in-patent markets. No research has been done 
though on the effect of generic entry on a switch in consumption towards the market 
of a different medicine of the same therapeutic class. This study fills in this gap in 
the literature, giving insight into this element of competition. Presence of such a 
switch would lead to higher pharmaceutical costs, as in-patent medicines do not 
have generic alternatives. Generic policies can be completely ineffective when 
dealing with such a phenomenon. This should trigger the implementation of policies 
in order to discourage such a switch in consumption from off-patent to in-patent 
markets.
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Section 5.2 discusses advertising and its effects on the pharmaceutical 
market; section 5.3 provides a conceptual framework; section 5.4 provides 
information on ACE inhibitor markets and section 5.5 discusses regulatory measures 
implemented in the countries included in the study. Section 5.6 discusses data and 
methods and section 5.7 explains empirical results. Section 5.8 discusses policy 
implications and concludes.
5.3 The importance of Advertising
The switching effect discussed in this chapter is possibly a result of changes 
in promotional efforts on behalf of the firm whose molecule loses its patent, so we 
start the analysis by discussing how advertising can influence markets. The reason 
why advertising is chosen to be included in this context of switching and 
competition between molecules of the same therapeutic class is that, as can be seen 
in the next sub-sections, it influences volume of sales of both the advertiser and his 
competitors.
5.3.1 A dvertising and Industrial Organization
Advertising is a means of increasing sales or market share in a particular 
market. Tirole discussed the economics o f advertising in his book “Industrial 
Organization” (Tirole 1988). Advertisements inform consumers (or proxy- 
consumers such as doctors) about prices, distribution locations, product properties, 
and reduce product differentiation which originates from lack of information. 
Perception of quality increases due to advertising because firms producing high 
quality products can communicate information on quality (Tirole 1988). Theory
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suggests that there is a degree of substitutability of product characteristics such as 
quality and advertising. It is possible that advertising may increase competition by 
increasing elasticity of demand, but it may also lead to the opposite results by 
creating differences across products which seem identical. In the latter case it 
decreases elasticity of demand. In certain industries, firms may choose to compete in 
terms of advertising rather than pricing.
Increased advertising efforts are associated with higher sales, according to a 
review of the literature on advertising since the early 20th century conducted by 
Bagwell (2005). This association is considered to be “short lived”. Further, an 
increase in advertising by a competitor may decrease sales of a rival, which may, in 
turn, trigger a reciprocal reaction, by increasing his advertising efforts and gaining 
back his market share.
5.3.2 Sales promotion and the Pharmaceutical Market
Promotion expenditure accounts for a significant part of the total 
pharmaceutical industry expenditure. According to the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) report on marketing and promotion in the 
pharmaceutical industry, an IMS industry related study for 2006 concluded that the 
research-based U.S. pharmaceutical industry spent $56.1 billion on R&D and $12.0 
billion on promotional activities (PhRMA, 2010).
A study conducted by Gagnon and Lexchin (2008) disputed available figures 
on the cost of pharmaceutical promotional activities for 2004. The authors claim that 
their findings indicate that the U.S. pharmaceutical industry spends almost twice as 
much on promotion than on R&D. The industry spent 24.4% of their sales on 
promotion, while for the same year the spending on R&D accounted for 13.4% of
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sales. According to the authors, these findings contradict the figures that the IMS 
and the CAM Group (two market research companies) reported. The IMS had 
reported $33.5 billion spending on promotional activities by the U.S. pharmaceutical 
industry, while the CAM Group had reported $27.7 for 2004. The authors used both 
reports, which studied expenditure on promotional activities from a different point 
of view, in order to reach their conclusions. IMS studied promotion from an industry 
point of view, while the CAM Group studied promotion from a physician point of 
view. The authors concluded that the total expenditure on promotion was $57.5 
billion in 2004. No matter which figure is the actual one, it is clear that promotion 
accounts for a significant part of the pharmaceutical industry’s activities and is an 
important determinant of market dynamics.
5.3.3 Competition and Sales Promoting A divides
A therapeutic class includes medicines of similar but not identical chemical 
substances which are meant to target the same disease. They differ in terms of side 
effects and efficacy, but there may be a certain degree of substitutability. Each 
medicine of the class is subject to patent protection. The first entrant actually starts 
the whole therapeutic class, and acts as a monopolist, as there is no other medicine 
in the same therapeutic class and no generic versions due to patent protection. The 
monopolist has more bargaining power with health insurance when setting the price 
at which the product will be reimbursed, and also a lot of power when it comes to 
the question whether the product will be reimbursed at all or not, since there are no 
close substitutes. A monopoly is a market in which the price is higher than socially 
optimal and the quantity is lower than socially optimal (Mas- Collel et al. 1995).
128
Eventually, the so called “me-too” medicines enter the therapeutic class with 
new products, also protected by patents. This triggers competition between the 
different medicines of the same class. This can now be considered as a monopoly 
market, as there is interaction between producers, and one producer’s decisions and 
actions influence other producers’ strategies. Research on the exact nature of 
competition between medicines of the same class is very limited. Kanavos et al 
(2007) suggest that for the case of statins, after product entry has been materialized, 
producers follow a Cournot competition model. It could be argued that producers 
follow a monopolistic competition type of market structure. This is because the 
product is not homogenous as it has some degree of differentiation, with regards to 
the chemical substance. The most important element though is that it is perceived as 
a differentiated product. Each producer puts some advertising and promotional 
efforts into his product, in order to achieve a larger market share of the therapeutic 
class.
Generic entry creates new market dynamics. The off- patent product now faces 
competition not only from other medicines of the same class, but also from generic 
products. Post patent expiry, the physician, who acts as the patient’s agent, loses his 
power to determine that a particular branded product will be consumed. Generic 
prescribing and substitution policies eventually lead to the dispensing of a generic 
product rather than the branded one. A way to determine exactly which product and 
brand will be consumed by a patient which is covered by health insurance, is to 
prescribe a product which is still in- patent. This can be done by prescribing a 
medicine of the same therapeutic class, which is a close substitute (although not 
exactly the same chemical substance) and is still patent protected. This product will 
be the one that will be dispensed because it is the only available product of that
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particular chemical substance. Also, it cannot be substituted at the pharmacy because 
there is no generic substitute.
While the medicine was in- patent, it was competing against other molecules of 
the same therapeutic class under the same conditions. Advertising helps sustain 
market share if competitors are putting in equivalent advertising efforts, or increase 
it, if competitors choose to put in weaker advertising efforts. But patent expiry 
changes the environment and makes the market much more complicated for the off- 
patent molecule. Competition originates from both generics and in- patent medicines 
and the market share shrinks rapidly in favour of generics. With generic substitution 
and dispensing policies present, and facing competitors which are still in- patent, a 
monetary unit invested in an off- patent product has a smaller expected return than a 
monetary unit invested in an in- patent product. Therefore it is more profitable for 
the pharmaceutical firm producing the off- patent product to focus on (and advertise 
in) medicine markets of other in- patent products that it produces.
Bagwell’s findings (2005), discussed in section 5.2.1 are in accordance with the 
hypothesis that a decrease in advertising on behalf of the firm whose molecule lost 
its patent may lead to a switch in consumption to other medicines. First, advertising 
is considered to be “short lived”, meaning that the effects of advertising which 
happened in previous periods have a small impact on current sales. Thus even if 
previously the molecule was communicated extensively to consumers or their agents, 
the impact is small on future consumption which takes place long after advertising 
decreases or ceases (after generic entry). Second, advertising may reduce rivals’ 
sales at the same time that it increases own sales. Thus, by decreasing advertisement 
efforts, sales of other (rival) molecules are expected to increase, while own sales will 
decrease.
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5.4 Conceptual Framework
Consider a therapeutic class characterised by an originator molecule, and 
other molecules which follow in the same class and are also under patent protection. 
New innovative pharmaceutical products are subject to patent protection for 20 years. 
During their effective patent life they are, in effect, the monopolist provider of the 
molecule in question. If they are the only product in the class they have even more 
market power, because any substitutes are less close to the product in question, 
because they will belong to another therapeutic class. Eventually, other products 
enter the therapeutic class so the first molecule faces competition from other 
molecules of the same therapeutic class which target the same illness. A description 
of these market dynamics at class level is shown in Figure 5.1. Eventually, the 
patent of the first provider expires and generic versions of the first molecule enter 
the market. Gradually patents of other medicines also expire and generics of other 
molecules also enter the market. This in principle intensifies competition and puts 
existing originators under greater pressure in terms of volume due to the presence of 
more competitors. Depending on regulation, this pressure may be more or less 
intense. Reference pricing at the therapeutic class level makes in- patent molecules 
subject to reimbursement at prices of generic versions of off- patent molecules, 
hence creating more competition and more savings for health insurance.
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Figure 5.1 Competition in the Pharm aceutical M arket
Stage 1. New Class. One molecule. Monopoly at class level
Originator Producer 1
Stage 2. New molecules in class. Monopoly only at molecule level
Originator Producer 1 Originator Producer 2 Originator Producer 3
Stage 3. Generic entry. A producer loses monopoly at molecule level; all others still 
have monopoly power at molecule level
Originator Producer 1 Originator Producer 2 Originator Producer 3
Generic Producer 
1A
Generic Producer 
IB
Generic Producer 
1C
Stage 4. Patent expiry of another molecule. Another producer loses monopoly at 
molecule level; Others still have monopoly power at molecule level
Ongmator Producer 3Originator Producer 1 Ongmator Producer 2
Generic Producer Generic Producer Generic Producer
1A IB 1C
Generic Producer Generic Producer Generic Producer
2A 2B 2C
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Assume there is a firm which has developed an originator medicine 
(medicine A). The cost of R&D is a fixed cost, which is a sunk cost. In addition, 
there is a unit cost of production, c. Before the development of this medicine, other 
medicines were used for the treatment of the particular disease. In order to help the 
new medicine penetrate the market, promotional strategies are implemented. This 
involves a unit cost of promotion efforts. Promotion should lead to higher.
Medicine A is sold at price P a  . Total sales are Q a . Post patent expiry, 
generics enter the market and gain part of the market. When generic competitors are 
present, advertising has a smaller effect on volume than before entry. First, the 
originator has a smaller market share, which constantly decreases due to higher 
generic prescribing, dispensing and use. Second, there is a spillover effect to generic 
producers, “not only by increasing the number of prescriptions written for generics, 
but also through generic substitution of brand-written prescriptions” (Caves, 
Whinston, Hurwitz, 1991). Therefore advertising does not have as positive effect as 
prior to generic entry.
Profits from medicine A while it is still on-patent are:
11A =PAQA(l + a ) - CA Q A - k a  (U
Where a  is the net promotion multiplier, indicating how sales increase due to the 
originator producer’s promotional activities, and k  indicates the cost of advertising. 
Profits from medicine A post generic entry are:
^ A  = P A(l A ^  +  a ) - CA ^ A - k ( X  (2)
Where qA<QA, as part of the market is taken over by generics with sales qG, and 
9a  + 9 g  = Q a
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It is common though that the originator producer has other branded in-patent 
products in other therapeutic class markets. Suppose medicine B is such a medicine. 
Profits from in-patent medicine B are:
Differentiating profits with respect to a for product A and B respectively gives us:
Economic theory suggests that prices in a monopolistic market are higher than prices 
in an oligopolistic or competitive market, thus p B > p A. Even if this is not the case 
though, and prices in the two markets are the same, sales are not expected to be the 
same after generic entry in market A. Market B is an in-patent market, thus generic 
products do not have any market share, contrary to market A, which faces generic 
competition. Therefore, in most cases it is reasonable to expect that QB > qA .
If this holds, then PbQb ~ ^  > Pa(1a ~ ^  (6)
d n B 3 n  A . . . .=> > , which means that the marginal return to promotion in an in-patent
d a  d a
market is higher then the marginal return to promotion in an off-patent market. The 
immediate implication is that it pays more for a pharmaceutical firm to focus on new 
products than to focus on old ones. Thus it is expected that a firm which has a 
patented product will focus its promoting efforts on that particular product rather 
than on one that has gone off patent. If one of the determinants of demand is 
advertising, assuming a positive effect of promotional efforts on sales, then generic
n *  ~  P b Q b O - ^ ~ & )  c b Q b k a (3)
(4)
(5)
134
entry has a negative effect on sales. This is when producers of other products of the 
same therapeutic class may attract part of the market of the molecule which went 
off-patent (regardless of if they were already in the market or just entered), assuming 
that medicines of the same class may be close substitutes. Unfortunately, data on 
expenditure for promotional activities are not announced at product level. Further, 
aggregate data on promotional activities of the pharmaceutical industry have been 
disputed (Gagnon and Lexchin, 2008). Therefore in the empirical model we will not 
be able to take this important factor into account. However, les advertising would 
have a volume effect on the off-patent molecule and its competitors. Data on volume 
of the off-patent molecule and other molecules that are still in- patent can show 
whether such a switch in consumption from the off- patent product to in- patent 
products does take place, regardless of the source of the switch.
5.5 The Case of ACE Inhibitors
ACE (angiotensin-converting enzyme) Inhibitors are used for the treatment of 
hypertension and congestive heart failure (NICE 2004). The first ACE inhibitor to 
enter the market was Captorpril, followed by many other products (Enalapril, 
Lisinopril, Quinapril, Ramipril, Trandalopril, Periodinopril, Moexipril, Fisinopril, 
Benazepril, Cilazapril, Cilazapril, Zofenopril, Imidrapril, Spriapril). The study 
period is 1991-2006, where in total there were 14 ACE inhibitors on the market. It is 
generally accepted that they are interchangeable for the conditions they are used for 
(Salvetti 1990). In a double blind comparison between Captorpil and Enalapril 
(Vlasses et al 1986), the authors conclude that the two ACE inhibitors have similar 
antihypertensive effects and mechanisms of action. Similar findings occurred from a 
double blind multicentre comparison of captopril and enalapril (Rumboldt et al.
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1988). According to the findings, these two ACE inhibitors demonstrate 
“comparable effectiveness within the used dose range”, although enalapril was more 
potent, longer acting, and possibly safer. In a comparison of enalapril versus 
captopril on left ventricular function and survival three months after acute 
myocardial infarction (Foy et al 1994), results showed that the benefit to patients 
was similar with both ACE inhibitors and was in excess of the benefits of optimal 
conventional therapy.
In a comparison of treatment with lisinopril (the third ACE inhibitor to enter the 
market) versus enalapril for congestive heart failure (Zannad et al 1992), the results 
indicate that lisinopril 5-20 mg once daily is at least as effective and well tolerated 
as enalapril 5-20 mg once daily. Dews et al (1989) conducted a study with 
limitations due to the small number of patients, but found that lisinopril is as 
effective as enalapril in lowering blood pressure. Similar findings occurred from a 
study by Enstrom et al (1992). The authors conclude that “no difference was found 
in blood pressure lowering efficacy between enalapril and lisinopril even though the 
blood pressure changes were evaluated in a more comprehensive way than in earlier 
studies of these medicines”.
Rumboldt et al (1993) compared the antihypertensive efficacy and safety of 
lisinopril to those of captopril. The results showed that both medicines demonstrated 
similar efficiency and safety, although lisinopril was marginally more potent and 
longer acting. Morisco et al (1997) conducted a comparison study between captopril 
and lisinopril for the treatment of congestive heart failure in elderly patients. The 
results showed that “lisinopril 5-20 mg once daily is at least as effective and well 
tolerated as captopril 12.5-50 mg daily in the treatment of elderly patients with 
congestive heart failure”.
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These studies indicate that there is a high level of interchangeability between 
ACE inhibitors and allows us to make the hypothesis that there is competition 
between medicines of this therapeutic class. This interchangeability may concern 
new patients, but may also apply to existing patients.
Health insurance practice also provides some evidence on how ACE inhibitors 
are perceived by social planners. In the Netherlands, all ACE Inhibitors are subject 
to the same reference price, as the reference price is set at the therapeutic class level 
(Kanavos and Gemmill 2005). In the United Kingdom, in the outpatient guidance for 
hypertension, the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) does not 
distinguish between ACE inhibitors (NICE 2004), but simply refers to the whole 
class, showing that according to NICE they are considered as similar treatments.
If the result of an ACE inhibitor going off patent has a positive effect on volume 
of other molecules of the same class, while total volume for both the originator and 
generics of the off patent molecule decrease, this would indicate a switch in 
consumption from the off-patent molecule to molecules that are still on patent. The 
effect would be clear on medicine expenditure. The off- patent originator can be 
substituted by a generic alternative, which is cheaper than the originator. In- patent 
medicines though have no generic alternative, so the originator has to be dispensed, 
unless there is “therapeutic” substitution in place which, strictly speaking, is not 
allowed, unless all ACE inhibitors are clustered together in the same reference 
cluster and reference pricing system exists. Thus a product going off patent may not 
lead to as much savings for health insurance as it could potentially lead to if the 
switching in consumption did not take place.
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5.6 Pharm aceutical Policies
Regulation plays a significant role in pharmaceutical markets in the 
European Union. Policies heavily influence volume and quantity of medicines sold, 
as well as the choice between alternative products, e.g. the choice between an 
originator medicine and its generic alternative. Policies also play a significant role in 
the significant price differences observed across countries within the European 
Union. Consequently it is imperative that policies are taken into consideration in this 
analysis. This section provides a brief overview of the main policies implemented in 
the countries studied in this chapter. These policies are discussed in detail in the 
Appenix, with reference to all countries studied in this dissertation.
Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 indicate the presence or not of different 
policies in pharmaceutical markets in Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. Policies included in the tables are: Reference 
pricing (rp), clustering all molecules of the same therapeutic class for the purpose of 
reference pricing (clust), mandatory generic substitution at pharmacy (ms), optional 
generic substitution at pharmacy (os), generic price controls (gcont), regressive 
pharmacy markups (markup), profit controls (pc), clawbacks (iclawb), tax funded 
health insurance (tax), contribution-based health insurance (contrib) and the explicit 
use of cost effectiveness analysis in the reimbursement approval process (cea).
5.6,1 Reference Pricing
A reference price is the maximum price that health insurance will pay for a 
particular molecule. Molecules are grouped together and a price is determined for 
each group. The price is usually based on the average of the prices of the cheapest 
medicines. Cross country reference pricing is also common. In this case, prices of
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other countries from the European Economic Area are taken into account when 
defining the reference price. Medicines may be grouped at the molecule level or at 
the therapeutic class level. Health insurance reimburses the reference price while the 
price difference for any medicine whose price exceeds the reference price will have 
to be paid out-of-pocket by the patient (Lopez-Casasnovas, Puig 2000, PPRI pharma 
profiles 2008).
5.6.2 Generic Substitution
Generic substitution refers to the pharmacists’ right or obligation (depending 
on regulation) to substitute a branded prescription medicine with its generic, when 
the medicine has been prescribed by brand name (PPRI pharma profiles 2008). Such 
policies help generic penetration.
5.6.3 Generic price controls
In some countries, generic medicines are subject to a price cap or a 
maximum price as a percentage of the price of the corresponding originator product. 
This percentage is usually gradually reduced with time (PPRI pharma profiles 2008).
5.6.4 Regressive Pharmacy margins
Depending on regulation, pharmacists are remunerated based on flat fees per 
prescription, fixed margins, progressive margins or regressive margins. Under flat 
fee schemes, pharmacists are indifferent with regards to the cost of the medicine 
dispensed. Fixed margins and progressive margins actually provide an incentive for 
pharmacists to dispense the most expensive medicine. It is more profitable for them
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to dispense the originator than the (cheaper) generic. It is regressive pharmacy 
margins which actually provide an incentive to pharmacists to dispense (cheaper) 
generic medicines rather than the (more expensive) originator. In an effort to contain 
costs, pharmacists are remunerated based on regressive margins in many European 
countries (PPRI pharma profiles 2008).
5.6.5 Profit controls
Profit controls are a form of rate-of-retum regulation (OFT 2007,DoH 2008). 
When this policy measure is present, the manufacturer is allowed to make profits up 
to a certain rate of the capital invested. Any profits exceeding this must be paid back 
to health insurance. This policy is present in the United Kingdom.
5.6.6 Explicit use o f  Cost Effectiveness A nalysis (CEA)
Cost Effectiveness Analysis is explicitly used in determining 
pricing/reimbursement rates of pharmaceutical products in some countries. This is a 
form of regulation applied to medicines prior to their entry into the market and used 
as an implicit means of quality assurance in that products requesting a price 
premium over similar products have to prove they are better than their competitors 
in clinical terms.
5.6.7 Clawbacks
When clawbacks are implemented, health insurance may retrieve part of the 
discounts given to pharmacists by wholesalers (PPRI pharma profiles 2008, 
Kanavos and Costa-Font 2005).
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5.6.8 Tax funded or NHS-type health insurance
Health systems may be organized as an NHS-type or an insurance-based 
system. NHS-type systems have gatekeeper arrangements in place through general 
practitioners and potentially restrict demand for health services, including 
pharmaceuticals, compared with social insurance-based systems where access to 
specialists is still safeguarded.
Table 5.1 Policy Measures 1992-2006, Denmark
Year n* clust sm so gcont markup pc clawb tax contrib cea
1992 no no no yes no yes no no yes no no
1993 yes no no yes no yes no no yes no no
1994 yes no no yes no yes no no yes no no
1995 yes no no yes no yes no no yes no no
1996 yes no no yes no yes no no yes no no
1997 yes no yes no no yes no no yes no no
1998 yes no yes no no yes no no yes no no
1999 yes no yes no no yes no no yes no no
2000 yes no yes no no yes no no yes no no
2001 yes no yes no no yes no no yes no no
2002 yes no yes no no yes no no yes no no
2003 yes no yes no no yes no no yes no no
2004 yes no yes no no yes no no yes no no
2005 yes no yes no no yes no no yes no yes
2006 yes no yes no no yes no no yes no yes
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Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Table 5.2 Policy M easures 1992-2006, France
n> clust sm so gcont markup pc clawb tax contrib cea
no no no no yes yes no no no yes no
no no no no yes yes no no no yes no
no no no no yes yes no no no yes no
no no no no yes yes no no no yes no
no no no no yes yes no no no yes no
no no no no yes yes no no no yes no
no no no no yes yes no no no yes no
no no no yes yes no no no no yes no
no no no yes yes no no no no yes no
no no no yes yes no no no no yes no
no no no yes yes no no no no yes no
yes no no yes yes no no no no yes no
yes no no yes yes yes no no no yes no
yes no no yes yes yes no no no yes no
yes no no yes yes yes no no no yes no
Table 5.3 Policy measures 1992-2006, Germany
rp clust sm so gcont markup pc clawb tax contrib cea
yes no no no no yes no no no yes no
yes no no no no yes no no no yes no
yes no no no no yes no no no yes no
yes no no no no yes no no no yes no
yes no no no no yes no no no yes no
yes no no no no yes no no no yes no
yes no no no no yes no no no yes no
yes no no no no yes no no no yes no
yes no no no no yes no no no yes no
yes no no no no yes no no no yes no
yes no no yes no yes no no no yes no
yes no no yes no no no no no yes no
yes no yes yes no no no yes no yes no
yes no yes no no no no yes no yes no
yes yes yes no no no no yes no yes no
Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Table 5.4 Policy Measures 1992-2006, N etherlands
rp clust sm so gcont markup pc clawb tax contrib cea
yes yes no no no no no no no yes no
yes yes no no no no no no no yes no
yes yes no no no no no no no yes no
yes yes no no no no no no no yes no
yes yes no yes no no no no no yes no
yes yes no yes no no no no no yes no
yes yes no yes no no no yes no yes no
yes yes no yes no no no yes no yes yes
yes yes no yes no no no yes no yes yes
yes yes no yes no no no yes no yes yes
yes yes no yes no no no yes no yes yes
yes yes no yes no no no yes no yes yes
yes yes no yes no no no yes no yes yes
yes yes no yes no no no yes no yes yes
yes yes no yes no no no yes no yes yes
Table 5.5 Policy Measures 1992-2006, Sweden
T clust sm so gcont markup pc clawb tax contrib cea
no no no no yes yes no no yes no no
yes no no no yes yes no no yes no no
yes no no no yes yes no no yes no no
yes no no no yes yes no no yes no no
yes no no no yes yes no no yes no no
yes no no no yes yes no no yes no no
yes no no no yes yes no no yes no no
yes no no no yes yes no no yes no no
yes no no no yes yes no no yes no no
yes no no no yes yes no no yes no no
no no yes yes yes yes no no yes no yes
no no yes yes yes yes no no yes no yes
no no yes yes yes yes no no yes no yes
no no yes yes yes yes no no yes no yes
no no yes yes yes yes no no yes no yes
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Table 5.6 Policy Measures 1992-2006, United Kingdom
Year rp clust sm so gcont markup pc clawb tax contrib cea
1992 no no no no no no yes no yes no no
1993 no no no no no no yes no yes no no
1994 no no no no no no yes no yes no no
1995 no no no no no no yes no yes no no
1996 no no no no no no yes no yes no no
1997 no no no no no no yes yes yes no no
1998 no no no no no no yes yes yes no no
1999 no no no no no no yes yes yes no no
2000 no no no no yes no yes yes yes no yes
2001 no no no no yes no yes yes yes no yes
2002 no no no no yes no yes yes yes no yes
2003 no no no no yes no yes yes yes no yes
2004 no no no no yes no yes yes yes no yes
2005 no no no no yes no yes yes yes no yes
2006 no no no no yes no yes yes yes no yes
5.7 Data and Methods
5.7.1 Data
Data used are obtained from the Intercontinental Medical Statistics (IMS) -  
MIDAS database. Collected and reported data are based on actual invoiced prices 
and sales. Within the European context, list of prices of prescription medicines are 
actually reimbursed by health insurance. Data are quarterly and concern the 1991- 
2006 period for 14 Plain ACE inhibitors (Captopril, Enalapril, Lisinopril, Quinapril, 
Ramipril, Trandalopril, Periodinopril, Moexipril, Fisinopril, Benazepril, Cilazapril, 
Cilazapril, Zofenopril, Imidrapril, Spriapril) in six European countries (Germany, 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, France, Denmark) for the retail
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(pharmacy) market in each country. Data were available for originator and generic 
versions of each molecule.
5.7.2 The Empirical Model
As expenditure data on promotional activities for each product separately are 
not available, it was not possible to include this important variable in the empirical 
model. However, the use of advertising as an explanatory variable would be 
endogenous and thus not suitable for the model, as it would be difficult to find a 
good instrumental variable for this. Without advertising data, the empirical model 
can show a possible switch in consumption volume using price, sales, competition 
and regulation data. The source of this possible switch can be theoretically attributed 
to a drop in promotional activities for the off- patent product and the constitution of 
promotional activities for those products in the same class that are still in-patent. 
The purpose of the empirical model is to explain the variation in volume as a 
function of generic presence, the number of competitors, regulatory measures and 
time. The empirical model is shown in equations (7) (8) and (9).
1 n Q T  = Pi +Po+ P\°ffu + P iN it +P2Nsqit + PAsuhit +P5rpit + P6gcontit
72
+ P1markupi( + Pspcu + p 9clawbit + Pl0taxu + Puceait
*=12
toQu =P, +Po+ p\°ffit + P iN i, +PiNs(lit +P*subit + p 5rpu +J36gcontit
72
+ P ^arkupx  + Pspcit + p 9clawbit + PXQtaxit + p uceait + p ktimeit + uit (8)
*=12
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Inr Q Z ^
kQu j
= Pi + Pa + Pi°ff„ + A Nu+ PiNsq,, + PAsub„ + fi5rpu + P6gconl„
72
+ Pmarkupit + P%pcit + p 9clawbit + P]0taxit + Puceait + Y ^P ^ im^u + Mu (9)
*=12
where i indicates the specific product in a specific country and t indicates time. £jt, Wjt 
and p\t are the error terms in equations (7), (8) and (9) respectively. The dependent 
variable in equation (9) can be expressed as the difference of the logs of Q1P and
Q?p . This follows the mathematical properties of logarithms, according to which
f (X^
log = log o r-log/?. Consequently, the dependent variable of equation (9) can
y P j
IP  i  r \O Pbe expressed as log Qu - log Qj;
Q°p indicates volume of the product which goes off patent measured in 
number of milligrams. Qjp indicates volume of all other products in the same
therapeutic class which are in patent when the study medicine goes off patent (also 
measured in milligrams), off is a dummy variable, indicating generic entry. The 
dummy takes the value of 1 when generic entry occurs for a product (j) in a country 
(i); 0 elsewhere. Generic entry is identified and confirmed by (a) patent records for 
the branded product and (b) separate entries of sales, volumes and prices of generics 
by firms other than the holders of the original patent (generic companies). N  is the 
number of generic competitors on the market. Nsq is the square of the number of 
generic competitors. This is included because the number of competitors as a 
determinant of volume competition is not linear. The effects are diminishing, 
therefore we assume a quadratic effect of competition. There is also a number of 
policy dummies included in the model: sub indicates the presence of generic
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substitution policies, rp indicates the presence of reference pricing, gcont represents 
generic price controls, markup indicates markup regulation, pc  indicates price 
controls, clawb is the presence of clawbacks and tax indicates that the health system 
is tax funded, and cea indicates the use of cost effectiveness analysis in 
pharmaceutical policy. Finally, time dummies are included for each of the 61 
quarters (time observations) in the data. Summary statistics for captopril, enalapril 
and lisinopril, which are the first ACE inhibitors on the market for the 6 study 
countries, which also went off- patent in this order, are shown in Tables 5.7, 5.8 and 
5.9 respectively.
Table 5.7 Summary Statistics, Captopril
Variable Obs M ean Std. Dev.
to & r  366 12.522 1.480in a ?
f
3089 9.235 2.324
3632 0.620 0.485
3632 3.375 6.618
3632 55.169 169.420
3632 0.149 0.356
3632 0.608 0.488
3632 0.398 0.490
3632 0.526 0.499
3632 0.168 0.374
3632 0.222 0.416
3632 0.446 0.497
3632 0.188 0.391
366 -2.392 1.591
N
Nsq
sm
rp
gcont
markup
pc
clawb
tax
cea
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Table 5.8 Summary Statistics, Enalapril
Variable Qbs Mean Std. Dev.
366 11.912 1.006
V/ »=i J 366 -2.396 0.997
In f if 2723 8.875 2.213
off 3266 0.438 0.496
N 3266 2.386 5.183
Nsq 3266 32.550 114.088
sm 3266 0.147 0.354
rp 3266 0.607 0.489
gcont 3266 0.398 0.490
markup 3266 0.524 0.499
pc 3266 0.168 0.374
clawb 3266 0.222 0.415
tax 3266 0.440 0.496
cea 3266 0.186 0.389
Table 5.9 Summary Statistics, Lisinopril
Variable Qbs Mean Std. Dev.
*n Q T  366 10.927 1.543
/  \
/ S a f
\ /  »=1 y 366 -2.751 1.502
In e f 2357 8.556 2.129
off 2900 0.255 0.436
N 2900 1.385 3.575
Nsq 2900 14.697 67.712
sm 2900 0.144 0.351
rp 2900 0.605 0.489
gcont 2900 0.398 0.490
markup 2900 0.522 0.500
pc 2900 0.168 0.374
clawb 2900 0.221 0.415
tax 2900 0.432 0.495
cea 2900 0.183 0.387
148
Equation (7) shows the effect of generic entry on the evolution of total 
volume (originator and generic after patent expiry) for the product which goes off- 
patent. Equation (8) shows how volume of other products in the same therapeutic 
class is affected by generic entry in the product which goes off-patent. Equation (9) 
is introduced in order to capture the effect of generic entry on the relative volume of 
the product which goes off-patent compared to all other medicines in the same class.
Although equations (7) and (8) are useful as they demonstrate the effect of 
patent expiry on the total volume (originator and generic) of the particular molecule, 
their findings do not necessarily confirm or contradict the presence of a switching 
effect. Total volume of the off-patent molecule may increase as a result of patent 
expiry but at a slower rate or not as much as the total volume of in patent ACE 
inhibitors. Similarly, the total volume of the off-patent molecule may decrease, but 
at a slower rate than the total volume of the in patent ACE inhibitors. Therefore, 
equations (7) and (8) separately do not provide evidence regarding the presence or 
not of the switching effect.
This is why equation (9) is introduced. This equation helps overcome 
possible problems which would occur due to a shock in demand for ACE inhibitors 
and changes in total market size. Equation (9) shows whether the switching effect of 
consumption from off patent molecules to in patent ACE inhibitors does or does not 
occur. A negative and statistically significant coefficient would suggest that the ratio 
of the volume of the off patent molecule over the volume of in patent molecules 
decreases post patent expiry, this would, in turn, suggest that the switching effect is
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present. Separate estimates are run for each of the three first ACE inhibitors that 
went off patent, namely captopril, enalapril and lisinopril, in this order.
The coefficient of o ff shows the effect of generic entry on volume of either 
the ACE inhibitor which goes off patent (equation 7), or the sum of all other ACE 
inhibitors. A negative coefficient for off in equation (7) would show that generic 
entry in the market of a particular ACE inhibitor leads to a decrease in the sum of 
originator and generic volume. A positive coefficient for o ff in equation (8) would 
suggest that volume of in-patent ACE inhibitors increases following generic entry in 
another ACE inhibitor. A negative coefficient for o ff in equation (9) would indicate 
that the volume of the molecule which goes off patent decreases relative to the 
volume of in-patent ACE inhibitors. All three cases mentioned above would suggest 
the presence of a switch in consumption.
Recent studies have emphasized the importance of pharmaceutical regulation 
whether on the supply- or the demand-side (Lopez-Casasnovas and Puig 2000, 
Kanavos et al, 2008; Kanavos and Costa-Font, 2005). The presence of generic 
substitution policies is expected to encourage switching behaviour (Kanavos et al 
2008). Generic substitution policies put pressure on the branded product’s market 
share, leading to lower revenue, and in practice limiting the effect of promotional 
activities. Thus, the producer has an incentive to promote other products in his 
portfolio which are on patent rather than focus on ACE inhibitors anymore. This 
would lead producers of in-patent ACE inhibitors to increase their market share by 
attracting a part of the off-patent molecules market share.
A higher number of generic competitors is also expected to encourage 
switching behaviour for the same reason. More generic competitors implies a higher 
price competition between generics, and, consequently, lower generic prices and a
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smaller market share for the originator. Again, the producer of the originator will 
“abandon” promotion effects in the particular market, allowing other ACE inhibitors 
to gain part of its market share.
Panel data is used to complete the analysis because it can give more 
informative data estimates, greater variability, less collinearity among variables, 
more degrees of freedom and higher efficiency (Gujarati 2003). Having a different 
intercept for each country and product allows us to have a more efficient model. The 
constant term, /?, is different for each molecule in each country and is determined 
using either fixed or random effects. We assume heterogeneity between countries 
due to the fact that different policies apply. Based on this assumption, the constant 
term that is different for each country captures the effects of those variables that are 
peculiar to the z-th individual and that are constant over time. The error term is 
assumed to be independent and identically distributed over products and time, with 
mean zero and variance oe2. Alternatively, the random effects approach assumes that 
the intercepts of the individuals are different but that they can be treated as drawings 
from a distribution with mean p and variance oa2. The essential assumption here is 
that these drawings are independent of the explanatory variables. Apart from the 
analysis including all six countries, regressions are also run for each country 
separately. However, in the latter case ordinary least squares are used instead of 
panel data, because of the presence of only one group per regression.
In estimating equations (7), (8) and (9), we have used panel data random 
effects. The Hausman Test suggests that we follow the random effects approach: 
The Chi-squared statistic is 0.32, indicating that the difference between the 
consistent fixed effects and the random effects estimator is statistically insignificant. 
Therefore, it is safe to use random effects (which provides a more efficient estimator
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compared to fixed effects) as, according to the Hausman test, they give consistent 
results.
Figure 5.2 shows the evolution of the ratio of captopril, enalapril and 
lisinopril volume over all in- patent ACE inhibitor volume in the United Kingdom. 
The vertical line indicates the point at which each molecule goes off patent. The 
graph shows that the ratio declines at a faster rate post patent expiry for captopril 
and enalapril. In the case of lisinopril, although the ratio increases prior to patent 
expiry, it decreases sharply after generic entry. Figure 5.3 shows the evolution of the 
ratio of captopril, enalapril and lisinopril volume over all in- patent ACE inhibitor 
volume in the Netherlands. The vertical line indicates the point at which captopril 
goes off patent Results are not as clear as in the case of the United Kingdom. The 
rate of enalapril over other ACE inhibitors appears to decline at a faster rate, and the 
ratio of captopril over other molecules decreases sharply post patent expiry, but this 
only follows another period of sharp decrease that was interrupted by a short period 
of steep increase. No effect seems to be present in the case of lisinopril. Figure 5.4 
demonstrates the case of France, where there is no evident sign of a switch post 
patent expiry. These figures are indicative only, and the analysis does not rely on 
graphical representations. Graphs show a two- dimension relationship only and do 
not include other factors which may affect volume. This is why we focus on 
econometric analysis which allows controlling for many other factors, such as 
number of generic competitors and regulation, which plays a primary role in 
pharmaceutical markets.
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Figure 5.2 Ratio of captopril, enalapril and lisinopril volume (originator and
generics) over volume of all in- patent ACE Inhibitors (originators and generics)
evolution, United Kingdom
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Figure 5.3 Ratio of captopril, enalapril and lisinopril volume (originator and 
generics) over volume of all in- patent ACE Inhibitors (originators and generics)
evolution, Netherlands
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Figure 5.4 Ratio of captopril, enalapril and lisinopril volume (originator and
generics) over volume of all in- patent ACE Inhibitors (originators and generics)
evolution, France
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5.8 Results
Equations (7) and (9) could be estimated simultaneously. This could 
potentially lead to a more efficient estimator, but would not lead to any gains in 
terms of consistency. In order to see if estimating the two equations simultaneously 
would improve efficiency, the correlation between the residuals in the two equations 
was observed. Correlation between residuals is small, thus there is no need to 
estimate them jointly.
5.8.1 Results at the aggregate level
Table 5.10 shows the regression results for equation (7), for the cases of 
captorpil, enalapril and lisinopril. In the case of captopril, the coefficient of off is 
negative (-0.702) and statistically significant (a=5%). This indicates a decrease in
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the total volume, originator and generic, of captopril post patent expiry. The number 
of generic competitors in the captopril market of each country has a negative and 
statistically significant effect, sub has a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient. This result suggests that when generic substitution policies are present 
the volume of the off patent ACE inhibitor increases post patent expiry. Generic 
price controls, regressive pharmacist markups and profit controls all have a positive 
and statistically significant effect on total captopril volume. Reference price, 
clawbacks and the use of CEA do not appear to have a significant effect on volume.
In the estimation results for enalapirl, off has a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient (a=l%). Generic substitution policies have a positive and 
weakly statistically significant effect. The effect of reference pricing is statistically 
insignificant. Generic price controls and profit controls have a positive and 
significant effect (a=l%) on enalapril volume post patent expiry. The coefficients of 
regressive pharmacist markups and clawbacks are negative and statistically 
significant.
The coefficient of off in the regression results for lisinopril is positive and 
statistically significant (a=l%). The calculation is made in the same way as for 
captopril and enalapril. Generic substitution policies lead to lower volume of 
lisinopril when it goes off patent. Reference pricing has no effect, as in the case of 
captopril and enalapril. Generic price controls, regressive pharmacist markups, profit 
controls and clawbacks have a positive and statistically significant effect on 
lisinopril volume.
The findings for captopril markets are different than enalapril and lisinopril 
markets. In the case of captopril, the coefficient of off is negative, demonstrating a 
decrease in total captopril volume post patent expiry. The opposite holds for
155
enalapril and lisinopril. These findings alone do not say much about the presence or 
not of a switch in consumption from an off patent ACE inhibitor to an in patent one 
as a result of generic entry. An increase in enalapril and lisinopril volume does not 
necessarily contradict the switching effect, as the volume of the in patent ACE 
inhibitors may increase at a faster rate post patent expiry. This would be the result of 
an increasing market of ACE inhibitors, out of which the molecules that go off 
patent gain a relatively smaller share. Consequently, the effect on the volume of 
captopril, enalapril and lisinopril post patent expiry has to be taken into 
consideration together with the effect on the volume of the in patent ACE inhibitors, 
as well as the relative changes compared to these other molecules. Estimation results 
of equations (8) and (9) will help draw a clear picture.
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Table 5.10 Random Effects Panel Data Estimation, off patent molecule volume
six countries
Dependent Variable:
Captopril Enalapril Lisinopril
off -0.702** 1.265*** 1.338***
(0.299) (0.316) (0.357)
N -0.076*** -0.101*** -0.082***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.011)
Nsq 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.005***
(1.39e-04) (1.54e-04) (2.88e-04)
sub 0.415*** 0.120* -0.288***
(0.089) (0.073) (0.075)
rp -0.035 -0.068 0.002
(0.087) (0.078) (0.082)
gcont 0.719*** 0.551*** 0.922***
(0.084) (0.063) (0.050)
markup 0.535*** -0.574*** 0.340***
(0.116) (0.107) (0.125)
pc 3.353*** 1.228*** 3.637***
(0.174) (0.174) (0.159)
clawb -0.100 -0.161*** 0.258***
(0.067) (0.062) (0.070)
tax -3.047*** -1.024*** -2.105***
(0.119) (0.103) (0.081)
cea -0.129 -0.075 -0.280***
(0.095) (0.084) (0.089)
constant 13.023*** 11.749*** 10.054***
(0.227) (0.257) (0.237)
Observations 366 366 366
Rsq within 0.428 0.641 0.781
Rsq between 0.992 0.994 0.998
Rsq overall 0.948 0.909 0.966
Wald chi sq 9568.03 7055.33 27116.58
* ** *** refer t0 statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Standard errors in parenthesis
After having estimated the effect of generic entry on the volume of the 
molecule which goes off-patent, we examine the effect on volume of all other ACE
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inhibitors. Estimation results of equation (8) are shown in Table 5.11. Captopril 
generic entry leads to an increase in volume of other molecules in the same class 
(statistically significant at a=5%). When captopril goes off patent, the total volume 
of all in patent ACE inhibitors increases. Generic substitution policies, generic price 
controls, profit controls and clawbacks lead to an increase in the volume of all in 
patent ACE inhibitors. Reference price has no effect, while regressive pharmacist 
markups have a negative effect on volume.
In the case of enalapril, off has a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient, indicating that generic entry leads to an increase in the total volume of 
all in patent ACE inhibitors. Generic substitution policies, generic price controls, 
profit controls and clawbacks lead to an increase in the volume of all in patent ACE 
inhibitors in the case of enalaril. Reference price has no effect and regressive 
pharmacist markups have a negative effect on volume.
Lisinopril patent expiry leads to an increase in the total volume of all other 
in-patent ACE inhibitors. This follows the estimation of the coefficient of off after 
controlling for the variables included in the econometric model. In the case of 
lisinopril, generic substitution policies, generic price controls, profit controls and 
clawbacks lead to an increase in the volume of all in patent ACE inhibitors. 
Reference price has no effect while regressive pharmacist markups have a negative 
effect on volume. The findings which occur from the estimation of equation (9) 
show the impact of generic entry in each of the three molecules considered in the 
study on the total volume of the other ACE inhibitors which remain in patent. 
Evidence is clear and shows that generic entry in captopril, enalapril and lisinopril 
leads to an increase in the volume of the in patent ACE inhibitors. This itself does 
not confirm the presence of a switch in consumption. When considered together
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with the estimation results of equation (7), the findings suggest that the switching 
effect is present in the case of captorpril because captopril generic entry leads to a 
decrease in the total volume of captorpil (occurring from the estimation results of 
equation (7)) and an increase in the total volume of all in patent ACE inhibitors 
(occurring from the estimation results of equation (8)). We cannot conclude the 
same for enalapril and lisinorpil. Generic entry for each of these two medicines leads 
to both an increase in volume of the molecule which goes off patent (findings from 
the estimation of equation (7)) and an increase in the volume of all in patent ACE 
inhibitors (findings from the estimation of equation (8)). In order to make things 
clear, we proceed to estimate equation (9), which considers the effect of patent 
expiry on the ration of the volume of the product which goes off patent over the total 
volume of all other in patent ACE inhibitors.
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Table 5.11 Random Effects Panel Data Estimation, in patent molecule volume,
six countries 
Dependent Variable: In
Captopril Enalapril Lisinopril
o ff 1.542*** 1.700*** 1.965***
(0.252) (0.278) (0.315)
N -0.017*** 0.002 0.040***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.011)
Nsq 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002***
(1.80e-04) (2.95e-04) (3.90e-04)
sub 0.136** 0.129* 0.258***
(0.068) (0.077) (0.087)
rp -0.058 -0.053 -0.052
(0.064) (0.072) (0.078)
gcont 0.483*** 0.641*** 0.686***
(0.074) (0.081) (0.091)
markup -0.486*** -0.547*** -0.686***
(0.075) (0.080) (0.088)
pc 1.400*** 1.448*** 1.359**
(0.538) (0.513) (0.582)
clawb 0.392*** 0.405*** 0.327***
(0.051) (0.055) (0.062)
tax -1.837*** -2.032*** -2.203***
(0.396) (0.388) (0.447)
cea 0.024 0.002 0.025
(0.062) (0.068) (0.075)
constant 7.898*** 7.403*** 6.970***
(0.303) (0.314) (0.358)
Observations 3089 2723 2357
Rsq within 0.426 0.451 0.462
Rsq between 0.163 0.205 0.211
Rsq overall 0.177 0.216 0.212
Wald chi sq 1889.91 1908.81 1760.04
****** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
Standard errors in parenthesis
Equation (9) is the most important of all three equations estimated in this 
study. It does not only show the effects on the off patent molecule or on all in patent
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ACE inhibitors separately, but also the joint effect on the relative volume of these 
two categories. Results are in Table 5.12. The findings of this equation are not 
distorted by an increase or decrease of total market size, as what matters is how the 
market is distributed between the molecule which goes off patent and all other ACE 
inhibitors, rather than the absolute volume of each of these categories.
In the case of captopril, the ratio of the total volume of captopril over the 
total volume of all other ACE inhibitors decreases post patent expiry. The 
coefficient of off is negative and statistically significant. Generic substitution 
policies have a positive effect on the ratio, meaning that the volume of the molecule 
that goes off patent increases compared to the volume of the other in patent ACE 
inhibitors. The effect of generic price controls, regressive mark-ups for pharmacists 
and price controls is positive and statistically significant. Clawbacks, reference 
pricing and the explicit use of cost effectiveness analysis for reimbursement 
purposes do not have a statistically significant effect on the ratio of volumes.
The coefficient of off in the regression for enalapril is also negative, 
suggesting that the switching effect is also present for the second ACE inhibitor 
which faces generic entry. Post enalapril generic entry, the ratio of the total volume 
of enalapril over the total volume of all other ACE inhibitors decreases. Similar to 
the case of captopril, generic substitution policies have a positive effect on the ratio. 
The effect of generic price controls, regressive mark-ups for pharmacists and price 
controls is positive and statistically significant. Clawbacks have a negative and 
statistically significant effect. Reference pricing and the explicit use of cost 
effectiveness analysis for reimbursement purposes do not have a statistically 
significant effect on the ratio of volumes.
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Finally, the estimation results of equation (9) also indicate the presence of a 
switching in consumption towards patent protected ACE inhibitors after lisinopril 
generic entry. On average the ratio of the total volume of lisinopril over the total 
volume of all other ACE inhibitors decreases post patent expiry. Substitution 
policies have a negative and statistically significant effect on the volume ratio. 
Generic price controls, regressive pharmacist mark-ups, price controls and 
clawbacks have a statistically significant positive effect on the volume ratio. Once 
again reference pricing has an insignificant effect.
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Table 5.12 Random Effects Panel Data Estimation, ratio of volumes,
six countries
Dependent Variable: In
Captopril Enalapril Lisinopril
O ff -2.213*** -0.859*** -0.841***
(0.287) (0.308) (0.264)
N -0.076*** -0.101*** -0.082***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.011)
Nsq 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.005***
(1.39e-04) (1.54e-04) (2.88e-04)
sub 0.415*** 0.120* -0.288***
(0.089) (0.073) (0.075)
rp -0.035 -0.068 0.002
(0.087) (0.078) (0.082)
gcont 0.719*** 0.551*** 0.922***
(0.084) (0.063) (0.050)
markup 0.535*** -0 574*** 0.340***
(0.116) (0.107) (0.125)
pc 3.353*** 1.228*** 3.637***
(0.174) (0.174) (0.159)
clawb -0.100 -0.161*** 0.258***
(0.067) (0.062) (0.070)
tax -3.047*** -1.024*** -2.105***
(0.119) (0.103) (0.081)
cea -0.129 -0.075 -0.280***
(0.095) (0.084) (0.089)
constant -0.990*** -1.391*** -2.154***
(0.227) (0.257) (0.237)
Observations 366 366 366
Rsq within 0.808 0.612 0.655
Rsq between 0.992 0.994 0.998
Rsq overall 0.955 0.908 0.964
Wald chi sq 10984.91 5243.41 20842.94
* ** *** refer t0 statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
Standard errors in parenthesis
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The results indicate the presence of a switch in consumption, in particular for 
captopril, the first ACE inhibitor which went off patent. The findings of all three 
regressions for this particular molecule point towards the same direction. The sum of 
volumes of originator and generic captopril decreases post patent expiry. The effect 
of captopril patent expiry on the volume of all other ACE inhibitors is positive. The 
ratio of volumes of captopril over all other ACE inhibitors decreases post patent 
expiry. Thus there is strong evidence that there is a switch in consumption from 
captopril to other ACE inhibitors after generic captopril enters the market. There is 
evidence that this switching effect is also present for enalapril and lisinopril, 
although it is not as strong as in the case of captopril. Enalapril volume increases 
after generic entry. The volume of other products of the same class also increases, 
though the ratio of volumes increases, which provides evidence that a switch in 
consumption from off patent enalapril to patented ACE inhibitors does occur post 
enalapril patent expiry. Results for lisinopril are similar to those for enalapril.
Empirical evidence suggests that the larger the number of generic 
competitors, the more intense the switch effect. This is what was expected: A higher 
number of competitors means lower profits for the producer of the originator, and 
therefore a stronger incentive for the producer to focus on another market.
5.8.2 Results at the country level
Tables 5.13 -  5.30 show the results of the econometric analysis for each 
country separately. Due to the small number of observations for each country, we 
used the ordinary least squares approach instead of panel data analysis. Clustered 
standard errors were used though when different products were present (estimation 
of equation (8)). Tables 5.13, 5.14 and 5.15 show the estimation results of equations
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(7), (8) and (9) respectively for Denmark. The effect of patent expiry on the volume 
of the off patent molecule is different for captopril, enalapril and lisinopril. The 
effect of generic entry on the total volume of originator and generic captopril is 
statistically insignificant. In the case of enalapril, generic entry leads to an increase 
in total enalapril volume, while the effect of lisinopril generic entry on total 
lisinopril volume is negative. The effect of captopril, enalapril, or lisinopril generic 
entry on the volume of other on patent ACE inhibitors in Denmark is much more 
clear. In all three cases generic entry has a positive effect on the volume of other 
ACE inhibitors. The most important findings though are those of the estimation of 
equation (9), as the results are unaffected by any changes in total demand for ACE 
inhibitors. The coefficient of o ff is negative for all three medicines examined, and 
strongly statistically significant for captopril and lisinopril. The coefficient of 
enalapril is insignificant. Empirical results suggest the presence of a switching effect 
in Denmark.
In France (Tables 5.16, 5.17 and 5.18), the effect of generic entry for 
captopril and enalapril has a negative and statistically significant effect on the total 
volume of each of these two ACE inhibitors. In the case of lisinopril the effect of 
generic entry on total lisinopril volume is positive but statistically insignificant. In 
the estimation results of equation (8), the coefficient of off is negative for all three 
medicines studied, although in the case of captopril the effect is statistically 
insignificant. These findings alone do not provide a full picture without taking into 
account the estimation results of equation (9). For all three medicines, the coefficient 
of off is negative and statistically significant, meaning that the ratio of total volume 
(originator and generic) of the product that goes off patent over the volume of all 
other in patent ACE inhibitors decreases post patent expiry. The results for France
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suggest the presence of a switching effect in consumption of ACE inhibitors once 
they go off patent, towards patented ACE inhibitors.
The estimation results of equations (7), (8) and (9) for Germany are shown in 
Tables 5.19, 5.20 and 5.21, respectively. Post patent expiry, total volume of 
captopril, enalapril and lisinopril appears to increase (Table 5.19). The effect is not 
that clear regarding the effects on the volume of all other ACE inhibitors which 
remain in patent (Table 5.20). The coefficient of o ff is positive and statistically 
significant for captopril, whilst insignificant for enalapril and lisinopril. Results for 
the ratio of volumes are also not clear (Table 5.21). The volume ratio decreases post 
patent expiry in the case of captopril, but increases in the cases of enalapril and 
lisinopril. Thus we cannot draw conclusions about the presence or not of a switch in 
consumption post patent expiry for ACE inhibitors in Germany.
In the Netherlands, total volume of captopril appears to increase post patent 
expiry. The effect of patent expiry on total volume of enalapril and lisinopril is 
insignificant (Table 5.22). Results are different for each molecule, regarding the 
effects on all other in patent ACE inhibitors (Table 5.23). The effect is positive 
when captopril goes off patent, negative when enalapril goes off patent and 
insignificant when generic lisinopril enters the market. The estimation results of 
equation (9) for the Netherlands are clear though. The effect of patent expiry on the 
volume ratio is negative and statistically insignificant for captopril, enalapril and 
lisinopril (Table 5.24), suggesting the presence of a switch in consumption post 
patent expiry for all three ACE inhibitors included in the study.
In Sweden, the coefficient of off in the estimation of equation (7) is positive 
and statistically significant for captopril and enalapril, while the coefficient is 
insignificant for lisinopril (Table 5.25). The coefficient of off in the estimation
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results of equation (8) is negative and statistically significant for captopril, but 
statistically insignificant for enalapril and lisinopril (Table 5.26). The effect of 
patent expiry on the ratio of volumes, as described in equation (9), is statistically 
insignificant for all three medicines, in the case of Sweden. Thus there is no 
empirical evidence that the switching effect is present in this particular country.
In the United Kingdom, the effect of patent expiry on the total volume 
(originator and generic) of the medicine that goes off patent is negative and 
statistically significant for captopril and enalapril, and negative but statistically 
insignificant for lisinopril (Table 5.28). The coefficient of off in the estimation 
results of equation (8) for the United Kingdom is positive and statistically significant 
for captopril, positive but insignificant for enalapril and negative and significant for 
lisinopril (Table 5.29). The estimation results of equation (9) demonstrate a negative 
and statistically significant effect of generic entry on the volume ratios for captopril, 
enalapril and lisinopril. Therefore, there is strong empirical evidence that the switch 
in consumption from off patent ACE inhibitors to in patent ones is present in the 
United Kingdom.
According to the country - specific results, there is strong empirical evidence 
that the switch in consumption post patent expiry is present in Denmark, France, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. No empirical evidence in support of the 
switch exists in Germany or Sweden.
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Table 5.13 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation, off patent molecule volume,
Denmark 
Dependent Variable: In Q°p
Captopril Enalapril Lisinopril
Off 0.097 0.369*** -0.130*
(0.061) (0.046) (0.076)
N -0.686*** -0.025 -0.021
(0.073) (0.026) (0.074)
Nsq 0.073*** 0.002 0.002
(0.007) (0.002) (0.008)
sub 0.321*** 0.270***
(0.044) (0.042)
rp 0.073 0.411*** 0.204***
(0.073) (0.057) (0.053)
cea -0.230*** 0.114* -0.081
(0.085) (0.060) (0.056)
constant 9.863*** 9 492*** 8.353***
(0.063) (0.079) (0.039)
Observations 61 61 61
Rsq 0.843 0.930 0.710
Adj - Rsq 0.829 0.923 0.678
F statistic 59.08 119.96 22.01
****** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively
Standard errors in parenthesis
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Table 5.14 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation, in patent molecule volume,
Denmark 
Dependent Variable: In
Captopril Enalapril Lisinopril
Off 0.361*** 0.689*** 0.422**
(0.127) (0.152) (0.181)
N 0.345*** 0.448*** 0.527***
(0.040) (0.047) (0.050)
Nsq -0.007** -0.022*** -0.027***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
sub -0.067 0.437***
(0.164) (0.156)
rp -0.265 -0.201 0.031
(0.202) (0.218) (0.243)
cea -0.075 -0.231 -0.191
(0.176) 0.199) (0.236)
constant 6.521*** 6.389*** 5.829***
(0.175) (0.189) (0.213)
Observations 464 403 342
Rsq 0.566 0.427 0.421
Adj - Rsq 0.562 0.418 0.411
F statistic 119.73 49.11 40.66
****** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively
Standard errors in parenthesis
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Table 5.15 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation, ratio of volumes, Denmark
r \
Dependent Variable: In
le f
Captopril Enalapril Lisinopril
Off -0.309*** -0.064 -0.498***
(0.104) (0.042) (0.087)
N -1.140*** -0.163*** -0.044
(0.124) (0.024) (0.084)
Nsq 0.117*** 0.011*** 0.002
(0.012) (0.002) (0.009)
sub -0.029 -0.078
(0.041) (0.048)
rp -0.315** -0.053 -0.411***
(0.124) (0.053) (0.061)
cea -0.282* 0.002 -0.292***
(0.145) (0.056) (0.063)
constant -4.255*** -3.672*** -4.246***
(0.107) (0.073) (0.044)
Observations 61 61 61
Rsq 0.8377 0.765 0.939
Adj - Rsq 0.823 0.738 0.933
F statistic 56.79 29.23 139.19
****** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively
Standard errors in parenthesis
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Table 5.16 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation, off patent molecule volume,
France 
Dependent Variable: In Q°p
Captopril Enalapril Lisinopril
Off -0.563*** -0.279*** 0.042
(0.052) (0.044) (0.051)
N 0.005
(0.015)
Nsq 0.016*** -0.002 -2.89E-04
(0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
sub
rp -0.317** -0.143* -0.129**
(0.137) (0.076) (0.054)
constant 10.482*** 12.624*** 12.076***
(1.021) (0.017) (0.010)
Observations 61 61 61
Rsq 0.893 107.640 0.329
Adj - Rsq 0.887 0.885 0.294
F statistic 158.06 0.88 9.32
* ** *** refer t0 statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively
Standard errors in parenthesis
171
Table 5.17 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation, in patent molecule volume,
France 
Dependent Variable: In Q f
Captopril Enalapril Lisinopril
off -0.456 -0.305** -0.380*
(0.132) (0.130) (0.216)
N 0.683 1.221*** 0.982***
(0.080) (0.108) (0.120)
Nsq -0.039 -0.096*** -0.074***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.016)
sub
rp -0.648 -0.446*** -0.133
(0.147) (0.154) (0.236)
constant 10.551 10.005*** 9.856***
(0.107) (0.089) (0.079)
Observations 598 537 476
Rsq 0.211 0.268 0.158
Adj - Rsq 0.206 0.263 0.151
F statistic 39.63 48.70 1.29
****** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively
Standard errors in parenthesis
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Table 5.18 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation, ratio of volumes, France
f  \
Dependent Variable: In
Captopril Enalapril Lisinopril
o ff -1.164*** -0.881*** -0.684**
(0.110) (0.158) (0.285)
N -0.065
(0.054)
Nsq 0.026*** 0.002 0.001
(0.010) (0.004) (0.004)
rp -0.453 -0.339 -0.408
(0.288) (0.273) (0.302)
constant -6.202*** -1.277*** -1.384***
(2.153) (0.061) (0.059)
Observations 61 61 61
Rsq 0.8562 0.821 0.536
Adj - Rsq 0.849 0.808 0.512
F statistic 113.17 64.04 21.98
****** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively
Standard errors in parenthesis
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Table 5.19 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation, off patent molecule volume,
Germany 
Dependent Variable: In Q°p
Captopril Enalapril Lisinopril
off 0.467*** 1 441*** 1.704***
(0.032) (0.103) (0.359)
Nsq 0.001*** 2.63E-04
(2.08E-04) (0.001)
sub -0.097 0.055 -0.009
(0.117) (0.334) (0.524)
markup 0.043
(0.060)
clawb -0.110 0.004 0.050
(0.124) (0.355) (0.556)
constant 14.084*** 11.557*** 11.461***
(0.023) (0.161) (0.466)
Observations 61 61 61
Rsq 0.806 0.8941 0.7436
Adj - Rsq 0.792 0.887 0.7253
F statistic 58.020 118.240 40.61
* ** *** refer ^0 statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively
Standard errors in parenthesis
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Table 5.20 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation, in patent molecule volume,
Germany 
Dependent Variable: In Q1*
Captopril Enalapril Lisinopril
o ff 0.366*** 0.110 -0.199
(0.107) (0.120) (0.264)
N 0.150*** 0.190*** 0.297***
(0.015) (0.021) (0.026)
Nsq *ooo1 -0.002*** -0.005***
(4.72e-04) (0.001) (0.001)
sub 0.022 0.019 0.022
(0.340) (0.368) (0.381)
markup -0.638*** -0.657*** -0.818***
(0.177) (0.202) (0.316)
clawb -0.062 -0.064 -0.065
(0.361) (0.390) (0.404)
constant 9.078*** 9.249*** 9.291***
(0.091) (0.077) (0.066)
Observations 628 567 506
Rsq 0.6094 0.489 0.391
Adj - Rsq 0.606 0.484 0.384
F statistic 161.47 89.30 53.35
****** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively
Standard errors in parenthesis
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Table 5.21 O rdinary  Least Squares Estimation, ratio of volumes, Germ any
Dependent Variable: In
Captopril Enalapril Lisinopril
Off -0.134** 0.660*** 0.978***
(0.055) (0.038) (0.232)
Nsq 4.25E-04*** 3.75E-04
(7.59E-05( (0.001)
sub -0.157 -0.031 -0.166
(0.197) (0.122) (0.339)
markup -0.299***
(0.101)
clawb -0.143 -0.070 -0.060
(0.209) (0.129) (0.360)
constant -0.363*** -2.210*** -2.057***
(0.039) (0.059) (0.302)
Observations 61 61 61
Rsq 0.6674 0.934 0.677
Adj - Rsq 0.644 0.930 0.654
F statistic 28.09 198.89 29.40
****** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
Standard errors in parenthesis
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Table 5.22 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation, off patent molecule volume,
Netherlands 
Dependent Variable: In Q°p
Captopril Enalapril LisinogrU^
Off 0.260*** 0.098 0.110
(0.053) (0.087) (0.207)
N -1.802***
(0.448)
Nsq 0.001*** 0.059*** 0.004
(0.000) (0.015) (0.003)
clawb -0.190*** 0.010 0.623***
(0.069) (0.096) (0.147)
cea -0.086 0.059 0.245
(0.054) (0.104) (0.155)
constant 11.868*** 25.040*** 9.315***
(0.059) (3.299) (0.677)
Observations 61 61 61
Rsq 0.74 0.760 0.790
Adj - Rsq 0.721 0.738 0.775
F statistic 39.84 34.74 0.27
****** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively
Standard errors in parenthesis
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Table 5.23 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation, in patent molecule volume,
Netherlands 
Dependent Variable: In Qltp
Captopril Enalapril Lisinopril
off 0.478* -0.796*** -0.249
(0.254) (0.302) (0.232)
N 0.526*** 0.548*** 0.561***
(0.040) (0.046) (0.057)
Nsq -0.014*** -0.018*** -0.018***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
clawb 0.089 0.533** 0.479
(0.325) (0.270) 0.314
cea -0.593** 0.088 -0.676**
(0.244) (0.378) 0.327
constant 6.307*** 6.367*** 6.486***
(0.115) (0.111) (0.126)
Observations 470 409 348
Rsq 0.7428 0.680 0.577
Adj - Rsq 0.740 0.676 0.571
F statistic 268.04 171.08 93.27
****** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively
Standard errors in parenthesis
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Table 5.24 O rdinary  Least Squares Estimation, ratio of volumes, Netherlands
Dependent Variable: In
Captopril Enalapril Lisinopril
Off -0.071*** -0.257*** -0.163**
(0.099) (0.076) (0.077)
N 1.234***
(0.390)
Nsq 0.002 -0.040*** 0.002
(0.000) (0.013) (0.001)
clctwb -0.243* -0.054 0.143**
(0.129) (0.084) (0.054)
cea -0.424*** -0.016 0.005
(0.102) (0.091) (0.058)
constant -3.021*** -11.491*** -3.471***
(0.111) (2.878) (0.252)
Observations 61 61 61
Rsq 0.901 0.853 0.300
Adj - Rsq 0.8935 0.840 0.250
F statistic 126.87 64.01 6.01
****** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively
Standard errors in parenthesis
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Table 5.25 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation, off patent molecule volume,
Sweden 
Dependent Variable: In Q°p
Captopril Enalapril Lisinopril
Off 0.903** 0.258** 0.192
(0.416) (0.108) (0.282)
N -0.179** 0.023*** -0.055*
(0.083) (0.007) (0.029)
sub 0.512*** 0.350*** 0.782*
(0.178) (0.118) (0.410)
rp 0.820*** 0.697*** 0.856***
(0.072) (0.088) (0.115)
constant 10.802*** 10.544*** 9.300***
(0.060) (0.077) (0.202)
Observations 61 61 61
Rsq 0.8339 0.771 0.561
Adj - Rsq 0.822 0.7546 0.529
F statistic 70.28 47.13 17.86
****** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively
Standard errors in parenthesis
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Table 5.26 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation, in patent molecule volume,
Sweden 
Dependent Variable: In
Captopril Enalapril Lisinopril
off -0.761*** -0.065 0.032
(0.249) (0.204) (0.679)
N 0.404*** 0.625*** 0.298***
(0.057) (0.046) (0.097)
Nsq -0.007 -0.024*** 0.014
(0.004) (0.004) (0.012)
sub 1.091*** 1.339*
(0.379) (0.780)
rp 1.480*** 1.728*** 2.015***
(0.370) (0.300) (0.355)
cea 0.543
(0.440)
constant 6.252*** 4.781*** 4.528***
(0.322) (0.285) (0.343)
Observations 379 318 257
Rsq 0.4293 0.544 0.439
Adj - Rsq 0.422 0.537 0.428
F statistic 56.12 74.47 39.35
****** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively
Standard errors in parenthesis
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Table 5.27 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation, ratio of volumes, Sweden
r \
Dependent Variable: In
Captopril Enalapril Lisinopril
off 0.379 -0.089 -0.334
(0.597) (0.119) (0.308)
N -0.165 -0.001 -0.063**
(0.118) (0.008) (0.031)
sub -0.356 -0.565*** -0.320
(0.256) (0.131) (0.447)
rp 0.403*** 0.074 -0.162
(0.104) (0.097) (0.125)
constant -3.355*** -2.814*** -3.251***
(0.087) (0.085) (0.221)
Observations 61 61 61
Rsq 0.8677 0.669 0.735
Adj - Rsq 0.858 0.645 0.716
F statistic 91.79 28.30 38.85
*,**,*** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively
Standard errors in parenthesis
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Table 5.28 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation, off patent molecule volume,
United Kingdom 
Dependent Variable: InQ°p
Captopril Enalapril Lisinopril
off -2.049*** -1.287*** -0.181
(0.149) (0.417) (0.147)
N 0.209*** 0.205***
(0.015) (0.048)
gcont -0.100 0.078 0.351
(0.115) (0.181) (0.269)
clawb 0.399*** 1.018***
(0.086) (0.121)
cea -0.299** -0.150 0.267
(0.114) (0.286) (0.260)
constant 13.779*** 12.580*** 11.730***
(0.031) (0.049) (0.071)
Observations 61 61 61
Rsq 0.937 0.461 0.813
Adj - Rsq 0.933 0.412 0.799
F statistic 208.18 9.41 60.76
****** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively
Standard errors in parenthesis
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Table 5.29 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation, in patent molecule volume,
United Kingdom 
Dependent Variable: In Qjj*
Captopril Enalapril Lisinopril
Off 0.646*** 0.110 -0.692**
(0.245) (0.643) (0.306)
N 0.754*** 1.303*** 1.202***
(0.048) (0.310) (0.363)
Nsq -0.087 -0.077
(0.074) (0.079)
gcont 0.001 -0.151 0.288
(0.473) (0.451) (0.544)
clawb 0.908*** 0.886***
(0.246) (0.273)
cea -0.323 0.119 0.214
(0.494) (0.750) (0.529)
constant 8.732*** 7.977*** 8.005***
(0.155) (0.158) (0.176)
Observations 550 489 428
Rsq 0.3222 0.389 0.161
Adj - Rsq 0.317 0.382 0.149
F statistic 64.78 51.21 13.49
*,***** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively
Standard errors in parenthesis
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Table 5.30 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation, ratio of volumes, United
Kingdom
Dependent Variable: In
Captopril Enalapril Lisinopril
o ff -2.765*** -2.085*** -0.458***
(0.173) (0.196) (0.065)
N 0.245*** 0.300***
(0.018) (0.023)
gcont -0.403*** -0.250*** 0.162
(0.134) (0.085) (0.119)
clawb -0.116*** 0.452***
(0.040) (0.054)
cea -0.466*** -0.201 0.121
(0.132) (0.135) (0.115)
constant -0.668*** -1.155*** -1.386***
(0.036) (0.023) (0.031)
Observations 61 61 61
Rsq 0.970 0.951 0.759
Adj - Rsq 0.968 0.946 0.741
F statistic 455.89 211.36 43.98
****** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively
Standard errors in parenthesis
5.9 Discussion and Policy Implications
Our findings show that the effect of generic entry on demand and 
consumption is not limited to just the product that has gone off patent, but also to 
other products within the same therapeutic category. Aggregate results for all six 
countries together show that post patent expiry there is a switch in consumption 
from the molecule that goes off patent to other molecules of the same therapeutic 
class which remain patent protected. Results from each country separately show that
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this phenomenon is present in the United Kingdom, Denmark, France and the 
Netherlands, but not in Germany or Sweden.
This switch in consumption can increase health spending significantly: When 
such a switch takes place, the market share of in-patent molecules would be larger 
than what it would be in the absence of this switch. Purchasing a molecule which is 
still in-patent means there is no generic alternative, so the product cannot be 
substituted by a cheaper generic. Therefore pharmaceutical expenditure for a 
therapeutic class which undergoes such market dynamics would increase, ceteris 
paribus.
This is a cause for concern for countries which experience switching effects. 
Since the challenge is to contain spending for health, appropriate policies should be 
implemented in order to tackle switching in consumption from off-patent to in­
patent products, which leads to higher costs. Stricter barriers to new medicines 
entering the same class as different products could also be part of the solution, in 
order to make sure that the new product is indeed differentiated at a sufficient level.
From a policy perspective, making the off-patent molecule a first-line 
treatment would help prevent this switch in consumption. Physicians would have to 
prescribe the off- patent molecule as a first choice for a patient, before considering 
another ACE inhibitor. The off- patent molecule has generic alternatives, so generics 
which are cheaper than the branded product can be dispensed, leading to savings for 
health insurance. This occurs despite the presence of supply and demand side 
generic policies, and reveals the weak enforcement of generic policies.
Further, reference pricing at the therapeutic class level could help achieve 
this goal. By setting a reference price at the class level, the price covered by health 
insurance would be a price that would take into account cheap generics of the off-
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patent molecule. This reference price would apply not only to the off-patent 
molecule, but also to the in-patent products of the same class. The price covered by 
health insurance would be at the level of the reference price, and anyone wishing to 
purchase any of the branded products with a higher price would have to pay the 
difference out-of-pocket. This policy though would not have the desired effects 
unless patients are well informed of their alternative choices.
5.10 Conclusions
We have found empirical evidence that a switch in consumption from a 
medicine which goes off patent towards other in-patent medicines of the same 
therapeutic class occurs after generic entry. The econometric analysis explored three 
dimensions of the market. First, the effect of patent expiry on the total volume (both 
originator and generic) of the molecule which goes off patent, then the effect on the 
volume of all other molecules of the same therapeutic category which remain in­
patent and, finally, the ratio (or differences, as the volume is measured in logarithms) 
of volumes. The latter approach is the most reliable, as it shows the relative volumes 
and the results are not affected by any shocks in the total demand of ACE inhibitors.
The effect of patent expiry on the volume of the molecule which goes off 
patent is not the same for captopril (decrease in volume), enalapril (increase) and 
lisinopril (increase). The effect on the total volume of all other ACE inhibitors, 
when each of them loses its patent, is consistently positive though. Most importantly, 
results show that the relative total volume (both originator and generic) of the 
molecule which goes off patent decreases compared to the volume of other 
molecules of the same therapeutic category which remain in- patent. This is strong 
evidence indicating that the switch in consumption does take place post patent
187
expiry. The effect is very strong for captopril, enalapril and lisinopril. When 
considering each country separately, the results suggest that there is a switch in 
consumption present in Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, 
but we do not find evidence of such a phenomenon in Germany or Sweden.
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6. The Impact of Parallel Trade on Pharmaceutical Competition:
A Game Theoretic Approach and Empirical Evidence from the 
European Union
6.1 Introduction
The differential regulation of pharmaceutical prices in the European Union 
(EU), resulting in significant price differences among EU Member States, alongside 
the development of the single European market has created arbitrage opportunities 
through pharmaceutical parallel trade (PT). Parallel trade is the practice of 
purchasing a product in one country and selling it in another country where its price 
is higher. The agent who is involved in parallel trade gains rent from the difference 
in prices. The manufacturer of the product supplies the product in both markets, but 
this practice reduces his profits because, for the part of the market which is covered 
by parallel trade, this is equivalent to selling in the high-priced market at the prices 
of the low-priced market. As both the manufacturer and the parallel trader sell in the 
importing market, they can be considered as competitors. However, differences in 
packaging and labelling across countries are often perceived as real differences and 
frequently differentiate locally sourced from parallel traded products.
Parallel trade has been viewed upon as an opportunity to enhance 
competition in in- patent markets due to its close relationship with the originator 
medicine. Whilst price competition in in-patent markets is in principle scarce due to 
product differentiation (Kanavos, Costa-Font, McGuire 2007), cultural issues in 
prescribing, dispensing and consumption, as well as differences in the features of 
different products in the same therapeutic class, parallel trade avoids such problems 
because the product is the same and is produced by the same manufacturer. The only 
differences which may occur are different languages used on the packaging and in
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the patient leaflet, which is usually solved by applying a sticker on the package and 
inserting a new leaflet in the language of the importing country in the box.
As the EU is a single market, and in accordance with the principle of 
regional exhaustion of intellectual property rights, no formal permission from the 
rights holder is necessary for parallel trade to take place, so long as it takes place 
within EU boundaries. The doctrine of regional exhaustion of intellectual property 
rights within the context of a single market in the EU postulates that once a product 
has been legitimately put on the market in one Member State it is in breach of 
competition laws, governed by articles 28, 81 and 82 of the Treaty of the EU, to 
prevent the product to be resold in another Member State even if the product is 
protected by the exclusivity granted by a patent or other intellectual property right in 
the latter state. In the EU, exhaustion of intellectual property rights is by first sale; 
however, Article 30 allows a trademark holder to exercise his rights to block the sale 
of an imported product bearing his trademark, if its original packaging has been 
modified in a way that is not necessary to permit its sale in the importing Member 
State.
The only regulatory requirement to allow a parallel traded medicine to be 
sold in a country other than the one in which it was originally intended for is a 
Parallel Import Product License, which is issued by the national regulatory authority 
of the destination country or the European Medicines Agency (EMEA), on condition 
that parallel distributors conform to national and EU regulations. In order to 
establish that quality is not undermined, the competent regulatory authority in the 
import country will contact its counterpart in the exporting country to receive 
documentation on the product in question.
190
Parallel trading in medicines is largely, but not exclusively, confined to the 
movement of patented products from lower-priced to higher-priced EU markets. The 
volumes of product moved are influenced by the extent of price variability between 
exporting and importing countries, currency fluctuations and product availability in 
export markets, among others. The share of products supplied via parallel traders in 
key import countries is between 10 and 20 per cent of the European in-patent 
prescription medicines market (Kanavos and Costa-Font 2005).
The aim of this chapter is to study the effect of parallel trade on prices of 
locally sourced products, the presence or not of a price spread between locally 
sourced and parallel traded medicines, and whether there is a downward or upward 
price convergence following parallel importation. For this purpose both theoretical 
and empirical means are used.
Section 6.2 discusses the legal background concerning parallel trade in the 
European Union and the various judgments which allow this practice to take place in 
the EU. Section 6.3 discusses the literature; section 6.4 provides a game theoretic 
approach about the market equilibria in the presence of parallel trade; section 6.5 
provides descriptive statistics on the price spread between locally sourced and 
parallel traded medicines; section 6.6 provides econometric results on the 
determinants of prices of locally sourced and parallel traded medicines; finally, 
section 6.7 discusses policy implications and concludes.
6.2 Legal Background
Parallel trade is based on the free movement of goods and the exhaustion 
principle of intellectual property rights that underpin the establishment of one free 
common internal market in the EU. The endeavour to assure a single intra-EU
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market is further reflected in numerous, continuous decisions by the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) that are implemented and protected by the Commission. These 
judgments form the ongoing jurisprudence and define the legal framework for 
parallel trade of medicinal products in the EU Member States. Over the past 30 years 
the ECJ has ruled on numerous occasions on cases related to parallel trading of 
goods with the majority of these cases being on pharmaceuticals (ECJ, 1978, 1987, 
1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2008). In a similar spirit, national authorities have 
legislated on certain aspects of pharmaceutical parallel trade, particularly in what 
concerns competition (White and Case, 2008). Key sources of dispute on 
pharmaceutical parallel trading activities have been trademarks, repackaging, re- 
boxing, relabeling and dual pricing. Namely, the ability of manufacturers to charge 
one price for the domestic market and another for the proportion of their sales that is 
parallel exported.
Complex litigation has arisen with respect to trademarks, and the rights of 
the original manufacturer to defend its trademark where parallel importers have 
repackaged a product sold under a particular trademark in one country and resell it 
under the current trademark in another country. The ECJ has developed consistent 
case law on the subject of trademarks and repackaging which are of central 
importance for parallel trade. Trademark owners may not use their trademarks to try 
and prevent parallel importation of their products within the European Economic 
Area including, the EU Member States plus Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland. 
However, this is dependent on the ‘specific subject matter’ of the trademark in 
question.
Repackaging has also been a key issue in pharmaceutical parallel trading. 
Since language barriers exist across the EU, medicines must be accompanied by
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detailed information for the end-user in the language of the country where the 
product is put on the market. This means that the leaflet must also be in the language 
of the destination country. The characteristic design of the external packaging is 
important in pharmaceutical markets so that products are recognizable by patients. 
Furthermore, medical insurance rules can make reimbursement of pharmaceutical 
expenses dependent on certain packaging, and some well-established medical 
prescription practices are based on standard sizes recommended by professional 
groups or sickness insurance organizations. The Treaty of the EU (article 30) allows 
a trademark holder to exercise his rights to block the sale of an imported product 
bearing his trademark, if its original packaging has been modified in a way that is 
not necessary to permit its sale in the importing Member State.
Repackaging guidelines can also be applied in the situation when an importer 
attempts to modify the packaging size under market authorization. In many cases 
parallel traders repackage medicines in such a way that the number of tablets is 
different than that in the original package.
Two further practices have been addressed in litigation in recent years: the 
first, is dual pricing, a practice whereby manufacturers supply wholesalers at the 
price of the country the latter sell at and at higher prices if the same wholesalers 
export their supplies to other EU countries, and the second relates to the practice of 
manufacturers managing their supplies to wholesalers. Both practices relate to 
whether or not they restrict competition within the European single market. Dual 
pricing has been repelled on the grounds that it impedes competition and interferes 
with the single market principle. In the case of manufacturers managing their 
supplies, however, it appears that pharmaceutical companies can legitimately 
employ systems to limit PT in certain circumstances providing that there be no
193
agreement between themselves and wholesalers, no outright ban on exports from the 
side of manufacturers, and no monitoring of the final destination of the product.
As a result of the evolving jurisprudence and the single market principle 
within the EU that favours it, parallel trade has grown as a share of the total 
prescription pharmaceutical market in some EU countries, although there is 
significant variability on its amplitude and intensity at product and country level 
(EFPLA, 2005; Kanavos and Costa-Font, 2005; Kanavos and Kowal, 2008). 
Simultaneously, product homogeneity across countries has improved while medicine 
presentations are increasingly standardised since the establishment of the European 
Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA), thus reducing barriers to entry across 
Member States. Pressures on the distribution chain in terms of lower margins over 
time (Kanavos and Gemmill, 2005) also provide an incentive to seek other markets 
by identifying profitable arbitrage operations that only have to face minimal 
transaction costs, maximum price differences and adequate market size in 
destination countries. The parallel distributor chooses a source country, where the 
target product has a low price relative to the same product sold by the original 
manufacturer in the destination country. The target product is, in most cases, a new, 
innovative medicine offering a high price differential and therefore a high profit 
margin in the destination country. Other factors determining the choice of the target 
product include patient population, (market size), formulation, transport, re-labelling 
and storage requirements. The market share of parallel traded products in six 
countries (Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK) has risen from 
10% in 1997 to almost 20% in 2002 (Kanavos and Costa-Font, 2005). Subsequent 
research has shown that parallel trade market penetration has remained stable in 
these countries (18.44% in 2003 and 18.40% in 2006) (Kanavos and Kowal, 2008).
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Many European countries, particularly those where prescription medicine 
prices are high, encourage parallel trade -  often explicitly, with incentives to 
pharmacies to dispense parallel traded goods - as they view this as an opportunity to 
introduce competition in their markets and, potentially, achieve savings on their 
medicine budgets, through the price competition between close substitutes that may 
ensue.
Although some evidence exists on price competition associated with 
pharmaceutical parallel trade in a single country (Ganslandt and Maskus, 2004), 
other research finds that competition effects are mainly associated with generic 
medicine introduction rather than parallel trade per se (Kanavos and Costa-Font, 
2005, Linnosmaa et al, 2003). This may, in part, explain why price dispersion across 
countries may not necessarily be influenced by PT penetration, which in turn implies 
that parallel trade might not produce the intended competition effects that one might 
attribute to arbitrage as clearing price differences (Malueg and Schwartz, 1994). If 
parallel trade led to price equalisation across countries, then the same product would 
be sold at the same price everywhere and profits would be eliminated.
Under lack of competitive effects, one should expect that PT would not be 
able to reduce medicine prices on a sustainable basis. If this holds, very limited price 
convergence across European Union countries should be observed. However, the 
evidence pointing towards these effects is limited. Moreover, one might well argue 
that health insurance in destination countries might benefit from parallel trade if 
prices are lower than those of locally-sourced originator medicines. Although some 
studies have examined the potential savings to health systems from parallel trade 
(West and Mahon, 2003; Kanavos and Costa-Font, 2005; Enemark et al, 2006), only 
one study demonstrates evidence on the determinants of the price gap between
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originator and parallel imported prices in destination countries (Kanavos and 
Vandoros 2010). Kanavos and Vandoros (2010) also studied the impact of 
competition in the distribution chain, and found some empirical evidence that a 
higher number of wholesalers and pharmacists leads to lower prices for the locally 
sourced originator product. However they found no empirical evidence of an impact 
on the prices of parallel traded products. This finding, however, should be put in the 
context of parallel trade and should not be used for policy recommendations for 
pharmaceutical markets in general, as according to Taylor, Mrazek and Mossialos 
(2004), increased competition in distribution and retail pharmacy may undermine 
social solidarity, hence outweighing any benefits for poorer service users. 
Furthermore, very limited evidence exists on the determinants of price differences 
between parallel traded and locally-sourced originator medicines. However, this 
question has only been examined empirically, without any theoretical predictions of 
the outcome of a market game between a parallel trader and a manufacturer.
In light of the intense legal and economic debate on the effects, costs and 
benefits of pharmaceutical PT, this chapter uses a game theoretic approach to 
analyse how the market works and how prices of locally sourced and parallel traded 
products evolve in a market open to parallel trade. In addition, it provides a 
theoretical explanation of whether parallel trade leads to a decrease in social welfare. 
The conceptual framework that is developed is subsequently used to investigate 
empirically whether there is a price gap between locally sourced and parallel traded 
products and whether prices of locally sourced products respond to competition 
from parallel trade. Finally, the analysis takes place from a comparative perspective 
by drawing on evidence from four countries where parallel trade has been prevalent 
and, often, extensive..
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The study advances the literature by providing a thorough approach of the 
effects of parallel trade on market dynamics, notably the impact on competition and 
prices of locally sourced products. Predictions of theory are used to find the outcome 
of a game between rational agents. The game theoretic approach helps understand 
why the market works in a particular way in the presence of parallel trade. As a 
result, the fact that parallel trade often does not trigger competition is no longer a 
paradox which cannot be explained by economic theory. The predictions of theory 
are followed by thorough empirical evidence. Both econometrics and descriptive 
statistics are combined to show whether there is a price gap between locally sourced 
and parallel traded products, and whether a possible price convergence is upward or 
downward. Previous studies have not considered both aspects simultaneously. Using 
only descriptive statistics would only show whether a price gap exists or not and 
would not show if the price of the locally sourced product decreases as a result of 
parallel trade. Econometric analysis alone shows whether parallel trade leads to 
price cuts for the locally sourced product, but does not reveal much on any price gap 
between locally sourced and parallel traded products, hence the combination of both 
methods to provide a spherical view of the issue. Further, this is a multi-country 
analysis, and results are reported both at the aggregate level as well as the country 
level.
6.3 Parallel Trade and the Pharmaceutical Market
Theoretically, in the presence of arbitrage, the same product will be sold at 
the equilibrium prices in all markets, profits will be eliminated and consumers 
capture the rent. The impact of parallel trade on (price) convergence and
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competition, innovation and overall welfare across countries, have been discussed 
mostly from a theoretical perspective but the literature often remains inconclusive.
Standard economic theory would predict that in unregulated markets and in 
the absence of product differentiation, arbitrage would give rise to Bertrand-type 
competition leading to a “race towards the bottom” where price equalization would 
be achieved in destination countries. This would contribute to pharmaceutical cost 
containment and, through that, consumer welfare could be improved. Unlike pure 
arbitrage, pharmaceutical PT arises for markets subjected to heterogeneous 
regulation and price fixing of prescription medicines. Due to price fixing policies, 
PT would not necessarily lead to price equalization, and thus the extent to which PT 
becomes a welfare-improving phenomenon across countries from a pricing point of 
view is questionable.
Key in the conduct of PT is the distribution chain in source countries, as PT 
results, in part, from a lack of barriers to arbitrage such as the lack of total vertical 
control in the distribution chain of pharmaceuticals by the originator rights holder. 
Other than risking being characterized as anti-competitive, maintaining vertical 
restraints implies substantial transaction and information costs for the originator 
manufacturer, and thus weak distribution control leads to some wholesalers in low 
price (source) countries diverting part of their stock to parallel distribution in high 
price (destination) countries. A likely explanation for this behaviour rests in the 
incentives associated in the medicines distribution chain, and, more specifically, the 
existence of observed and unobserved (price and volume) discounts within the 
distribution chain. The existence of parallel imports can cause retail prices both to 
diverge between markets and to increase in high cost locations due to the existence 
of vertical restraints, which are some times envisaged as a natural extension of IPR
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owners to vertically control the product chain (Barfield and Groombridge, 1998). 
Even if competition results in price uniformity across countries, then in the presence 
of increasing returns to scale, such uniformity can affect negatively all countries 
(Hausman and Mackie-Mason, 1988).
While the impact of pharmaceutical PT on prices has produced ambiguous 
results, there is greater consensus on its impact on innovation at theoretical level. 
The dynamic effects on innovation suggest that PT could lead to significant welfare 
losses (Ganslandt and Maskus, 2004; Rey, 2003; Szymanski and Valletti, 2005; 
Danzon, 1998; Bordoy and Jelovac, 2003). Parallel trade could reduce welfare if 
consumer willingness to pay in different countries is sufficiently dispersed, the 
reason being that when dispersion is high, some markets are dropped by the 
monopolist who prefers to concentrate only on richer markets (Malueg and 
Schwartz, 1994).
In most countries pharmaceuticals are not directly purchased by consumers 
but are supplied at prices negotiated between the government (or health insurance 
organisations) and the manufacturer. Arguably, parallel trade reduces the ability of 
government or health insurance to make a conscious choice to invest in R&D by 
paying high prices while permitting foreign governments to negotiate lower prices 
(Rey, 2003). In this view parallel trade limits the ability of government to make its 
own policy choices. This challenges the medicine market due to the possible 
negative effects on future R&D investment as PT grows, despite short-term 
pecuniary benefits to health insurance, however, small these may be.
It is also argued that price uniformity in the form of average prices might 
benefit some customers but might affect the equilibrium balance between prices and 
quality (Rey, 2003). Product quality will, in fact, fall because lower investment will
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be devoted to those products under PT, and therefore global welfare could fall 
(Valletti and Szymanski, 2005).
Overall, the normative implications of increasing parallel trade on welfare 
are ambiguous as some models employing horizontal arbitrage models suggest 
(Malueg and Schwarz, 1994; Knox and Richardson, 2002). A regime of uniform 
retail pricing would be globally inferior to one in which firms could price- 
discriminate on the basis of countries grouped by demand elasticity (Malueg and 
Schwartz, 1994). On the other hand, by reducing prices in high income countries 
parallel trade reduces the incentives for innovative companies to put forward 
innovations. Finally, a policy leading to the international exhaustion of IPR would 
enhance welfare by enabling consumers everywhere to take advantage of lower 
prices, simultaneously would lower welfare of many, especially those in poor 
countries, because it would actually raise prices in those markets to the international 
average price (Maskus, 2000).
The theoretical literature and empirical evidence examining price 
competition effects, the impact on innovation and welfare across countries, is often 
ambiguous, inconclusive, or, simply, incomplete. In addition, little evidence exists 
on the impact that parallel trade has on price competition, innovation and welfare, 
within the destination country. In the section that follows we develop a conceptual 
framework that attempts to explain and analyse the price behaviour of the originator 
manufacturer and the parallel distributor as well as the likely determinants of the 
price difference between locally-sourced originator and parallel traded medicine in 
destination countries for parallel imports.
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6.4 A Game Theoretic Approach
In this section, a game theoretical approach is made in order to explain 
pharmaceutical market dynamics in the presence of parallel trade. This is an attempt 
to formalise the market strategies into a game theoretic model. Assuming the 
presence of rational producers, a game between a producer and a parallel trader is 
explored in order to see the predictions of theory on price evolution and whether 
parallel trade has an effect on competition or not.
6.4.1 4.1 Conceptual Framework
Parallel distributors, just as originator medicine companies, are profit 
maximisers. The product sold by manufacturers and parallel traders is homogenous, 
produced by the same manufacturer and sold in two separate markets, the exporting 
market and the importing market. Suppose the originator medicine is sold at price 
P^s in the importing country and at price Plfexp in the exporting country by the
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manufacturer of the product. In order for parallel trade to be profitable, the price in 
the exporting country must be lower than the price in the importing country, and this 
difference must be lower than all associated transactions which may include re­
packaging, relabeling, different language patient leaflets and other costs. If 
transaction costs per unit are ku, then the condition for parallel trade to take place is
p L s > p c,P+kjt (1)
In principle, parallel traders cannot serve a large part of the local market on a 
sustainable basis (although there have been few cases of parallel trade supplying 
significant parts of the importing market (Kanavos and Costa-Font 2005)). The 
challenge for parallel traders is how to acquire larger quantities of the parallel traded 
product, as it may be the case that the authorities in exporting countries have the 
option to restrict exports if the local supply is threatened. That is the public health 
cause, which has not been enforced in any country yet. These are facts that are used 
as basic assumptions for the game theoretic approach.
Suppose is the amount of product in the exporting country which covers
domestic demand in the exporting country. qft is the amount of product that can be 
imported from the exporting country to the importing country, if > P™v + kit 
holds, which implies that parallel trade is profitable. The amount of product 
exported equals the amount imported into the destination country; q™p is the total 
amount of product that covers demand in the importing country, whether this is 
satisfied only by locally sourced product (in the absence of parallel trade) or 
partially by parallel trade, qjf  is the amount of locally sourced product in the
importing market if parallel trade is present (assuming, as explained above, that 
parallel traders can sell all quantities they can get hold of). Therefore
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(2)
Profits for the parallel trader equal:
(3)
where q]t is the volume of parallel imports and P ” is the price that the parallel
trader sets in the local market, i and t subscripts refer to product and time, 
respectively. The manufacturer has a large R&D sunk cost. The per-unit production 
cost of medicines is c, assumed to be the same across countries. In the absence of 
parallel trade, the originator manufacturer’s profits are the sum of profits in the 
importing and exporting country:
In the presence of parallel trade, the originator producer will sell fewer units
covered by parallel trade. Assuming that total demand remains constant in each 
market, the producer’s sales will increase in the exporting market by the amount of 
product exported. Total profits for the originator manufacturer in both markets in the 
presence of parallel trade are:
= fau i! r  -  cq‘,7 )+( p n r  -  )
(4)
of the medicine in the importing market, as a proportion of the market will be
LS _
- c q ? ) + { p r < l l - c uq l Y { P r q 7 - c q ? ) (5)
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From (2), as q'™p = qjf + q]t , the difference between profits for the manufacturer in 
the absence and presence of parallel trade is:
Parallel trade causes a drop in the manufacturer’s profits by the difference in price 
between the importing and exporting country times the volume of parallel trade. 
This occurs because the manufacturer sells the product in the low-price exporting 
country at the price of that market, but this ends up in the importing country.
Total demand (the sum of locally sourced and imported products) for a 
particular product can be assumed to be fixed over time. This assumption is made 
based on the fact that there is universal health insurance for patients, because 
patients with full insurance will consume the medicines prescribed and covered by 
health insurance regardless of prices. Thus the same total quantity will be dispensed, 
regardless of prices, unless there is a real price difference and patients pay 
significant co- payments and are incentivised to select the cheaper product. 
Although co-payments are only a small fraction of the price, they could make 
patients show preference for the cheapest available medicine. If parallel traders enter 
a market due to profit opportunities, they will sell the whole amount of product they 
can get hold of. This happens for two reasons. First, they provide discounts to 
pharmacists. These are undisclosed and not recorded and local manufacturers do not 
always have the flexibility to provide such discounts. These discounts provide a 
great incentive for pharmacists to dispense parallel traded products rather than 
locally sourced ones. The manufacturer of the product is the same in any case, so 
which of the two is dispensed should not matter to the patient. Second, quantities of 
parallel traded products are limited. They depend on availability of sufficient
(6)
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quantities in low-price countries. Parallel traders cannot always get hold of large 
quantities, as medicine supply is accounted for and monitored by manufacturers.
The previous paragraphs have set the background of a game, explaining 
profit functions of the manufacturer and the parallel trader, who are the two agents 
involved in this game. A decisive difference between the two agents, which makes 
the game special, is that they have different cost functions and have different break 
even- points. The parallel trader buys the product at the price that the manufacturer 
sets in the exporting market, and is also subject to transportation costs. The 
manufacturer’s unit cost is lower than the price he sets in the exporting market. 
Other factors which move this game away from a standard two- agent game is the 
presence of discounts only on behalf of one of the agents and the fact that the 
manufacturer does not want to signal that parallel trade triggers competition, as such 
a development would encourage policy makers to consider more intense promotion 
of parallel trade, or press for further price cuts for branded products.
6.4.2 Parallel trade markets in the absence o f  policies targeting parallel trade
After discussing the properties of the agents involved in the game, we now 
develop the game between the manufacturer and the parallel trader. Assuming both 
agents are profit maximizers, the question is what strategies manufacturers and 
parallel traders will follow in order to maximise their profits. Parallel traders wish to 
maximise their profits by selling imported products. For manufacturers, parallel 
trade is a source of a decrease in profits, so they would like to eliminate it, if the cost 
of fighting it out of the market would be lower than that of accommodating. 
Alternatively, manufacturers would have to accommodate it, as the latter strategy 
may lead to higher profits rather then fighting it.
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Figure 6.1 Price setting in the presence of parallel trade
B
Z M
X
Consider a plane where the parallel trader buys the product at price P*xp in 
the exporting country and is subject to transportation and distribution costs k it per
unit (Figure 6.1). A is the price level at which the product is priced in the export 
market. B is the price of the export market plus transaction costs that the parallel 
trader would undergo in order to sell in the import market, thus B is the break even 
price for the parallel trader. Z is the level at which the locally sourced product is 
initially priced, before facing parallel trade. M is a point higher than Z, and X is a 
price between B and Z. The break-even point of the parallel trader is P*1= +ku,
thus the price that he will set in the import country must cover the price in the 
exporting country and transportation and distribution costs, and ideally provide a 
return. Otherwise profits are zero (if price is B) or negative (if the price is lower than 
B). Any point beyond B to the right leads to profits.
Branded pharmaceutical products enter the market at a price which is 
negotiated and agreed upon with health insurance. Price increases are very difficult 
to take place due to regulatory practices. Upward changes in medicine prices are 
usually sticky in import countries because of the involvement of insurance in the 
negotiation resulting in price fixing for reimbursement purposes. Prices though are
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usually more flexible downwards. Thus, when a parallel trader enters the import 
market, an “anchor” price is already defined, as the price at which the locally 
sourced product was priced before parallel trade took place. This makes it difficult 
for any of the two players to set a price higher than the initial price of the locally 
sourced product. Thus, setting a price for the parallel trader product P f  =M > Z
= Ptf s would not be feasible. If the trader sets price X, with B<X<Z, he may increase 
profits by moving closer to Z (which is the manufacturer’s initial price). His price 
will still be lower than Pff s , having an advantage in the market, and the profits will
rise by the difference in the price times the quantity sold (q™ *AP” ). Since the 
product is homogenous, the parallel trader will have the incentive to set a price 
which is not lower than Z= P^ . It could be argued that the manufacturer of the 
originator could decrease its price in order to force the parallel trader out of the 
market. If he decreases the price to say price X (with B<X< P^ ), the parallel
trader’s best response is to lower his price too, close to the same price. Both will still 
have positive profits, but smaller than in the previous case, making them both worse 
off. In order to force the parallel trader out of the market, the manufacturer will have 
to lower his price to P^xp +kit. At that point the parallel trader will have to leave the
market, as by setting price P " =P™p + k it he will have no profits, and by setting a 
price higher than that, his product will be more expensive than that of the 
manufacturer, and will thus occur no sales. The manufacturer though will have a 
much lower price in the local market than previously and, as pricing agreements are 
currently structured in most (regulated) countries, once a product’s price is 
discounted, it is difficult to be risen again within a short period of time. Concerning 
the part of the market that is parallel traded, his per-unit profits will be higher by kit
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(as it will be sold at the local market at price + kit instead of the exporting market 
at price P ™p), but for the previously locally sourced part of the market he will have a 
lower per-unit revenue by - P'*p + k it.
Parallel traders usually cannot serve a large part of the local market and their 
main challenge is how to acquire larger quantities of the parallel traded product. 
Hence, in order for a price war on behalf of the manufacturer to be profitable, it 
must hold that the manufacturer’s profits with a price war are larger than without 
such a pricing strategy. This is expressed by inequality (7).
(p.“ -  pt te' > te* -  te r + M +9.") (?)
Inequality (6) is highly unlikely to hold in most cases due to the relatively small 
market share of parallel trade. We therefore assume that inequality (7) does not hold, 
so instead:
fcf* -  p t  h r  < fa r  -  f a r + + 9 . “ ) (?)
Taking this assumption into account, Figure 6.2 shows all possible pricing 
strategies for the manufacturer and all possible responses from the parallel trader. 
We assume that for any strategy which leads to zero profits for the parallel trader,
the parallel trader does not enter the market at all. We also assume that the two
players do not form a cartel and do not fix prices or agree on how to split the market.
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Figure 6.2 Price Setting for the M anufacturer and the Parallel T rader
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The different outcomes of the game between the manufacturer and the parallel trader 
described in Figure 6.2 are:
I. (B, B): n f  = (B - c)qimp + qexp(p exp -  c), n " = o
II. (B, X): I l f  = (.B - c ) q imp + qcxp(p cxp - c ) , n f = 0
III. (B,Z): n f  = ( B - c ) q imp + qexp(p cxp - c ) , n f  = o
IV. (X, B): I l f  = (X  -  c)qimp + qexp (p cxp -  c) , n f = o
v. (X, X): I l f  = ( X - ^ q 18 + (q'xp+ qT)(p*xp- c ) , n f = ^ ( x - / 7 ^ - ^ )
VI. (X,Z): I l f  = (X -c)< T P +<fxp(/?exp - c ) , n " = o
VII. (Z,B): n f  = ( Z - c ) q imp + q°xp(p 'xp- c ) , n f = o
VIII. (Z, X): I l f  = ( Z - ^ + i q ^ + q ^ i p ^ - c ) , -/>■*-*)
IX. (Z,Z): I l f  = (Z-c)<7W + (<?exp + qT)(pe'p - c ) , n f = ^ ( z - Pexp-^ )
where II fts is the profit of the manufacturer and IIJ7 is the profit of the parallel 
trader.
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This is an infinitely repeated game of perfect information for both players. In 
each period players can choose another strategy. We put forward that outcome (IX) 
is the only Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
A profile of strategies a = (oj, ..., ci) in an I-player extensive form game Te 
is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) if it induces a Nash Equilibrium in 
every subgame of Te. (Mas Collel, Whinston and Green, 1995). Any subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium is also Nash equilibrium.
Assuming that inequality (8) holds, setting price at level B is strictly 
dominated by setting price at level X or Z, regardless of the reaction of the parallel 
trader. If the manufacturer sets price Z, the best response of the parallel trader is to 
also set price Z. The payoffs in this case are:
( I l f  ,n "  ) ^ { { X - c ) q u  +(qexp + qT)(pc*p - c ) ,  qT (X  -  - k ) )  (IX)
The parallel trader’s best response to the manufacturer’s decision to set price 
Z is to also set price Z, as the payoff for him is higher than to respond by setting 
price B or X. The manufacturer knows the rational moves that the parallel trader will 
make as a response to his price setting. Consequently, he chooses to set price Z, as 
this will lead to equilibrium (Z, Z) with a higher payoff than equilibrium (X, X). 
Taking trigger strategies into account, each player knows he will be punished if he 
deviates from an equilibrium which suits both players, and is also ready to punish if 
the other player deviates. This holds if the discount factor 8 = e'rt is close enough to 
1, which means that future payoffs do not lose much of their value due to time 
preference. The implication of a low discount factor is that each player cares about 
future payments, so he is hurt if the other player punishes him in the next period. 
Therefore, in the present round of the game an agent will take into account possible 
future punishments when making a move. If the discount factor would be very large,
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it would make the present value of future payments small, thus making any 
punishments in future periods less painful for the agent that is punished, and 
punishment threats would be less credible.
The reason why equilibrium (Z, Z) is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium is 
as follows. The manufacturer knows that setting a price lower than Z will make him 
worse off. Setting price B will lead to lower profits, and setting price X would 
generate a reaction from the parallel trader, who would set price X. The parallel 
trader also knows the manufacturer’s payoffs for each pricing strategy, and does not 
lower his price below Z as this would make him worse off: If the manufacturer 
would not respond with a price cut, the parallel trader would be worse off by the 
difference in price times the quantity, and would increase his profits by increasing 
his price back to Z again. This follows the assumption that the parallel trader has 
access to limited quantities of the product, and sells all quantities he imports if the 
price he sets is not higher than the price of the manufacturer.
If the manufacturer would also lower his price, this would make the parallel 
trader (as well as the manufacturer) worse off, given that the parallel trader can sell 
all quantities he can import if his price is not strictly higher than the manufacturer’s 
price. A possible price war could eventually even drive him out of the market, if 
prices decline down to the level of the parallel trader’s break-even point. It is not in 
the parallel trader’s best interest to provoke the manufacturer by setting a lower 
price, because if the manufacturer follows, the parallel trader may have to exit the 
marker, as a result of having a higher break even point than the manufacturer.
Consequently, either of the two players choosing to deviate from (Z, Z) 
would, eventually, be worse off. Both rational players observe that they are better 
off by simultaneously setting prices Ptf s =P™ =Z, rather than setting any price = X
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G [ / T  + * .. ^)- This is the unique outcome of the game in the absence of any
regulation, particularly targeting parallel trade. In this equilibrium the price of the 
parallel imported product will equal the price of the locally sourced product prior to 
the presence of parallel trade.
According to this equilibrium, manufacturers accommodate parallel traders 
as this strategy is more profitable than fighting them out of the market through price 
competition. Once they are accommodated, parallel traders will manage to sell all 
the quantities of imported medicines.
In the presence of discounting, the parallel trader would preferably give 
discounts to pharmacists, rather than lower the official price of the parallel traded 
product. Lowering the price would make pharmacists’ profits decrease, while with 
unofficial discounts pharmacists receive the same mark-up but benefit directly from 
discounts.
Otherwise, in the absence of any discounts on behalf of parallel traders, a 
parallel trader would avoid setting a price lower than that of the locally sourced 
product. The reason is that lower prices would lead to lower profits for pharmacists, 
as pharmacist mark-ups are fixed, at least for the United Kingdom, Sweden and 
Germany. In Sweden there is some form of regressive nature of mark-ups, but this 
only applies for medicines with significant differences in price, and is partially or 
fully offset by an extra fee per medicine dispensed, which actually increases rather 
than decreases as the price goes up. Consequently, also in Sweden, pharmacists 
usually gain more by dispensing more expensive medicines, especially when price 
differences are relatively small. Therefore, if the pharmacy purchase price is smaller 
for the parallel traded than the locally sourced product, pharmacists would prefer to 
dispense locally sourced products, as their profit would be larger, making it obvious
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that parallel traders would avoid setting a price lower than that of the locally sourced 
product.
The difference in the cost functions between the two agents plays a very 
important role in this game. Clearly, the parallel trader has a higher unit cost than 
the manufacturer and any price lower than this would force him out of the market. 
The difference in the break even point prevents a price war. The parallel trader 
knows that by triggering a price war he may eventually be forced to exit the market, 
so he prices at the same point as the manufacturer. The manufacturer also knows that 
if he reduced his price, in order to eventually kick the parallel trader out of the 
market, the parallel trader would follow, but the price war would stop only after the 
parallel trader leaves the market, at his break even point. At this point the 
manufacturer would be worse off anyway due to the large reduction in price he 
would have to make compared to the market share he would actually gain and the 
inability to increase prices quickly due to stickiness.
If inequality (8) ]q” < (/>“  -  (p ” + k ” )\q” + q f f ) did not hold,
meaning that the quantities imported by the parallel trader do not represent only a 
small fraction of the importing market, a manufacturer could drive the parallel trader 
out of the market through a price war. Even in this case, however, a manufacturer 
may still not wish to be engaged in a price war with a parallel trader. Manufacturers 
are large multinational firms with strong brand names, large sales worldwide and 
care about their reputation. Being engaged in a price war against a parallel trader 
selling a product manufactured by them is controversial and counter-intuitive and 
would most certainly damage the brand’s reputation and by extension the firm’s 
reputation. Such damage to the firm’s image would jeopardise future revenue in all 
aspects of the firm’s activities. Another factor is the sustainability and continuity of
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the parallel trade supply chain. The volume of parallel traded products is not 
constant and also depends on the prices in the export countries. By lowering his 
price, the manufacturer may find himself in the situation of a low price which cannot 
be increased quickly, while parallel trade has stopped or decreased due to other 
reasons.
Importantly, lowering prices of medicines which are subjected to parallel 
trade could have a very negative effect on prices of medicines which do not face 
parallel trade, predominantly for two reasons:
First, a price reduction as a result of competition from parallel trade would 
lead to large savings for health insurance. Parallel trade would no longer be a 
controversial activity of which effects on competition are ambiguous. It would 
provide clear evidence that parallel trade lowers prices of locally sourced products 
almost down to the level of exporting countries. Thus more aggressive policies 
encouraging parallel trade could be implemented.
Second, lowering the price of the locally sourced product would indicate that 
the manufacturers can indeed manage with lower prices in import countries. This 
would lead to tougher negotiations and overall tougher stance by health insurance 
when pricing and reimbursement decisions are made upon the launch of new 
medicines, resulting in lower future profits.
Therefore, it would be better for manufacturers not to engage in a price war 
and somehow acquiesce to parallel trading activity. Manufacturers’ efforts could 
instead focus on exporting countries, where their local offices could try to limit 
quantities to only what is needed in the local market, so that there is no space for 
parallel traders to perform their activities.
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The above analysis generates an important question regarding parallel trade 
penetration in importing countries. If the price of the parallel imported product is the 
same or almost the same as the locally sourced product pharmacies would not 
necessarily be interested in dispensing parallel traded products. The reason why they 
do lies in discounts which parallel traders give to pharmacists and any incentives or 
enforcement mechanisms by health insurers. Even when discounts are officially 
allowed, they are not recorded. Branded product manufacturers usually do not have 
the flexibility to make discounts on top of what they are allowed to give through 
regulation. Thus, there is a strong financial incentive for pharmacists to dispense 
parallel traded products. Another factor contributing to the dispensing of parallel 
traded products by pharmacies is government intervention, as discussed in the next 
sub-section. In some cases, policies may provide incentives encouraging pharmacies 
to dispense parallel traded products, or may force them to do so through 
disincentives.
6.4.3 The effect o f  Policies targeting Parallel Trade on equilibrium prices
In the previous section we analysed how prices of locally sourced and 
parallel imported medicines evolve as a result of parallel trade. The equilibrium in 
game outcome (IX) assumed no regulatory interventions targeting parallel trade. 
However, policy makers in importing countries are aware of price differences across 
countries and the possibilities to reduce costs through parallel imports. As a result of 
this perception, explicit policies aiming at the dispensing of parallel imported 
medicines have been implemented in Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom.
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6.4.3.1 Price Spread sharing
A policy aiming directly at encouraging parallel imports is sharing the price 
difference between the locally sourced and the parallel traded product with 
pharmacists. Any price difference which occurs between the locally sourced product 
and the parallel imported product leads to savings for health insurance. When this 
policy is implemented, health insurance shares these savings with pharmacies. This 
is a very strong incentive for pharmacists to dispense parallel traded products, as this 
leads to additional rents. This measure has been implemented in the Netherlands, 
where the pharmacists gain a third of the price difference. The remaining two thirds 
accrue to health insurance.
Pharmacists do not compete against the manufacturer or the parallel trader. 
They simply work as a channel through which the product reaches patients. Thus 
they are treated as an exogenous factor, rather than an agent in this model.
The main difference between this case and the case of the absence of any 
policies encouraging parallel trade is that the parallel trader is pressed by a third 
party to lower prices. The third party (the pharmacist), has some bargaining power 
and can choose not to dispense parallel traded products if their price is not lower 
than locally sourced products, as they benefit from a price gap. The argument to do 
so is reinforced by parallel traded and locally sourced products not always being 
considered to be identical due to different packaging or labelling, which can 
potentially confuse patients.
The parallel trader enters at a price lower than that of the locally sourced 
product, but the manufacturer does not follow. By following, he would not increase 
his market share, as parallel traders can sell all the (limited) quantities that they can 
import. In order to gain more than this, the manufacturer would have to lower his
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price further down than the level of the parallel imported product. The parallel trader 
would have to respond by reducing his price down to the level of the locally sourced 
product, or even lower, as pharmacists would demand a price gap in order to benefit 
from it. This would trigger a game which would again lead to a “race to the bottom”, 
and would force the parallel trader to exit the market and the price being set at the 
break- even point of the parallel trader. This would leave both sides worse off.
In summary, the manufacturer would not gain a larger part of the market by 
lowering the price down to the level of the parallel trader and lowering the price 
even further would lead to a price war.
The parallel trader would not have set a price lower than that of the 
manufacturer, in the absence of this policy because this would not necessarily lead 
to an increase in his market share. He only does so due to pressure from the 
pharmacist.
Figure 6.3 Pricing with Price Spread Sharing Policies
p? p^*kk pk
B X
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In the presence of this policy, there are infinite equilibria. These are between 
the break-even point of the parallel trader P 'xp + kit and the price of the locally 
sourced product/),15 (Figure 6.3). The outcome depends on the negotiating powers of
the parallel trader and the pharmacist. The price of the locally sourced product 
remains unchanged at its initial level because, again, in order to drive the parallel
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trader out of the market he would have to reduce prices down to P™p+kit. Also, if 
the price of the parallel traded product is set below , even if the manufacturer
reduced his price to that level, the parallel trader would still be able to sell all 
quantities he imports due to discounts, as explained in section 6.2.2. When 
examining whether the manufacturer would have an incentive to set a price that is 
lower than the price that the parallel trader sets, the game will be reduced to the 
simple game without policy interventions. Thus, the manufacturer would not set a 
price lower than P*xp either. Consequently, the price of the locally sourced product
will remain unchanged at its initial level.
In this particular case (in the presence of price spread sharing), the different 
outcomes of the game described in Figure 6.2 are:
X. (B, B): n f  = (B — c)qimp + q"':(p 'xp - c ) , n f  =o
XI. (B, X): n f  = ( B - c ) q lmp+ q '’* (p 'x> -c ) , n f  “ 0
XII. (B, Z): n f  = ( B - c ) q imp + ? 'Ip(/>'xp - c), n f = o
XIII. (X, B): n ‘f = ( X - c ) q l™ +qa*(p 'v - c ) , n f = o
XIV. (X. X): n f  = {X -  c)qu  + (? '"P + qT)(p’v ~c), n f = o
>X (X,Z): n f  = ( X - c ) q mp + q'v (p 'v  - c ) , n f = o
XVI. (Z,B): n f  = ( Z - c ) q ‘-p + q"p(p ‘v - c ) , n f = o
XVII. (Z, X): n f  = ( Z - c ^  +(q''p + qT)(p‘v - c ) . n  p^ q T( X - p ™ - k )
XVIII. (Z,Z): n f  = ( Z - c ) 9“  +(q**+qT)(p 'v  - c), n f = o
Compared to the analysis in the absence of price spread sharing, the parallel 
trader makes no profit in this case when his price is the same as the price of the 
manufacturer. This leads to a new equilibrium, (XVII), at which the price of the
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parallel trader is X, which is lower than Z, which is the price of the manufacturer. So 
at the equilibrium, ( P^s , P *1) = (Z, X). Profits for the parallel trader are
n f / = q T( X - p ^ - k )  (9)
and profits for the manufacturer are
n f  = { Z - ^ q 18 + { q ^ + q T) { p ^ - c )  (10)
Another case in which the parallel trader could have a positive profit would be if 
both the parallel trader and the manufacturer price their products between B and Z, 
with P™ < P^s . Both occur profits in this case, but this strategy is strictly dominated 
by outcome XVII, where , P " ) = (Z, X)
6.4.3.2 Co-payments
Another policy measure which in principle favours parallel imports over 
locally sourced products is the presence of patient co-payments, particularly co- 
insurance (rather than a flat co-payment)9. Co-insurance helps fight moral hazard 
and encourages generic dispensing. Co-insurance also encourages the dispensing of 
parallel traded medicines. Patients benefit from the price difference as they pay a 
smaller co-payment. In this case, the game is exactly the same as in the previous 
case, as there is an exogenous factor pressing for lower parallel trade prices 
compared to the locally sourced prices. The outcome is again ( P^s , P f1) = (Z, X). 
Co-insurance type co-payments are present in Sweden and in Germany since the 
beginning of 2004.
9 When the patient is burdened by a flat fee per product, the out-of-pocket payment remains the 
same regardless of the price. In the case of co-insurance, the out-of-pocket payment is a function of 
the price.
219
6.4.3.3 Clawbacks
Discounts are generally granted to pharmacies on behalf of the parallel 
traders. Generic products are also subject to discounting (Kanavos, Costa-Font, 
Seely 2008) and, as in the case of parallel trade, these are not officially announced 
and their extent is not known. Health insurers assume a reasonable discount that 
pharmacists may be benefitting from and impose clawbacks in order to benefit from 
the discounts that pharmacists receive from parallel traders, as clawbacks are 
typically lower than the overall discounts received. Following this policy, 
pharmacists have a strong incentive to dispense parallel traded products because 
they maximise their rent from discounts. By dispensing even more parallel traded 
products or by achieving even higher discounts they may even manage to make a 
profit. Clawbacks are in place in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. This 
does not necessarily lead to official prices of parallel traded products being lower 
than locally sourced ones though. Clawbacks will lead to higher unofficial discounts 
for pharmacists rather than to lower prices. The equilibrium in the absence of any 
policies was upward convergence between the price of the locally sourced and the 
parallel traded product. This equilibrium is not affected by clawbacks alone. When 
implemented together with other policies though, clawbacks will push the price of 
the parallel traded product upwards towards, if this would have been lowered to a 
level lower than that of the locally sourced product due to another policy.
6.4.3.4 Quotas
Finally, quotas directly promote the dispensing of parallel imported 
medicines. This measure is present in Germany. In particular, pharmacies have to 
reach a certain percentage of parallel traded products as a proportion of their total
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sales. This creates demand from pharmacists for parallel traded products; otherwise 
they will be burdened by financial penalties. The parallel traders observe this 
demand, so they understand that they do not have to dispense at a lower price to be 
able to sell the products they imported, as quotas make pharmacists seek parallel 
traded products anyway. Thus quotas lead to upward price convergence. Once the 
quota is reached though, this incentive on behalf of the pharmacists disappears. 
Therefore, quotas work for only part of the parallel traded products which are 
dispensed. After the quota is reached, the market becomes similar to a market 
without quotas for the remaining products. If the quota is not high enough and is 
easily reached, it may actually have no effect on parallel trade. Quotas do not have 
any effect on the initial equilibrium without policy interventions, but when 
implemented together with other policies which push prices of parallel traded 
products downwards, quotas will revert part or the whole price reduction which 
would take place in the presence of only the other policies.
6.4.3.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, in the absence of any policy interventions, the outcome of a 
game between the manufacturer and the parallel trader is that both set their prices at 
the price of the locally sourced product prior to the presence of parallel trade. This, 
however, may change in the presence of policy interventions. Cost sharing and 
sharing savings with pharmacists lead to infinite equilibria, while quotas and 
clawbacks lead to upward price convergence. The price of the locally sourced 
product remains stable at its initial level in all cases though, in the presence or not of 
policies targeting parallel trade.
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6.4. 4 Generic Entry and Parallel Trade
Patent expiry brings more players in pharmaceutical markets. Generic 
competitors enter the market at a price which is a fraction of the originator’s price. 
Empirical evidence has showed that originator producers do not compete against 
generics in terms of price. Frank and Salkever (1993 and 1997) used data from the 
United States to show that prices of originators do not decrease post patent expiry, 
and may actually increase (generics paradox). The authors point out that a necessary 
condition for such price increases is that entry leads to a decline in the own-price 
elasticity of reduced-form brand-name demand. Grabowski and Vemon (1992) 
found that pioneering firms did not attempt to deter entry through their pricing 
strategies. Rather, in most cases, the firms continued to increase their prices at the 
same rate as prior to entry. Rizzo and Zeckhauser (2005) also found that producers 
of brand-name products do not decrease prices after generic market entry. Caves, 
Whinston and Hurwitz (1991) conclude that generic entry only leads to a slow-down 
in the increase of originator medicine prices. Therefore, the originator price is not 
expected to decrease post patent expiry. But the parallel imported originator product 
may follow a different strategy.
After a product goes off patent, the higher branded price is not covered by 
health insurance any longer. The price which is covered is that of a cheaper generic. 
As a result, the originator medicine only keeps a small fraction of the total market 
(Kanavos, Costa-Font, Seeley 2008). In order to get its product reimbursed by health 
insurance, the parallel trader may decrease the price of his product, choosing to 
compete against generics in importing countries, depending on generic prices. This 
can happen if the price of the generic in the import country is higher than the price 
of the originator in the export country plus any transportation costs. Such a strategy
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may allow the parallel trader to secure a significant market share in the off patent 
market. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that under certain circumstances generic 
entry may push prices of parallel imported medicines down.
At the same time, prices of locally sourced products remain unaffected. In 
the absence of parallel trade, this happens because post patent expiry the originator 
keeps only a small part of the market. These consumers are the most brand loyal 
ones, hence they are insensitive to changes in prices, meaning that the absolute value 
of price elasticity of these particular consumers is lower than 1. Thus, a 1% decrease 
in the price of the originator product will lead to an increase in consumption by less 
than 1%, leading to a decrease in total revenue. Contrary, an increase in the price 
will lead to an increase in total revenue. Besides, engaging in a price war with 
generic producers will only push the price of the product further down, as generic 
producers can carry on decreasing their prices down to very low levels.
In the presence of parallel trade and generic competitors, the producer of the 
originator product will again sustain his price at high levels. A price war against the 
parallel trader will make the producer worse off, as analyzed in section 6.4.1. The 
fact that generic producers are also present only makes the possibility of a further 
price reduction as a result of a price war more likely. Therefore, we do not expect 
generic entry in the presence of parallel trade to lead to a decrease in the price of the 
originator product, but it may well affect the parallel trader, leading to a decrease in 
prices of parallel traded products.
6.4.5 The effect o f  Pharmaceutical Parallel Trade on Social Welfare
The advocates of parallel trade suggest that this practice leads to savings for 
health insurance and helps cut medicine spending. This could possibly be the case in
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the short run in some countries via direct savings from dispensing parallel imported 
products, when they happen to be priced at lower levels than the locally sourced 
product. Nevertheless, the long term effects of parallel trade should not be ignored. 
The agents who suffer from this practice are the manufacturers. For them, parallel
of the exporting country.
In the absence of parallel trade, the originator producer’s profits are the sum 
of profits in the importing and exporting country:
Where cit is the unit cost of production, which can be assumed to be the same in 
both countries, as they are produced by the same company, in the same plant and 
with the similar transportation costs in order to reach both markets.
In the presence of parallel trade, the originator producer will sell fewer units 
of the medicine in the local market, as these units will be purchased abroad by a 
parallel trader and imported into the local market. Thus, assuming that total demand 
remains constant in each market, the producer’s sales will increase in the exporting 
market as much as the drop in sales in the importing market. Total sales in both 
markets together for the originator producer will remain the same, but the parallel 
imported products are purchased by the parallel trader at a lower price abroad. 
Profits for the originator medicine manufacturer in the presence of parallel trade are:
trade is equivalent to covering demand in the importing country at the lower prices
(11)
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The difference between profits in the absence and in the presence o f parallel trade is:
«p
it k' u (13)
Parallel trade causes a drop in the manufacturer’s profits by the difference in price 
times the sales of parallel trade.
Parallel traders (or the supply chain in general) benefit from parallel trade by their 
profits:
Concerning consumers, if the prices are the same as the locally sourced product, 
they do not benefit from lower prices. In the case where the parallel traded product 
is priced at a lower level than the locally sourced product, the price is still higher 
than the exporting price, so a large proportion of the difference ends up as the 
parallel traders’ profit.
Reduced manufacturer profitability due to parallel trade though may lead to 
lower levels of future R&D. This leads to lower future profits of the firm, say - 
e (A7T*f+n) and fewer new medicines in the future, which might impact health 
compared to what would occur in the absence of parallel trade ( E(Ah)).
The total benefits of parallel trade are:
(14)
(15)
The total welfare losses due to parallel trade are:
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(p.“  ~p 7} l f /+E[A^)+E(Ah) (16)
As (pjf - p “p )q™ > (p™ -  (p .^  + tc"))q ™, it is clear that social welfare decreases
due to parallel trade. The manufacturer observes parallel trade today and estimates 
returns of future medicines subject to parallel trade practice. Therefore a lower 
return is expected, potentially leading to less future innovation.
6.4.6 Conclusion
We have theoretically analyzed the impact of parallel trade on competition in 
the pharmaceutical market and how prices of parallel traded products evolve. We 
showed that in the absence of particular policies, parallel trade does not affect the 
prices of locally sourced products. The presence of such policies though may change 
the outcome. Some policies may lead to the price of the parallel traded product to be 
lower than that of the locally sourced product. Such policies are sharing savings with 
the pharmacist and co-payments. Policies which lead to upward price convergence 
are clawbacks and quotas. Of course, combinations of such policies make things 
more complicated and the outcomes depend on the intensity of these policies and the 
market agents’ reaction. The price of the locally sourced product remains stable at 
its initial level in all cases though, in the presence or not of policies targeting parallel 
trade. The next step is to test these findings empirically, in the main parallel 
importing countries, which are Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom.
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6.5 Price Differences between Locally Sourced and Parallel Im ported
Medicines
After having in theory analysed the effects of parallel trade on prices and 
competition, we now observe empirical data to see how parallel traded medicines are 
priced compared to locally sourced products. This section focuses only on the price 
spread rather than the effect on locally sourced medicine prices. The next section 
which involves econometric analysis will focus on whether prices of locally sourced 
products are affected by parallel trade.
Tables 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 show the price spread between locally sourced 
products and parallel traded products in Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006. Products which face generic 
competition are indicated with an asterisk. The Tables show that products which 
face generic entry demonstrate higher price differences between locally sourced and 
parallel trader products. This shows that, as explained in a previous section, the 
parallel trader may choose to compete against generics in an off- patent market.
The country with the lowest price spread is the United Kingdom (Table 6.5). 
Most medicines have a zero percent price spread. An exception is Captopril, which 
faces generic competition. But this is clearly an outlier, as parallel traded captopril 
accounts for less than 1% of the UK market. Parallel traded Omeprazole, 
Simvastatin and Ramipril, which all face generic competition, also have lower prices 
than the corresponding locally sourced medicines. All other products however have 
exactly the same price. The fact that in the vast majority of cases in the United 
Kingdom the price of the parallel imported medicine is the same as that of the 
locally sourced, reflects the absence of policies which would lead to lower parallel 
trade prices. Co-payments are flat in the UK, and there is no sharing of savings with
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pharmacists. Clawbacks are present, but this only leads to pharmacies dispensing 
more parallel traded products, rather than cheaper products.
The country with the higher price spread is the Netherlands (Table 6.3). 
There is no single parallel imported product with the same price as the respective 
locally sourced product. This reflects the savings-sharing policy which is present in 
the Netherlands. Pharmacists have a strong incentive to demand lower prices from 
the parallel traders, which are passed on to the retail market. However, the highest 
price differences occur for off-patent products. Sweden is a similar case. Patient co­
payments are relative to prices in this country, so there is downward pressure on the 
parallel traded medicines. Again, the largest price differences occur for off-patent 
products. Some price differences are very large, but most cases are products with 
small market share of parallel imports. Finally, Germany has some products with 
zero price spread and others with large price differences. Products with zero spread 
are patent protected, while price differences are present for off-patent products. 
Before these are reached parallel traders have no incentive to sell at lower prices. 
But patient co-payments are also present. These two policy measures have opposite 
effects on prices of parallel traded products, hence the large volatility in the price 
spread.
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Table 6.2 Price spread between Locally Sourced and Parallel Im ported
Medicines -  G erm any (percent), 2003-2006
2003 2004 2005 2006
Lansoprazole 4.27 6.25 6.84 21.18*
Omeprazole 9.42* 39.59* 32.82* 35.38*
Pantoprazole 4.20 7.82 5.67 2.12
Atorvastatin N/A N/A N/A N/A
Pravastatin 6.57 6.57* 0.00* N/A
Simvastatin 19.77* 41.85* 36.80* 40.96*
Captopril 21.78* 38.98* 40.72* 21.78*
Enalapril 16.05* 25.15* 35.42* 16.05*
Quinapril 0.00 0.00 N/A 0.00
Ramipril 3.69 0.00* 0.00* 28.07*
Losartan N/A N/A N/A N/A
Vais art an 7.59 3.00 0.00 N/A
Citalopram 5.07* 10.97* 14.44* 24.99*
Clozapine N/A N/A N/A N/A
Olanzapine 3.34 5.15 5.00 2.48
Paroxetine 4.79 8.94 16.23 12.30
Risperidone 10.03 12.90 7.42 12.11
Sertraline 3.45 2.07 9.38 13.46*
Asterisk indicates generic presence.
Source: The authors from IMS
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Table 6.3 Price spread between Locally sourced and Parallel Im ported
Medicines -  N etherlands (percent), 2003-2006
2003 2004 2005 2006
Lansoprazole 12.51 9.44 11.74 40.34*
Omeprazole 20.64* N/A N/A N/A
Pantoprazole 18.74 9.67 12.08 15.13
Atorvastatin 16.01 12.69 12.66 9.71
Pravastatin 7.33 26.17* 17.24* 33.43*
Simvastatin 11.84* 22.58* 30.24* 49.61*
Captopril 14.81* N/A N/A N/A
Enalapril 14.00* N/A N/A N/A
Quinapril 17.20 14.57 5.13 8.59
Ramipril 12.74 13.20* 6.95* 12.79*
Losartan 11.99 12.65 9.80 11.59
Valsartan 9.01 N/A N/A N/A
Citalopram 7.38* 3.38* N/A 10.76*
Clozapine N/A N/A N/A 43.04
Olanzapine 7.78 7.59 7.60 7.57
Paroxetine 6.15 N/A N/A N/A
Risperidone 9.26 7.84 7.50 9.57
Sertraline 13.49 12.74 11.80 3.95*
Asterisk indicates generic presence.
Source: The authors from IMS
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Table 6.4 Price spread between Locally sourced and Parallel Im ported
Medicines -  Sweden (percent), 2003-2006
2003 2004 2005 2006
Lansoprazole N/A N/A N/A N/A
Omeprazole 7.74* 8.95* 6.80* 23.92*
Pantoprazole N/A N/A N/A N/A
Atorvastatin 6.28 9.55 2.87 5.21
Pravastatin 5.83 9.83* 2.88* 11.84*
Simvastatin 30.06* 85.86* 87.90* 90.39*
Captopril N/A N/A N/A N/A
Enalapril 13.13* N/A N/A N/A
Quinapril N/A N/A N/A 10.28
Ramipril 16.25 0.00* 0.00* 65.82*
Losartan N/A 1.12 1.12 N/A
Valsartan 6.00 6.73 2.27 2.27
Citalopram 7.83 7.14 78.42 80.40
Clozapine 19.57* 31.56* 34.97* 18.63*
Olanzapine 12.24 10.42 3.38 8.35
Paroxetine N/A N/A N/A N/A
Risperidone 14.97 10.32 2.89 0.36
Sertraline 10.00 9.41 31.66 66.70*
Asterisk indicates generic presence.
Source: The authors from IMS
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Table 6.5 Price spread between Locally sourced and Parallel Im ported
Medicines - United Kingdom (percent), 2003-2006
2003 2004 2005 2006
Lansoprazole 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00*
Omeprazole 7.86* 15.29* 10.15* 0.00*
Pantoprazole 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Atorvastatin 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pravastatin 0.00* 0.00* 9.00* 0.00*
Simvastatin 4.55* 10.45* 20.71* 18.00*
Captopril 46.48* 45.85* 48.61* 31.60*
Enalapril 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
Quinapril 0.00 0.00 4.69 0.00
Ramipril 0.00 9.34* 16.67* 15.33*
Losartan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Valsartan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Citalopram 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
Clozapine N/A N/A N/A 0.00
Olanzapine 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Paroxetine 8.40 0.36 0.00 0.00
Risperidone 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sertraline 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.10*
Asterisk indicates generic presence. 
Source: The authors from IMS
6.6 The Econometric Model
6.6.1 Data
In conducting this analysis, data from the Intercontinental Medical Statistics 
(IMS) pharmaceutical sales database were used. IMS also records volume and prices 
of parallel imports. Price data on parallel trade were acquired from countries. IMS 
collects and reports market data on pharmaceutical sales, prices and market shares of 
all products and product presentations in many countries. The data have been 
validated and their accuracy ranges between 98%-99% (IMS, 2002). Collected and 
reported data are based on actual invoiced sales of pharmaceutical products.
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Data were obtained for the 2003-2006 period. The focus of the analysis was 
the retail (pharmacy) market in four countries (notably Germany, Sweden, The 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom), which have been known to encourage 
parallel imports and their price level for prescription pharmaceuticals is above the 
European average. Therefore, the potential for parallel trade from lower-priced 
countries is in principle significant. Of the entire retail market, a segment 
comprising six therapeutic (product) categories was selected. The product categories 
were proton pump inhibitors (PPI), HMG CoA reductase inhibitors (statins), ACE I 
inhibitors, ACE II inhibitors, SSRIs, and atypical anti-psychotics. These categories 
were chosen because they provide a large number of high-volume and high-price 
products10, many of which are patent protected and, therefore, potentially more 
susceptible to PT.
For each product and product formulation within these product categories, 
data was obtained on market shares, prices, sales, and volumes (in terms of packs) 
sold. All pecuniary (price and sales) figures were expressed in Euros (€). It was 
possible to distinguish between market shares of volumes, sales, and prices of 
locally-sourced and parallel imported versions of the same product.
A very important aspect of the selected data and period is that this period
covers both in-patent and off-patent medicines. This allows controlling for factors
such as generic entry. Prior to generic entry the manufacturer of the branded product
is a monopolist in the market. Patent expiry though allows new players to enter the
market. These are generic competitors, which are not subjected to R&D costs as the
branded manufacturer is. They enter the market immediately after patent expiry and
swiftly take up the vast majority of the market, due to policies promoting generic
10 These categories include very widely prescribed life-saving and very effective products for severe 
chronic conditions, such as (peptic and duodenal) ulcer, depression, hypertension, angina, prevention 
of heart disease, hyperlipidemia, and schizophrenia.
233
prescribing and dispensing in Europe. This aspect of competition should not be 
ignored, as it may influence the behaviour of the originator firm. Including both 
products which are in- patent (and hence do not face generic competition) and 
medicines which do face generic competitors, allows controlling for this very 
important factor. Further, the sample also includes some medicines which in some 
countries over certain periods do not face parallel trade competitors. This also allows 
for observing the differences in pricing behaviour in the presence or not of parallel 
traders in the market of a particular product.
6.6.2 The Empirical Model
The game theoretic approach showed how prices of locally sourced and 
parallel traded products are set as a result of parallel trade, in the presence or not of 
relevant policies. The descriptive section showed that in United Kingdom the price 
spread is usually zero, suggesting that there is price convergence. But we do not 
know yet whether this price convergence is upward or downward. Upward 
convergence would show that parallel trade does not lead to any savings in the 
United Kingdom. Similarly, in the Netherlands and Sweden there is a significant 
price gap, which means that direct savings may occur by dispensing parallel traded 
products. But if the price of the locally sourced product also decreases as a result of 
parallel trade, this would mean that indirect savings also occur, making parallel trade 
a significant contributor to cost containment. In Germany, some medicines have 
zero price spread, while others have a positive price spread.
For all previously mentioned cases, in order to determine whether there is 
downward or upward convergence, hence positive or zero savings (United Kingdom 
and some molecules in Germany) respectively, or whether parallel trade leads to
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indirect savings apart from direct savings (the Netherlands, Sweden and some 
molecules in Germany) we use econometric methods. Indirect savings would occur 
if the parallel traded product triggers a response from the manufacturer in terms of 
lowering the product’s price. In this case savings would also occur by dispensing the 
locally sourced product.
According to economic theory, the price of the product depends on the 
presence of other competitors. The price of the locally sourced product may be 
influenced by the presence of generics in the market. Thus a cut in parallel trade 
prices may be the result of generic entry rather than the presence of parallel traded 
products. The hypothesis is that parallel traded products do not affect the price of the 
locally sourced product, but as a competitor, they can enter the equation describing 
the type of market. The price of a locally sourced product is:
P “ = P„LS(G,Pl) (17)
where G represents competition from generics and PI competition from parallel 
traders.
Using equation (16) we create the empirical model. Instrumental variable 
panel data regressions are run, using prices of the locally sourced products as the 
dependent variable. The equations which will be empirically estimated are (18), (19), 
(20) and (21):
P^f = ai + + J3xmsptit + J32 generics , +  J33statinsi( +  fi4aceijt
n
+ PsPPhj + P ( , a c e i i i,t + P i a ty P i,'  + P%exrU, + Y jP ktimei,y +£U (18)
k=9
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P(t = a ( + p Q+ /?i p tit + p 2 generics jt + p 3statinsit + p 4aceiit
n
+ PsPPh,t + P^aceii + p-,atyp + P%exr + £  Pktimeiy + uit ^
Pit = a ( +P0+ p xmsptit + p 2generics it + P3statinsjf + p 4aceijt
11
+ P iP P h ,+ Pf,a ce ii, . ,+ P iaty p „ + + Y j Pk,im e .,y +  A/ ,< ( 2 0 )
*=9
= or,. + /?0 + p xmsptit + p 2genericsit + p 3statinsit + P4aceiit
ii
+ PsPP'u + Peaceiii,t + Pi“tyPu + P%exrit, + g  Pktimeiy + v,,
where / indicates the specific product in the specific country and t indicates time. 
P ^  is the price of the locally sourced product, measured in logs, mspt is the market 
share of each parallel traded product, as a proportion of each particular product 
(capturing parallel trade market penetration), pt is a dummy variable indicating the 
presence or not of parallel traders in the market of a particular medicine, generics is 
a 0-1 dummy variable which indicates the presence of generics in the market of each 
particular molecule, statins, acei, ppi, aceii, atyp and ssri are dummy variables for 
each therapeutic class. They are used to control for differences in demand across 
therapeutic classes, ssri is not included in the regression as this would lead to a 
singular matrix, exr is the exchange rate, measured in logs. Finally, we also use time 
dummies to control for time effects.
In equation (21), the dependent variable is the log of the ratio of prices.
According to the properties of logarithms though, lo = logx -  lo g y . In other
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words, the log of a ratio of numbers is equal to the difference of the logs of these 
numbers. Hence we can write the dependent variable as P*f -P ? J  where P ff  is the
log of the price of the locally sourced product and PfJ is the price of the parallel
imported product. Policies targeting parallel trade which influence prices (share and 
copay) are excluded from the empirical model due to colinearity problems. Policies 
influencing volume of parallel trade are used as instruments, as explained later. 
Summary statistics are in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6 Summary Statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev.
p L S 287 4.403 1.228
p F T 225 4.309 1.244
mspt 287 15.289 16.833
generics 288 0.389 0.488
copay 288 0.438 0.497
quota 288 0.250 0.434
clawback 288 0.500 0.501
share 288 0.250 0.434
acei 288 0.222 0.416
ppi 288 0.167 0.373
aceii 288 0.111 0.315
atyp 288 0.167 0.373
exr 288 -0.555 0.963
dist 288 19.294 3.247
Due to endogeneity between prices and parallel trade penetration, we use 
instrumental variables to estimate equations (18), (19) (20) and (21). The 
instruments used are Idist and policy. Idist is the average Euclidian distance of 
latitude and longitude between each importing and exporting country capitals 
measured in logs. Parallel traders are subject to transportation costs. These costs 
may be significant and extend beyond the price difference between the importing 
and the exporting country, making parallel trade not profitable. A smaller
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geographical distance between importing and exporting countries may be important 
in making parallel trade profitable, thus changing the state from zero parallel trade 
originating from a particular exporting country to a positive volume of parallel trade 
from that country.
Policies encouraging parallel trade penetration are also used as instruments. 
The inclusion of two different policy dummies , namely quota and clawback causes 
some collinearity problems. Therefore, we used a new variable, policy, which is the 
sum of the other two policy dummies: quota and clawback, copay indicates the 
presence of patient co-payments; quota indicates the presence of quotas for parallel 
traded products for pharmacists; clawback indicates clawback mechanisms for 
pharmacists, share and copay are not included because they may affect prices 
directly, rather than through the market share. Using policy instead of quota and 
clawback addresses collinearity problems.
We use Panel Data analysis in order to estimate the model. Panel data is used 
because it can give “more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among 
variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency” (Gujarati 2003). Thus, 
having a different intercept for each country may allow us to have a better and more 
efficient model. The constant term, /?, is different for each product in each country 
and is determined using either fixed or random effects.
We assume heterogeneity between countries due to the fact that different 
policies apply. According to this assumption, the constant term that is different for 
each country captures the effects of those variables that are peculiar to the z'-th 
individual and that are constant over time. The error term is assumed to be 
independent and identically distributed over individuals and time, with mean zero 
and variance oe2. Alternatively, the random effects approach assumes that the
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intercepts of the individuals are different but that they can be treated as drawings 
from a distribution with mean p and variance a tt2. The essential assumption here is 
that these drawings are independent of the explanatory variables. (Verbeek 2005). 
The panel identifier in this model is the pharmaceutical product per country. In this 
way we can distinguish, both, between countries and between medicines. This is 
useful because there can be different demand structures not only from country to 
country but also from medicine to medicine within the same country.
Equation (18) examines the effects of parallel trade penetration {mspt) on 
prices of locally sourced medicines. Equation (19) examines the effects of the 
presence of parallel traded products {pt) on the market. A negative and statistically 
significant coefficient for mspt or p t would suggest that parallel trade leads to lower 
prices for locally sourced products. This would provide evidence that parallel trade 
would trigger competition and would also lead to indirect savings, apart from direct 
savings. If the coefficient is negative or statistically insignificant, it would indicate 
that parallel trade does not affect prices of locally sourced products. Equation (20) 
examines the effect of parallel trade penetration on prices of parallel imported 
medicines. Finally, equation (21) examines the determinants of the ratio of locally 
sourced and parallel imported medicine prices.
6.6.3 Empirical Results
6.6.3.1 Aggregate Level Results
Estimation results of the instrumental variable panel data analysis of 
equations (18) and (19) are in Table 6.7. Equations (18) and (19) show the effects of 
parallel trade penetration and parallel trade presence respectively on prices of locally
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sourced products. The estimation results of the fixed effects model of equation (18) 
demonstrate a positive and statistically insignificant coefficient of mspt, which 
shows that prices of locally sourced products are not influenced by parallel trade 
penetration. The coefficient of the variable representing generic entry is also 
statistically insignificant, showing that prices do not respond to generic entry either 
(this is known in the literature as the “generics paradox”, as discussed previosuly).
Results are similar for the random effects model. The coefficient of mspt is 
positive and statistically insignificant, and the coefficient of generics is once again 
insignificant. Coefficients of some therapeutic class dummies are statistically 
significant, indicating cross class price variability.
The Hausman Test suggests that we follow the random effects approach: The 
chi-squared statistic is 0.14, which indicates that the difference between the 
consistent fixed effects and the random effects estimator is statistically insignificant. 
Therefore, it is safe to use random effects, which are a more efficient estimator 
compared to fixed effects, as according to the Hausman test they give consistent 
results. Nevertheless, both approaches suggest that parallel trade penetration does 
not affect prices of locally sourced medicines.
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Table 6.7 Instrum ental Variables Panel D ata Estimation
Dependent Variable: P ff
FE RE FE RE
mspt 0.070 0.001
(0.186) (0.014)
pt -1.681 -0.476
(2.709) (1.127)
generics 0.202 -0.114 -0.043 -0.091
(0.856) (0.107) (0.170) (0.098)
statins 0.706*** 0.732**
(0.261) (0.346)
acei -0.532** -0.601*
(0.268) (0.350)
ppi 0.277 0.243
(0.265) (0.347)
aceii -0.995*** -1.057***
(0.299) (0.407)
atyp 1.676*** 1.670***
(0.268) (0.342)
ln_exr 28.292 -0.411*** -5.112 -0.375***
(75.858) (0.079) (10.719) (0.135)
timel -0.038 -0.053 -0.178 -0.089
(0.122) (0.060) (0.213) (0.096)
time2 -0.119 -0.160*** -0.351 -0.208*
(0.162) (0.062) (0.320) (0.124)
time3 -0.255 -0.144* -0.315 -0.186
(0.328) (0.074) (0.291) (0.117)
constant 12.117 -2.906*** -3.872 -2.451**
(39.132) (0.312) (4.493) (1.071)
Observations 287 287 287 287
R2 within 0.210 0.214 0.212 0.057
R2 between 0.067 0.406 0.047 0.310
R2 overall 0.065 0.403 0.046 0.304
Waldy2 4208.23 166.84 11300.42 112.09
Hausman y2 0.14 0.24
*,**,*** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Standard Errors in Parenthesis
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Findings from the estimation results of equation (19) point towards the same 
direction. In both the fixed effects and the random effects models, the coefficient of 
pt (which indicates presence of parallel trade for a particular molecule in a particular 
country) is negative but statistically insignificant. The same holds for the coefficient 
of generics.
The Hausman test again suggests that it is safe to follow the random effects 
approach. Results for fixed effects and random effects are very similar, so which 
approach is followed does not change the findings.
The coefficients of mspt or pt are not negative and statistically significant 
(Table 6.7) in any of the country specific regressions. This indicates that parallel 
trade does not spark competition in any of these markets and price convergence is 
not downward, if any.
The estimation results of equation (20) are shown in Table 6.8. In the fixed 
effects approach, the coefficient of mspt is positive and statistically insignificant, 
indicating no effects of parallel trade penetration on prices of parallel traded 
medicines. The effect of generic presence also appears to be insignificant. In the 
random effects model, again, the coefficient of the variable representing parallel 
trade penetration is statistically insignificant, although negative this time. The 
coefficient of generics is statistically significant at the a=10% level, indicating a 
negative effect of generic entry on prices of parallel traded products. The 
coefficients of statins, ppi, aceii and atyp are statistically significant, showing some 
cross therapeutic class price variability.
In this case the Hausman test (2.85) suggests that it is safe to rely on the 
random effects approach, which is more efficient than the fixed effects approach. 
The number of observations is smaller than in the estimation of equations (18) and
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(19) because only observations which include the presence o f  parallel traded
products are included.
Table 6.8 Instrumental Variables Panel Data Estimation
r%PTDependent Variable: Pi t
FE RE
mspt 0.043 -0.002
(0.102) (0.017)
generics 0.053 -0.222*
(0.557) (0.134)
statins 0.694**
(0.287)
acei -0.148
(0.295)
ppi 0.701**
(0.297)
aceii -0.904***
(0.339)
atyp 2.122***
(0.298)
ln_exr 42.043 -0.526***
(65.782) (0.109)
timel -0.090 -0.058
(0.104) (0.074)
time2 -0.183 -0.209**
(0.114) (0.086)
time3 -0.289 -0.218**
(0.287) (0.107)
constant 15.882 -3.042***
(27.724) (0.378)
Observations 225 225
Rsq within 0.244
Rsq between 0.115 0.473
Rsq overall 0.134 0.604
Wald chi sq 4843.48 173.13
Hausman chi sq 2.85
******  refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. Standard Errors in Parenthesis
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Table 6.9 shows the estimation results of equation (21). In the fixed effects 
model, the coefficient of mspt is positive and statistically significant, which suggests 
that the relative prices of the locally sourced products and parallel traded products 
do not change as parallel trade penetration increases. The impact of generic entry on 
relative prices is insignificant.
In the random effects approach, the coefficient of mspt is again insignificant, 
but negative this time. What does change, compared to the fixed effects approach, is 
that the coefficient of generics is statistically significant.
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Table 6.9 Instrumental Variables Panel Data Estimation
Dependent Variable: P^f — P£T
FE RE
mspt 0.018 -0.002
(0.053) (0.006)
generics 0.150 0.121**
(0.289) (0.060)
statins 0.047
(0.097)
acei 0.001
(0.103)
ppi -0.080
(0.100)
aceii -0.086
(0.117)
atyp -0.018
(0.105)
ln_exr -1.632 -0.083**
(34.189) (0.037)
time1 0.034 0.023
(0.054) (0.045)
time2 0.047 0.093*
(0.059) (0.049)
time3 0.033 0.112**
(0.149) (0.055)
constant -1.032 0.061
(14.409) (0.136)
Observations 225 225
Rsq within 0.038
Rsq between 0.068 0.195
Rsq overall 0.061 0.156
Wald chi sq 81.05 28.17
Hausman chi sq 13.99
* ***** refer t0 statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. Standard Errors in Parenthesis
6.6.3.2 Country Specific Results
We now estimate the same static models at country level. Due to the small 
number of observations, using panel data would create problems with regards to the
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asymptotic properties (Verbeek 2005). The total number of observations is 287. The 
number of observations per country is limited to 72, with the exception of Germany, 
where there is one missing observation. Per time unit though, there are only 18 
observations (for 18 medicines). This is lower than 30, which would be the absolute 
minimum number of observations per time period included in the panel. Thus we 
estimate the country-specific models using instrumental variable regressions. The 
same instruments are used as in the panel data approach, notably policy and Idist. 
The equations estimated per country are as follows (the equation corresponding to 
equation (19) is not included due to not enough variation for dummy variable pt at 
the country specific level):
P LS = J30 + /?, mspt + p 2generics + fi3statins + fiAacei
n
+ P5ppi + fl6aceii + J37atyp + P%exr + ^ J 3 ktime + €
*=9
P pr = p 0 + Pxmspt + p 2generics + P2statins + PAacei
n
+ P5ppi + P6aceii + Pnatyp + P%exr + ^ P ktime + //
k= 9 '  '
p ts  _ p LS = PQ+ p xmspt + P2generics + p^statins + p^acei
ii
+ P5ppi + P6aceii + Pnatyp + p %exr + ^ P ktime +v
k =  9 (24)
The country specific estimation results of equation (22), which shows the 
determinants of locally sourced product prices, are in Table 6.10. Parallel trade 
penetration has no statistically significant effect on locally sourced prices in Sweden
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and the United Kingdom, but in Germany and the Netherlands, an increase in the 
market share of parallel trade appears to have a positive effect on prices of locally 
sourced medicines. This finding suggests that in these particular countries not only 
does parallel trade not lead to lower prices, but actually it may encourage price 
increases. Generic entry has a statistically insignificant effect in all three countries, 
suggesting that generic competition does not affect originator locally sourced 
medicine prices in any of the four countries.
Table 6.10 Instrumental Variable Estimation
German
y Netherlands Sweden UK
Dependent Variable: P ff
mspt 0.041** 0.102** 0.055 -0.039
(0.018 (0.048) (0.025) (0.034)
generics -0.150 0.323 -0.680 0.177
(0.339 (0.385) (0.476) (0.352)
statins 1.310** 0.209 -0.081 1.279***
(0.501 (0.604) (0.641) (0.468)
acei 0.457 0.491 -2.178*** 0.335
(0.432 (0.457) (0.732) (0.580)
ppi 1.498*** 1.520*** -1.792*** 1.318***
(0.418) (0.482) (0.642) (0.454)
aceii -1.793**
(0.697)
atyp 1.755*** 2.464*** 2.205***
(0.416) (0.500) (0.465)
timel 0.019 0.231 -0.290 -0.062
(0.365) (0.448) (0.585) (0.415)
time2 -0.184 0.325 -0.649 -0.113
(0.357) (0.493) (0.623) (0.413)
time3 -0.215 -0.045 -0.437 -0.067
(0.366) (0.442) (0.609) (0.423)
constant -4.013*** -4.689*** -1.207* -2.931***
(0.475) (0.640) (0.623) (0.938)
Observations 71 72 72 72
Rsq 0.441 0.131 0.298
Adjusted Rsq 0.359 0.004 0.197
F- statistic 4.45 3.09 6.91 0.01
*,**,*** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Standard errors in parenthesis
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Equation (23) shows the effects on prices of parallel imported products. 
Results are shown in Table 6.11. Prices of parallel traded products do not increase as 
their market penetration increases. The coefficient of mspt is statistically 
insignificant in the results of all four country regressions. Generic entry apparently 
has a negative and statistically significant effect on prices of parallel traded products 
in Sweden. Results of the regressions for Germany, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom suggest that generic entry does not affect prices.
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Table 6.11 Instrumental Variable Estimation
Germany Netherlands Sweden UK
D T
Dependent Variable: P
mspt 0.047* 0.051 -0.006 -0.040
(0.024) (0.032) (0.028) (0.027)
generics -0.146 0.253 -1.313** 0.064
(0.376) (0.335) (0.623) (0.282)
statins 1.070 0.698 0.908 1.246***
(0.679) (0.422) (0.585) (0.377)
acei 0.528 0.981** -0.915 0.041
(0.552) (0.424) (0.819) (0.467)
ppi 1.639*** 1.402*** 1.311***
(0.520) (0.461) (0.365)
aceii -0.918
(0.815)
atyp 2.789*** 3.326*** 1.600** 3.293***
(0.580) (0.479) (0.750) (0.431)
timel 0.058 0.095 0.230 -0.081
(0.418) (0.365) (0.617) (0.344)
time2 -0.261 0.147 -0.007 -0.178
(0.408) (0.407) (0.714) (0.342)
time3 -0.339 -0.377 -0.047 -0.404
(0.431) (0.371) (0.766) (0.342)
constant -4.274*** -4.372*** -1.189 -2.776***
(0.713) (0.525) (0.776) (0.762)
Observations 57 53 46 69
Rsq 0.479 0.501 0.525 0.388
Adjusted Rsq 0.379 0.396 0.406 0.294
F- statistic 7.73 5.91 4.04 7.52
******  refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Standard 
errors in parenthesis
Equation (24) shows the impact of parallel trade and generic competition on 
the ratio of prices of the locally sourced product and the corresponding parallel 
traded product (Table 6.12). Of course, observations include only time periods and 
products at which parallel trade is present, otherwise there would be no particular 
ratio of locally sourced and parallel traded medicine prices. In none of the country -
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specific regressions was the coefficient of mspt statistically significant. This finding 
suggests that parallel trade market penetration does not affect relative prices of 
locally sourced and parallel imported medicines. This is also an indication that 
parallel trade does not trigger competition.
Table 6.12 Instrumental Variable Estimation
Germany Netherlands Sweden UK
Dependent Variable: PLS —p P T
mspt 3.94E-04 -0.001 -0.025 0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.017) (0.005)
generics 0.142** -0.016 0.345 0.150
(0.061) (0.050) (0.384) (0.058)
statins 0.062 0.017 0.437 0.022
(0.110) (0.063) (0.360) (0.077)
acei 0.004 0.025 -0.436 0.288***
(0.089) (0.064) (0.505) (0.095)
ppi -0.026 0.012 0.001
(0.084) (0.069) (0.074)
aceii 0.143
(0.503)
atyp 0.030 0.026 0.416 0.005
(0.094) (0.072) (0.462) (0.088)
timel -0.004 0.015 0.255 0.013
(0.068) (0.055) (0.381) (0.070)
time2 0.037 0.019 0.553 0.096
(0.066) (0.061) (0.440) (0.070)
time3 0.043 -0.031 0.726 0.097
(0.070) (0.056) (0.472) (0.070)
constant 0.023 0.118 0.241 -0.135
(0.115) (0.079) (0.479) (0.155)
Observations 57 53 46 69
Rsq 0.234 0.019 0.391
Adjusted Rsq 0.087 0.019 0.298
F- statistic 1.45 0.16 1.03 4.61
****** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Standard errors in parenthesis
The country specific regressions do provide some insight the effects of 
parallel trade in each particular country. Nevertheless, the country specific
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regressions are subject to limitations compared to the general regressions including 
all countries, originating from the fact that ordinary least squares are used instead of 
panel data, and the relatively small number of observations.
6.6.3.3 The Dynamic Model
In order to capture the dynamic effects of parallel trade, we include a lag in 
the dependent variable. When using panel data, the unobserved panel-level effects 
are correlated with the lagged dependent variable, making the estimators 
inconsistent. This can be addressed by estimating a dynamic panel data model using 
the first-differenced GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991). However, this 
estimator may also not perform well if the autoregressive parameters are too large, 
which is proved to be the case in our model. Therefore, we use the Blundell Bond 
estimator (1998) which addresses this problem. Another indication of the 
appropriateness of the Blundell Bond estimator is whether the first lagged dependent 
variable has a coefficient very close to one.
One lag of the dependent variable is used ( Pt_x) given the yearly nature of the
data and the fact that coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. This estimation 
procedure relies on an assumption concerning the initial conditions and provides a 
framework that enables us to deal explicitly with potential endogeneity in 
explanatory variables using a set of appropriate instruments. Using panel data in 
estimating common relationships across countries is particularly appropriate because 
it allows for the identification of country-specific effects that control for missing or 
unobserved variables. Unit root tests were performed using simple OLS regressions 
on their lagged values, which is consistent under the null hypothesis.
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Accordingly, the dynamic model can be expressed as follows:
K S = a i + Po + P\p!f-\ + P imsPt i,, + generics it + p 4 statinsit + P 5 aceiit 
+ PePPhj + Pi<*ceiitJt + P%atypit + P 9 exrit + £it ^
pu = a i + Po + P ipu - 1  + P 2 Ph,t + P 3 generics it + /3 4 statinsil + f isaceiit
+ PePPhj + P iaceiiu + P iatyPu + P9exru + uu (26)
Pt7  -  a i + Po + + P i^ P h j  + P3genericsit + p 4statinsit + J3saceii t
+ PePPhj + P iaceiiu + PsatyP,,, + P ^ xri,, + Put (2 7 )
-  p i 7  = a i + P o + P i  [pu-i -  Pi7 -\)+  P i ^ i j t  +  Pigenericsu + 0 4 statins„ + P 5 aceii t 
+ PePPh,, + P iaceii,j + P%atyput + P 9 exrit + v,., ^
Note that as in the static model, the log of the ratio of prices which is the dependent 
variable, can be written as the difference of the logs of the prices, according to the 
properties of logarithms. Hence, the dependent variable is Pt7  -  Pt7  •
By adding a lag, we would obtain an inconsistent "within" estimator as both 
our dependent and our lagged dependent variable are correlated with the country- 
specific effect. Therefore, we take the first differences of equations (25), (26), (27) 
and (28), to obtain equations (29), (30), (31) and (32) respectively:
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pt f  -  pu-i = Yi [pu~\ -  Pu-2 )+ Yi imsPti,i -  mspt„_ 1)+ ft (generics,, -  generics„_x)+ 
+ f t (statf/w,, -  statins„_x)+ ft (acez,, -  tfcez,. M)+ ft -  PPh,,-1) +
+  f t  (acez'z., - c z c e z z , . ) +  f t  (aO'P,,, - atyp„_x) +  f t  (exr,,  - ex r .,_ ,) +  e„ - e„_x
pu ~ pi%i = Y\ iPiLf-\ ~ pu - 2 )+ 72 (P*ij ~ Ptu-1)+ Yi (generics,, -  generics„_x)+
+ ft ( s t a r t s  -  statins „_x)+ ft (acez,., -  a c e z ,.)+ f t (/?/?/., -  ppi„_x) +
+ Yi(aceii„ - aceii„_x)+ ft (atyp,, - atyp„_x)+ ft (exr„ - exrit_x)+u„ - 1i„_x ^
pi 7  ~ K - i  = 7\ iPi7-\ ~ P<7-2)+  72 (msP t,t ~ mspt„_x)+  Yi (generics,, -  generics „_x )+  
+ f t  (statins,, -  statins „_x)+  f t  (acei,, -  acei„_x)+  f t  (ppi„ -  ppi„_x) +
+ y1(aceii„ -aceii„_^+ y%(atyp„ -atyp„_x)+ y9(exr„-exr„_x)+ p„ -  p„_x
f e f  -  ^ 7 ) -  f e  -  ^ 7 , )  = K ( f e  -  / ? £ ) -  ))+ 72 (mspt,, -  mspt„_x)+
ft (generics,, -  generics,,_x) +  f t  (statins,, — statins„_x)+ ft (acei,, -  acei„_x )+
Ye (PPhj ~ PPk'-1) + Yi (aceii,, -  aceii„_x)+ ft (atyp„ -  atyp„_x)+
ft (exr„ -  exr„_x)+ v„ -  v„_x (32)
By estimating equations (29), (30), (31) and (32), we would not obtain a 
consistent estimator because F^-i and e^-i are correlated (where j  refers to originator 
or parallel imported prices). Thus we will use i \ t-i - F^ i.t-2 as an instrumental 
variable by making use of P3 The latter is correlated with the former, but is not 
correlated with the lagged error term. The effect of generic entry is insignificant.
Estimation results of equations (29) and (30), both with the price of locally 
sourced medicines as dependent variable, are in Table 6.13. For equation (29), with 
parallel trade penetration as an explanatory variable, the first lag of the dependent 
variable does not have a statistically significant coefficient. The same holds for mspt. 
Thus, similarly to the static model estimation results, there is no evidence that
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parallel trade penetration affects prices of locally sourced medicines. Regarding 
results of equation (29), the lagged variable does have a statistically significant 
effect. The coefficient of pt is insignificant, indicating, once again, that prices of 
locally sourced medicines are not affected by the presence of parallel trade. The 
effect of generic entry is insignificant.
Table 6.13 Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel Data Estimation
Dependent Variable: Pff
LI. -1.546 -1.252**
(0.971) (0.668)
mspt -0.022
(0.020)
Pt -0.016
(0.567)
generics -0.009 0.088
(0.201) (0.147)
statins 11.337 1.930
(16.514) (12.984)
acei -83.859 -12.081***
(95.105) (4.646)
ppi -3.309
(3.429)
aceii -132.300
(165.883)
atyp -76.944 -15.232
(87.610) (12.212)
ln_exr -7.561 -1.907
(9.950) (6.238)
timel 0.331** 0.332**
(0.169) (0.143)
time2 0.124 0.137
(0.109) (0.087)
constant 33.266 -1.578
(44.193) (1.176)
Observations 215 215
Wald chi sq 81.70 292.90
******  refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. Standard Errors in Parenthesis
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Equation (31) is a dynamic model exploring price determinants of parallel 
traded products (results are in Table 6.14). The lagged variable is insignificant, and 
so is the coefficient of the variable indicating the market share of parallel trade. 
Therefore, the results of the dynamic model are in accordance with the findings of 
the static models which suggest that prices of parallel traded products do not change 
as parallel trade market penetration takes place. Also, generic entry does not appear 
to affect the price of parallel traded products, as the coefficient of generics is 
negative but insignificant.
Table 6.14 Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel Data Estimation
r%PTDependent Variable: Pi t
LI. -0.012
(0.638)
mspt -0.009
(0.013)
generics -0.328
(0.145)
statins 13.246
(9.469)
ppi -50.525
(37.177)
aceii 47.766
(31.333)
atyp -14.024
(9.741)
ln_exr 10.209
(6.940)
timel 0.099
(0.070)
time3 0.038
(0.088)
constant 6.373
(6.676)
Observations 158
Wald chi sq 203.92
******  refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. Standard Errors in Parenthesis
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Table 6.15 shows the estimation results of the dynamic model with the ratio 
of locally sourced and parallel traded prices as dependent variable (equation (32)). 
According to the results, parallel trade market penetration has no effect on the 
relative prices of locally sourced and parallel imported medicines. Generic entry also 
has no effect on relative prices.
Table 6.15 Blundell-Bond Dynamic Panel Data Estimation
Dependent Variable: Pff — PfJ
LI. 0.164
(0.446)
mspt 0.008
(0.005)
generics 0.298
(0.123)
statins 5.651
(9.551)
acei 13.587
(28.118)
ppi 7.135
(21.865)
atyp 16.135
(35.104)
ln_exr -2.759
(6.145)
timel -0.023
(0.047)
time3 -0.051
(0.059)
constant -9.016
(19.626)
Observations 158
Wald chi sq___________________________________211.81
* ** *** refer to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. Standard Errors in Parenthesis
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The empirical analysis included static and dynamic models in order to study 
whether parallel trade market penetration (or presence) affects prices of locally 
sourced products, parallel imported products or the ratio of prices. We do not find 
any empirical evidence from any model that prices of locally sourced products 
decrease following parallel trade product entry or market penetration. This suggests 
that parallel trade does not trigger competition with originator locally sourced 
medicines. Results also suggest that prices of parallel imported products do not 
increase as parallel trade market share increases. Finally, the ratio of prices remains 
unaffected by parallel trade penetration. Results are robust and similar in all 
specifications. These findings suggest that parallel trade does not trigger competition 
in branded medicine markets. Some weak evidence does exist though, that prices of 
parallel imported products may be pushed downwards as a result of generic entry, 
which indicates that in off-patent markets parallel traders may choose to compete 
against generic providers.
6.7 Discussion and Policy Implications
The game theoretic approach suggests that parallel trade does not trigger 
competition, so the locally sourced products do not demonstrate a price decrease as a 
result of parallel trade. Normally, prices of parallel traded products are also priced at 
the same level as the locally sourced product. However, in the presence of particular 
policies (sharing the price difference with pharmacists and patient co-insurance), 
prices of parallel traded product may deviate downwards. Descriptive statistics show 
that in the absence of policies favouring parallel trade, the locally sourced and the 
parallel traded product are priced at the same level, with some exceptions in the 
presence of generic competitors. The previously mentioned policies, however, do
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lead to a price spread between the two products. The econometrics analysis confirms 
that prices of locally sourced products do not decline due to parallel trade, and that 
in general there is upward price convergence. Similar results are found from the 
employment of a dynamic model. With regards to country specific results, there is 
no evidence from any of the four study countries that locally sourced prices decline 
due to parallel trade.
Findings are different than what Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) found in their 
study. The authors had suggested that prices of locally sourced products in Sweden 
decrease as a response to competition from parallel trade. Linnosmaa et al (2003) 
suggested that savings from parallel trade are low in Finland because parallel trade 
has not intensified competition, which is an indirect implication from our findings. 
This is also what Kanavos and Kowal (2008) and Kanavos and Costa-Font (2005) 
suggest in their studies.
This study has shown that policies favouring parallel trade do not help 
achieve savings for health insurance when parallel traded products are priced at the 
same level as locally sourced products. Policies which lead to lower parallel traded 
products may indeed lead to some direct savings when dispensing parallel traded 
products, but there is no evidence from this study that savings occur when locally 
sourced products are dispensed, because their price does not change as a response to 
parallel trade. Also, in some cases although the parallel traded product is cheaper 
than the locally sourced one, generic products are present which could address the 
cost containment concerns at least as well as a parallel traded product. Regulators 
should be cautious when taking measures which encourage parallel trade, as in the 
long run the effects of parallel trade may be adverse.
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We have showed theoretically that parallel trade may decrease investment in 
R&D and social welfare in general. The manufacture is the agent who actually 
invests in R&D in order to develop the molecule. The parallel trader simply buys the 
product in one market and sells it in another, making a profit from arbitrage. Even 
when the parallel imported product is priced at lower levels than the locally sourced 
product, gains still occur for the parallel trader. These profits are also lower profits 
for the manufacturer. The manufacturer loses the price difference between the 
importing and the exporting country. As the manufacturer’s profits are invested in 
R&D, parallel trade means lower funds available for R&D and fewer innovative 
medicines in the future. Therefore, although parallel trade may lead to some savings 
in some countries with a positive price spread between the locally sourced product 
and the parallel traded product, in the long run the overall impact of parallel trade on 
social welfare may be negative.
The European situation has some relevance for the US policy environment, 
in light of the Dorgan -  Snowe Bill (Pharmaceutical Market Access and Medicine 
Safety Act), that was introduced to Congress in January 2007. Key components of 
the Dorgan-Snowe Bill put forward at that time included a selection of permitted 
countries from where to import prescription medicines, the precise identification of 
the medicines that would qualify for importation, requirements for the registration of 
importers and exporters, labelling requirements, tracking and tracing requirements, 
and trader fees (capped at 2.5% of the price of the medicines imported annually) 
payable to the US government, among others.
Although this legislation has not been passed by the previous Congress, it is 
likely that similar legislative acts may be debated in the future. The relevance of the 
findings in this study are compelling for such debates. This analysis has showed that
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parallel trade has not lead to downward price convergence in the pharmaceutical 
market and that competition is not enhanced due to parallel trade. Therefore, US 
policy makers should not expect that lifting barriers for parallel trade in the United 
States would lead to lower pharmaceutical prices or help contain health costs. Some 
savings would occur directly by dispensing parallel traded medicines, but this would 
not trigger competition or lead to lower prices for locally sourced products, which 
actually represent the largest part of the market. Importantly, prescription medicine 
re-importation in the US would in reality involve the importation of other countries’ 
medicine price controls into the United States, and hence a weakening of intellectual 
property rights within the US.
6.8 Conclusions
We have studied the competition aspect of parallel trade both theoretically 
and empirically. The game theoretic approach shows that the manufacturer has no 
incentive to deviate from his initial price when parallel traded products appear in the 
market. The pricing strategy of the parallel trader should also be that of following 
the price of the locally sourced product and setting the price at that level. Things 
may change in the presence of particular policies though. When insurers share the 
price difference between locally sourced and parallel traded products with 
pharmacists, there is a strong incentive on behalf of the pharmacists to demand 
prices for parallel traded products which are lower than those of locally sourced 
products, as this directly generates profits for them. Co-payments create pressure on 
parallel traders to set prices at a lower level than locally sourced products and the 
co-paying consumers benefit from this price spread. Quotas lead to an incentive for 
pharmacists to demand parallel traded products at any price up to the level of that of
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the locally sourced product as they are penalized if the do not reach the quota. But if 
the quota is not high enough and is reached easily, it may actually have no effect. 
Finally, clawbacks lead to demand of parallel products on behalf of the pharmacists. 
This leads to higher unofficial discounts for pharmacists rather than to lower prices.
Empirical data on prices of locally sourced and parallel traded products show 
different price spreads (if any) in different countries. In the United Kingdom in 
almost all cases the parallel traded products are priced at the same level as the 
locally sourced product. This is probably the result of the absence of relevant 
regulation, which leads to the initial Nash Equilibrium which was discussed in the 
game theoretic section of the study. In the Netherlands, price spreads are positive in 
all cases, reflecting the effect of sharing the price spread with the pharmacists on 
prices. In Sweden, in almost all cases the price spread is positive. This could be due 
to the presence of patient co-payments as a proportion of the price of the medicine. 
In Germany, some parallel imported medicines are priced at the same level as the 
locally sourced ones, while others are priced at lower levels. This could be the result 
of the presence of both quotas (which work for only a part of the market) and co­
payments which are larger, the higher the price of the product.
The econometric analysis shows that the prices of locally sourced products 
are not affected by parallel trade presence or penetration and that any downward 
movement of the prices are a result of genericization rather than due to parallel trade. 
In other words, parallel trade does not spark competition between the parallel 
imported medicine and the locally sourced one.
The data on price spreads in combination with the results of the econometric 
analysis lead to the conclusion that parallel trade does not trigger competition in the 
pharmaceutical market and prices of locally sourced products do not decline due to
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parallel trade, thus no savings occur for health insurance by dispensing locally 
sourced products due to parallel trade penetration. Thus parallel trade does not lead 
to indirect saving. Savings only occur directly by the dispensing of parallel imported 
product, only if they are priced at a lower level than the locally sourced product. 
This means that in the United Kingdom, with a few exceptions, there are no savings, 
(either direct or indirect) for health insurance due to parallel trade. In the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Germany some savings occur due to the price spread, but 
these occur only when parallel imported medicines which are cheaper than locally 
sourced medicines are dispensed.
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7. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Pharmaceutical markets do not have the same dynamics as regular markets. 
Regulation, third- party payers and patents make market dynamics unique. Existing 
industrial organization models and empirical evidence from other markets do not 
always apply to this special type of market. This thesis has considered three 
important aspects of competition in pharmaceutical markets in order to fill in gaps in 
the literature.
First, previous research had not examined the impact of generic entry on 
originator prices in markets subject to some form of regulation. Second, the impact 
of generic entry on a possible switch in consumption between different molecules of 
the same therapeutic class was unknown. Third, parallel trade had not been studied 
from a holistic approach. Although a previous study had suggested that parallel trade 
does not lead to decreases in prices of locally sourced products (Kanavos and 
Vandoros 2010), the behaviour of rational agents involved in the pharmaceutical 
market and why a particular equilibrium is reached had not been explained 
previously, and no study provided a combination of empirical and theoretical models 
to explain market dynamics in the presence of parallel trade.
7.1 Summary of the Dissertation’s Contribution
7.1.1 Generic entry and the effect on originator prices
The first aspect of competition studied in this thesis is the impact of generic 
entry on the prices of branded products which go off patent. Patent expiry, triggering 
generic entry, transforms a monopolistic market into a market with a number of 
competitors. Economic theory suggests that the introduction of competition in a
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market leads to a decrease in prices among all competitors, unless there are 
differentiation issues impacting price. Previous research had pointed out that in 
unregulated pharmaceutical markets prices of originators increase rather than 
decrease post patent expiry. This thesis examined whether the so-called “generics 
paradox” holds in markets subjected to some form of regulation. The econometric 
analysis showed that even in markets subjected to forms of regulation, prices of 
branded products increase rather than decrease post patent expiry. This finding 
suggests that there is little price competition between the originator and generic 
products of the same molecule. Consumers who continue to purchase the originator 
product post generic entry are the most brand loyal ones; hence their price elasticity 
is low. The originator producer is willing to give up a further part of his market 
share by increasing his price. As these consumers are irresponsive to price, the total 
revenue of the originator producer will increase. The generics paradox indicates that 
savings occur post patent expiry only through the dispensing of generic products. 
Dispensing originator products does not lead to any savings due to a lack of price 
competition in the market.
7.1.2 Competition within therapeutic class
The second aspect this thesis examined is competition between drugs in the 
same therapeutic class. The thesis investigated whether there is a switch in 
consumption from a molecule which goes off patent towards molecules from the 
same therapeutic category which are still patent protected in the case of a therapeutic 
class comprising products that are considered to be close substitutes. Conceptually, 
it is shown that a monetary unit invested in advertising or promoting an in- patent 
product has greater returns than a monetary unit invested in advertising or promoting
264
an off- patent product. Consequently, it is more efficient for the manufacturer to 
relax promotion efforts for the off-patent originator drugs and focus on other 
products, usually from other therapeutic categories, which are patent protected and 
generate higher profits. This causes a shift towards molecules within the same 
therapeutic class which are still patent protected, whose manufacturers advertise 
more intensively than the off- patent drug. Promotion of the originator product has a 
spillover effect on generic drugs of the same molecule. Post patent expiry generics 
gain a large market share of the molecule, and volume of the off -patent originator 
product will decrease, as well as the total market share of the molecule (originator 
and generic). Hence this analysis examined the effect of patent expiry on total 
volume of the molecule, including both originator and generic volume.
The econometric analysis showed that post patent expiry there is a gradual 
decrease in the relative volume of the off- patent molecule over time compared to 
the volume of the in- patent drugs of the same therapeutic class. This part of the 
thesis showed that there is within-class competition present in pharmaceutical 
markets and a switch from off-patent products to in-patent products of the same 
therapeutic class. As the in- patent molecules do not have generic alternatives, this 
switching in consumption leads to increased health costs for health insurers.
7.1.3 The impact o f  parallel trade on medicine prices
The third and final aspect of competition examined in this thesis was the 
impact of parallel trade on pharmaceutical prices. The analysis explored whether 
manufacturers of locally sourced products compete in price against parallel traded 
products. Governments in importing countries often regard parallel trade as a cost 
containment mechanism and have adopted policies promoting the dispensing of
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parallel traded products. Parallel trade could help reduce costs if either the parallel 
traded products are cheaper than the locally sourced ones, or if they trigger 
competition, forcing locally sourced products to lower their prices as a response to 
the presence of parallel trade. The game theoretic approach showed that in the 
absence of regulation promoting parallel trade, the Nash Equilibrium is that the 
parallel trader sets prices of the imported product at the same level as the locally 
sourced product and the manufacturer does not lower his price as a response to 
parallel trade. The outcome of this game is upward price convergence. In the 
absence of policies promoting parallel trade, no savings occur for health insurance, 
but the profits of the innovative pharmaceutical manufacturers decline. In the 
presence of particular policies promoting parallel trade, prices of imported products 
may be set at a lower level than the locally sourced products, but the manufacturer 
does not engage in a price war, leaving his price unchanged. Other policies do not 
provide any incentive for the parallel trader to set a price lower than that of the 
locally sourced product.
Descriptive analysis showed that prices converge in the absence of policies 
promoting parallel trade and a price gap occurs in the presence of some of those 
policies. The price gap is significant for off- patent drugs, possibly because the 
parallel traders choose to compete against generic products. The econometric results 
showed that there is upward price convergence towards the price of the locally 
sourced originator drug. This study showed that parallel trade is not a source of 
competition in pharmaceutical markets, and although the product is homogenous, in 
aggregate terms there is no price competition between the manufacturer and the 
parallel trader. In some cases though, in which the product is subject to generic entry, 
there may be price competition between the parallel trader and generic
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manufacturers rather than with the locally sourced originator brand. The findings 
suggest that policy makers should be cautious when encouraging parallel trade, as 
savings to health insurance do not always occur.
7,1.4 Overall summary
Overall, this thesis has shown how competition affects in- patent products in 
different regulation, geographical and competition contexts. It appears that there is 
no price competition between originators and their generic alternatives, or between 
locally sourced products and parallel traded ones. Quantity competition though 
seems to be present between drugs of the same therapeutic class and there is a 
within-class switch in consumption post patent expiry.
7.2 Impact on Stakeholders
All three studies have important implications for pharmaceutical market 
stakeholders. This section discusses the impact of the findings of each study on 
health insurance and policy makers, the pharmaceutical industry, generic producers, 
parallel traders and patients.
7.2.1 Health Insurance and Payers
Health and pharmaceutical care costs are rising and as cost containment and 
efficiency in prescribing remain a challenge for policy makers, it is very important 
for them to understand pharmaceutical market dynamics. The three studies in this 
thesis have analyzed very important aspects concerning the reactions of the 
pharmaceutical industry to different market environments and policy situations.
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Different cases require different action on behalf of policy makers, in order to 
achieve the goal of cost containment, without lowering treatment quality.
The generics paradox study suggests that generic entry does not trigger price 
competition between the originator drug and the generic versions. Originator prices 
increase (depending on the intensity of regulation) or remain constant post patent 
expiry. Thus there are no savings from generic entry by dispensing originator 
products, as competition does not necessarily lead to a decrease in originator prices. 
There are several reasons why this may happen. Primarily, post patent expiry, a 
large part of consumers switch to generic products. The part who continue to 
consume the branded product are the ones with lower price elasticity. If demand is 
inelastic, the originator producer can increase profits by increasing the price. The 
percentage decrease in consumers will be lower than the percentage increase in price, 
and the total revenue will be larger than before increasing the price. This is closely 
linked with brand loyalty, as more brand loyal consumers demonstrate lower price 
elasticity levels. Another reason for an increase in originator prices is competition at 
the presentation level. Not all producers market the same presentations, so at 
presentations with fewer competitors prices can be higher than in other with higher 
levels of competition. Fixed or low co-payments, linked to the originator product 
may be another predictor of the generics paradox, implying patient moral hazard. In 
order to achieve savings from patent expiry, generic products have to be dispensed 
instead of the originator drug. Generics are cheaper and their price drops gradually 
as their market share increases and further entry intensifies. Therefore, 
genericization has to be swift post patent expiry and policies helping generic market 
penetration have to be implemented and vigorously enforced. Policies can target 
different aspects of the drug decision-making process. Physician prescribing can be
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targeted, through the implementation of compulsory generic or molecule prescribing 
(rather than brand name prescribing) and enforcement through the use of IT systems 
on a real-time basis. Physician budgets can also encourage generic prescribing, 
provided they do not create disincentives to cost-saving or indirectly lead to multi­
tier systems. Pharmacy-level policies are also hugely important and complement 
physician-level policies. In particular, substitution policies allow pharmacists to 
substitute a prescribed branded product with its generic alternative. Flat fee per 
prescription eliminates the incentive to dispense more expensive drugs, as opposed 
to progressive margins, while regressive margins for pharmacists in principle 
provide an incentive to dispense cheaper generic products rather than branded ones, 
depending on the design of the regressive margin scheme and the price difference 
between the alternative products. Finally, patient information is vital in the effort to 
contain costs. Patients must be informed that generic products are of the same 
quality as branded drugs, in other words quality of care is just as good, therefore, 
they should not hesitate to trust a generic drug instead of the corresponding branded 
one. Reference pricing in principle encourages generic dispensing, as when patients 
wish to purchase a branded product or a highly priced generic they will have to pay 
the difference out of pocket.
Policies targeting generic prices can help reduce costs further. Reference 
pricing and price caps are popular policy measures in many European Union 
countries, but their effectiveness over time may be questionable in terms of helping 
reduce prices further and faster. Recently, tendering for out-patient drugs has been 
implemented in Germany and the Netherlands. This may be a further step towards 
cost containment, although there is a possibility that tendering systems may drive 
out competition in the long run, leading to relatively higher prices in the future.
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The second study (switching post patent expiry) shows that in some cases 
there is a switch in consumption from a molecule that goes off- patent towards other 
molecules in the same therapeutic class that are still in- patent. Evidence from ACE 
Inhibitors shows that after captopril (the first ACE inhibitor) went off- patent, the 
ratio of total captopril volume (including the originator and generics) over the 
volume of all other in-patent ACE inhibitors declined. Simply, consumption was 
largely switched from the off- patent product (captopril) to other ACE Inhibitors 
which were still in- patent. Similar findings hold for the second and third ACE 
inhibitor that faced generic entry (enalapril and lisinopril respectively). There is 
evidence of a diversion of consumption from an off- patent molecule to in-patent 
molecules. This also suggests that there is substitutability among ACE I alternatives, 
which is also supported by the clinical literature. The effects on health insurance 
expenditure on pharmaceuticals can be significant. In off-patent markets, the 
implementation of appropriate generic policies, results in large savings for payers. 
When in-patent originator drugs though are prescribed, a cheaper generic alternative 
is not available, so health insurance has to reimburse the expensive originator. These 
findings are alarming for health insurance, but appropriate policies can help face 
these problems. A solution is to make the off- patent drug first line treatment. This 
will make physicians prescribe the off- patent drug first, and only prescribe other 
drugs of the same class if necessary but it does not imply solid evidence on 
substitutability among alternatives within the therapeutic or product class. This has 
to be combined with other policies promoting generic penetration. Such policies 
should target physician prescribing and pharmacy dispensing.
Another measure that can help address this switch in consumption is setting a 
reference price at the class level (instead of the molecule level). This reference price
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could be set at the average price of the cheaper generics of the off- patent molecule. 
There is evidence that this is happening in classes such as ACE inhibitors which 
different molecules are considered to be close substitutes. Both the Netherlands and 
in Germany are pursuing such policies to a degree, but they are, of course, 
contestable because of the extent to which they can be generalised across other 
therapeutic categories which may comprise drugs that are not close substitutes. 
Dispensing in- patent products of the same class will be subject to a co-payment on 
behalf of the patients. The manufacturers of the in- patent products will also have the 
option to lower their price at the reference price level and be covered by health 
insurance, but this is highly unlikely to happen, as shown in the generics paradox 
study (study 1), since originator products do not compete on price with generics.
Study 3 suggests that parallel trade does not trigger competition between 
locally sourced and parallel traded products. The prices of locally sourced products 
remain unaffected by parallel trade, while parallel traders price their products at the 
same level as the locally sourced drug in most cases, at least for in-patent drugs. 
Overall, there appears to be an upward rather than downward price convergence. 
This means that parallel trade does not lead to indirect savings by triggering price 
competition, as the price of the locally sourced product remains unchanged. Savings 
may occur from the parallel traded products in some countries and for particular 
drugs. Often this concerns off-patent drugs, so savings do not really occur, as cheap 
generic alternatives can be dispensed instead. Further, parallel trade can be 
perceived as a threat to R&D and the development of future drugs, as manufacturers 
of innovative originator products lose part of their profits. Parallel trade for them is 
equivalent to selling their product in the high price market at the prices of the low 
price market. This threat to innovation become more concerning when taking into
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account the decreasing number of new drugs introduced on the market, due to tighter 
regulation and the relatively high cost of developing new medicines which target 
only a relatively small group of patients (Taylor 2003). Parallel trade can make this 
problem even more severe.
Clearly, some policies do encourage parallel trade. These include sharing 
savings with pharmacists, implementing quotas, co-payments and clawbacks. The 
first two measures are implemented explicitly to encourage parallel trade. The latter 
two are implemented in order to encourage generic dispensing, as well as provide an 
incentive to dispense parallel traded products. When health insurance shares part of 
the savings with pharmacists or when co-payments are present, there is an incentive 
for parallel traders to price the imported product at a price which is lower than that 
of the locally sourced product. The size of the price difference depends on the 
bargaining power of all sides involved, namely the pharmacist, the wholesaler and 
the patients’ elasticity of demand. Quotas and clawbacks do not provide any 
incentive for the parallel trader to price the product at a lower level than the locally 
sourced drug. In the absence of policies promoting parallel trade price converge 
upwards occurs for in-patent products. Thus, some savings can occur for health 
insurance when potential savings are shared with pharmacists or when co-payments 
are present, but these savings are small compared to total pharmaceutical 
expenditure (Kanavos and Kowal, 2008). Policy makers should be skeptical when it 
comes to encouraging parallel trade as it may lead to some savings in some countries 
and under certain circumstances, but are unlikely to engage en masse on a rule of 
thumb.
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7.2.2 Originator Pharmaceuticals
As these studies examine branded pharmaceutical markets, there are 
important implications for the research-based pharmaceutical industry.
The study on the generics paradox (study 1) has shown that the producer of 
the originator drug, has the incentive to increase prices post generic entry. This is a 
special case of competition, as the introduction of direct competitors leads to higher 
prices, although economic theory suggests that more competition leads to lower 
prices. The answer to this paradox lies in the presence of brand loyal patients, or 
brand loyal physicians, who generate demand on behalf of patients. As generics 
steadily increase their market share and take up most of the market, the patients who 
insist on purchasing the branded version of the particular drug are the most brand 
loyal ones. Lack of alternatives may also be the case. These patients are the least 
respondent to increases in price, thus demand is inelastic for these patients. As a 
result, when the branded product’s price increases, relatively few patients switch to a 
generic alternative and total revenue increases for the branded producer. Our 
findings are based on prior actual behaviour of drug manufacturers, so 
manufacturers are aware of the price elasticity of brand loyal consumers and take 
advantage of it.
Study 2 suggests that there is a switch in consumption from drugs which face 
generic entry towards drugs of the same therapeutic class that are still in- patent. 
This finding is more alarming for generic manufacturers rather than for the 
innovative pharmaceutical industry. This switching effect is most likely due to a 
drop in advertising and promoting efforts on behalf of the producer of the product 
which went off patent, as post patent expiry they lose most of the market to generic 
producers, and would rather focus on other drugs which the company produces. This
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is a good chance for other pharmaceutical companies to step in and try to attract part 
of the off patent molecule’s market share.
The game theoretical approach of study 3 suggests that the best strategy for 
the manufacturer of the branded products is not to compete in terms of price with the 
parallel trader. The parallel trader has the flexibility to reduce his price down to the 
level of the price in the exporting country, which is the price at which he buys the 
product, plus the per- unit transportation cost. This is his break- even point. The 
parallel trader will respond to any decreases in the manufacturer’s price with a 
decrease in price on his behalf, until the price reaches his break- even point. If the 
price decreases further he will have to leave the market. For the manufacturer, 
getting involved in a price war will make prices eventually decrease down to the 
break- even point of the parallel trader. Taking into account the relatively small 
market share of the parallel trader, this strategy will most likely lead to a decrease in 
total revenue for the manufacturer. Further, competing against a parallel trader will 
make parallel trade a cost-containment mechanism for health insurance and policy 
makers will take more aggressive measures in order to encourage this. In any case, 
the game theoretic approach shows that the manufacturer is better off “ignoring” the 
parallel trader rather than competing against him in terms of price.
7.2.3 Generic manufacturers
The generics paradox study shows that generic manufacturers do not face 
price competition from the producer of the originator product. The originator’s price 
increases post patent expiry, in an effort to maximize profits from the brand loyal 
consumers, which are least responsive to price changes. This leads to an even larger 
market share for generic producers. This is a positive fact for generic producers, as
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they enjoy larger revenue in total, without having to lower the price further. The fact 
that there are many generic producers though forces them to compete against each 
other for market share. The presence of regulation can provide an equilibrium point 
for the producers’ price. A reference price can act as a point at which generic prices 
converge, without any explicit collusion between companies. The same can happen 
with price caps. In any case, generics have to compete against one another and can 
ignore the pricing strategy that the originator producer follows, as he may not 
choose to compete against generics. Competition between generics can be fierce 
though, and given the large number of producers and the low unit cost of production, 
it can lead to very low prices.
Findings from study 2 (switching post patent expiry) are alarming for generic 
producers. This study suggests that there is a switch in consumption from the 
product that goes off patent towards other in-patent products from the same 
therapeutic class. This leads to a drop in total volume of the product that goes off 
patent, or an increase which is disproportionate compared to the increase in the 
volume of in-patent drugs of the same class. The implications for generic producers 
are very important: as generics gain a large part of the market post patent expiry, this 
switch towards in patent drugs is a great threat to their presence on the market over 
the longer term and may lead to exit due to insufficient market share.
Findings of study 3 are on parallel trade of originator drugs so in general 
there are no direct implications for generic producers although this study does 
provide some information which can be of interest to generics. It appears that prices 
of parallel traded products that are off patent are significantly lower than the locally 
sourced product. This does not appear to happen to prices of in-patent drugs, which 
converge upwards towards the locally sourced price. This can be an indication that
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parallel traders compete against generic drugs and set lower prices in order to 
possibly attract part of their market share. Further research has to be conducted on 
this complex issue before reaching conclusions, but if this indeed holds, it is a threat 
to generic producers.
7.2.4 Parallel traders
Study 3 has direct implications for the behaviour of parallel traders. The 
game theoretic approach shows that the best strategy for the parallel trader is to set 
the same price as that of the locally sourced originator product. Any downward 
deviation could trigger a price war that will make the parallel trader worse off and 
may force him out of the market. Even if the originator manufacturer does not lower 
its price in response to the parallel trader’s lower price, a price lower than that of the 
locally sourced originator product will lead to lower profits, given the fact that 
quantities imported by parallel traders are in the majority of cases limited (as 
quantities in the exporting markets are limited) and that they manage to sell all 
quantities they import. Besides, parallel trade generates profit through arbitrage 
involving little risk, and parallel traders have no incentive to jeopardize their returns 
by engaging in a price war with originator manufacturers. Thus, the game theoretic 
approach shows that the optimal pricing strategy for the parallel traders is setting the 
price at (or close to) the locally sourced drug’s level.
7.2.5 Patients
Patient care is not only about affordability and availability of safe and 
efficacious medicines, but also about costs, as they indirectly pay health costs via
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their contributions or taxes and directly pay copayments. Patients paying 
contributions in practice care little about the costs of their personal treatment for a 
specific condition as overall spending on this is low, unless copayments are high and 
structured in a particular way to encourage one type of drug vs another (e.g. brand vs. 
generic). Patients do care about total health expenditure levies though, as higher 
expenditure could mean higher taxation (for tax-based systems) or higher 
contributions (for insurance-based systems). Alternatively, the quality or quantity of 
health services may decrease. Consequently, patients are concerned about health 
costs rising, either directly or indirectly due to the threat of increased taxation or 
contributions or lower quality services. Therefore the implications discussed in the 
section concerning health insurance and policy makers also apply to patients.
The generics paradox analyzed in study 1 highlights the importance of 
patient information, particularly within the context of doctor - patient relationship, 
but also, increasingly, in the context of pharmacist - patient interaction. Patients 
must be aware of their alternative choices. Currently, patients have access to much 
more information than they had in the past, so they can participate in decision 
making along with their physician, but are also subject to misleading information 
from various sources. In an environment where direct to consumer advertising for 
medicines is not allowed, it is very important for decision makers to provide reliable, 
validated and comprehensive information on diseases and treatments. This will not 
only make patients feel more confident, less confused and allow them to discuss 
treatments with their physicians, but also help contain costs through wider generic 
prescribing, acceptance and use.
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7.3 Limitations
The three studies in this thesis are not without limitations. The IMS data used 
for the empirical analysis of all three studies is 98% accurate, according to IMS 
itself (IMS 2002). This is a high rate of reliability, but it is still not 100% accurate, 
and findings are subject to this limitation. In general though, the IMS database is the 
only and most commonly used database for the analysis of pharmaceutical market 
dynamics, from an intertemporal and comparative perspective.
Another limitation is that some explanatory variables were excluded from the 
econometric models due to multicollinearity. Multicollinearity does not bias 
coefficients of other non-collinear explanatory variables, or the direction of changes 
of the explanatory variables suffering from multicollinearity. However, it can 
influence the coefficients of the collinear coefficients, thus making the interpretation 
of the magnitude of changes impossible. Dummy variables are often subject to 
multicollinearity, and as our models included a significant number of such variables, 
the model specification had to be determined with great caution. Therefore, in order 
to avoid multicollinearity problems, some variables were not included in the 
empirical models. Nevertheless, this exclusion is not thought to have affected the 
conclusions and policy recommendations of the three studies.
Endogeneity problems in econometric estimations were addressed with the 
use of instrumental variables. All instruments were tested to determine if they are 
suitable for each case, and were proved to be strong and appropriate. However, no 
instrument can be absolutely perfect, due to the endogenous and the (at least weak) 
interactive nature of almost any variable surrounding economic agents and markets.
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In addition, the impact of important variables used in conceptual frameworks 
in studies 1 and 2 could not be tested empirically because of the fact that advertising 
data on particular drugs is not available and brand loyalty is difficult to quantify.
Study 2 (switching effects post patent expiry) provides empirical evidence 
from only one therapeutic class (ACE inhibitors). Findings concern this particular 
class and any generalizations to other classes should be subject to interchangeability 
across molecules of the same class.
Finally, the empirical analysis in study 3 does not use discounts provided by 
parallel traders in the empirical analysis, because such discounts are unofficial and 
undeclared, and therefore, cannot be captured. As these discounts are not publicly 
available, it is not possible to pursue empirical research taking the actual discount 
levels into account. Nevertheless, the model used reflects the effects of parallel trade 
on public prices which are reimbursed by health insurers and, therefore, the findings 
are reliable.
7.4 Further Research
This thesis has studied three very important topics related to market 
dynamics in pharmaceutical markets and in different regulatory and geographical 
contexts. Additional research can bring these issues further.
With regards to study 1 (the generics paradox revisited), future research 
could use data from heavily regulated markets in order to determine if the generics 
paradox holds in even more rigid regulatory environments. Data from France, Spain, 
Italy or elsewhere would provide further insight into this phenomenon, as the 
countries included in the generics paradox study in this thesis have elements of 
flexible pricing.
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Future research on switching within therapeutic class could consider a wider 
range of therapeutic classes, in order to examine whether this finding holds for other 
drugs, possibly with lower levels of substitutability. Research can also be conducted 
with regards to possible consumption switching across different therapeutic classes 
(e.g. from ACE I to ACE II inhibitors, or from SSRIs to SNRIs). Also, taking 
discounts into account (although practically very difficult) would be useful for an in- 
depth analysis of incentives and games between parallel traders and pharmacists.
Another limitation is the use of instrumental variables, which are used to 
address endogeneity problems. Instruments used have been tested and appear to be 
good instruments, but the choice of a perfect instrumental variable is always 
challenging.
Finally, research on parallel trade could include a more detailed model with 
data on generic prices and study competition across molecules when all options are 
available (originator, parallel traded and generic) in a prescription market. 
Considering all aspects of the market and focusing on parallel trade of off- patent 
drugs would provide valuable insight into this controversial topic.
This PhD thesis has analysed three very important aspects of pharmaceutical 
markets. Using theory and empirical evidence it has studied in depth how market 
players react in three different situations and how prices and market shares evolve. 
Findings provide valuable policy implications and set a framework for further 
research in the field. In an environment of rising health costs, it is very important 
that policy makers consider the findings of such studies when implementing 
pharmaceutical policies. In any case, understanding market dynamics and
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determinants of competition can help shape the direction and intensity of supply and 
demand-side policies.
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Appendix
Pricing and Reimbursement in Outpatient Prescription Drug Markets.
The Appendix provides an overview of the main pharmaceutical policies in 
the seven countries studied in this thesis (Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom). This is based mostly on information 
from the PPRI country profiles (2007 and 2008) by OBIG, Kanavos and Gemmill 
(2005) and Espin and Rovira (2007).
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Table A.1 Overview of Pharmaceutical Policy Measures in Seven European
Countries, 2007 
DK FR GER NL NO SE UK
Reference
pricing X X X X
therapeutic
clustering X X
Mandatory
generic
substitution
X X X
Optional
generic
substitution
X X X X
Generic price 
controls X X X X
Regressive
pharmacy
markups
X X X X
Profit controls X
clawbacks X X X
Tax-funded 
health system X X X X
Contribution 
funded health 
system
X X X X
Use o f CEA X X X X X
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A.1 D enm ark
In principle, prices of pharmaceuticals are free in Denmark. However, 
products reimbursed by health insurance are subject to regulatory interventions. 
International reference pricing applies for originator in-patent medicines.
Reference pricing was implemented in Denmark in 1993. Drugs are grouped 
at the molecule level and the price of the cheapest is determined as the reference 
price, which is the price that health insurance reimburses. If the physician explicitly 
prescribes a product whose price exceeds the reference price, the price difference 
must be covered by the patient.
On the demand side, wholesale margins are negotiated between wholesalers 
and pharmaceutical manufacturers, as they are not regulated. Pharmacy mark-ups 
were regulated and were determined by a formula, depending on the price of each 
product. This was a function of the price of the product, a fixed fee and a 
conscription percentage. This involved indirect profit controls for pharmacies, which 
were negotiated every two years and led to the determination of the formula based 
on which their margins were calculated. However, this system changed in 2007 in 
order to eliminate any incentives that pharmacists had to dispense more expensive 
products. According to the new formula used, pharmacists gain 8.8% of the 
pharmacy purchase price plus a fixed fee. Pharmacists are allowed to receive 
discounts by the wholesalers. VAT for pharmaceuticals is at the standard 25% level, 
which is much higher than other European countries. There are no claw-backs in 
Denmark.
Prescription guidelines are set for physicians, but are usually not obligatory. 
Physicians prescribe by pharmaceutical product rather than by chemical compound. 
However, generic substitution is obligatory at the pharmacy since 1997 (substitution
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was introduced in 1991 but was initially not mandatory). Substitution is mandatory 
at the chemical substance level (ATC level 5), meaning that a branded product can 
be substituted by its generic, or a generic product can be substituted by another 
cheaper generic. Physicians can ask for a product not to be substituted without 
providing a reason for it. Patients can also deny substitution. In both cases though, 
patients have to pay the difference between the price of the product and the cheaper 
alternative out-of-pocket. If the price difference between the prescribed product and 
its generic alternative is negligible, substitution is not mandatory.
Patients pay a flat fee of DKK10 per pack dispensed. They are also subject to 
a 100% to 15% co-payment on each dispensed product, depending on the annual 
expenditure per person. Co-payments for children under the age of 18 range from 
50% to 15%. Chronically ill patients pay lower co-payments and have an upper limit 
of annual out-of-pocket payment. Terminally ill patients do not pay any co-payment. 
Drugs for inpatient use are free for all patients.
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A.2 France
France is a tightly regulated country regarding pharmaceutical policies. 
Legislation surrounding pricing and reimbursement of pharmaceuticals is closely 
monitored and regulated by various policies. Generic and originator prices are 
subject to policies in an effort to contain costs. While negotiations with the 
authorities and international referencing are used for the price setting of originator 
products, in the case of generics both reference pricing and price capping are 
implemented, making France one of the most tightly regulated countries in western 
Europe. Apart from the supply side, policy measures also apply on the demand side 
in order to provide a holistic approach to const containment and efficient use of 
medicines.
Prices of originator drugs are set after negotiations between manufacturers 
and the authorities. The price of the originator that the manufacturer applies for must 
be close to the price levels in other European countries (Germany, Italy, Spain and 
the United Kingdom). Any changes in prices in these countries must lead to a 
change in prices in France. Internal reference pricing is used, as price comparisons 
are made across drugs. Generic prices are set at 50% of the corresponding originator 
price, and are also subject to implicit reference pricing.
From the demand side, regressive wholesale margins apply in France. These 
margins are regulated and decrease as the price of the product increases. Pharmacists 
receive a flat fee per pharmaceutical product, which burdens patients. Further, they 
receive a mark-up, which is regressive. Arrangements have been made so that 
pharmacists receive the same amount, regardless of whether they dispense an 
originator product or its generic alternative. Pharmacists may receive discounts,
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which are regulated and are negotiated with the supplier. The discount cannot 
exceed 10.74% for generics supplied by wholesalers and 15% for generics supplied 
directly by the producer.
Patients pay a flat fee of €0.50 out-of-pocket per pack dispensed. Annual 
out-of-pocket expenditure is capped at €50. Also co-payments as a percentage of the 
price of the product occur in some cases. On average, 76% of pharmaceutical 
expenditure is reimbursed. Patients under 16 years of age and chronically ill patients 
are exempted from co-payments. Also, claw-backs were introduced in France in 
1999 in an effort by health insurance to gain part of the discounts offered to 
pharmacists by wholesalers.
Physicians are encouraged, but not obliged, to prescribe by International 
Non-proprietary Name (INN). However, an increase in pharmaceutical expenditure 
may indirectly prevent physician fees from rising, so physicians have an indirect 
incentive to promote generic prescription rather than originators. Generic 
substitution by pharmacists has been allowed since 1999, but is not obligatory. 
However, there are indirect incentives for pharmacists to substitute branded products 
with generics, as if the recommended rate of substitution is not reached, new rates 
will be introduced, leading to losses for pharmacists.
Finally, the VAT standard rate is 19.6%. However, for pharmaceuticals 
eligible for reimbursement the VAT rate is 2.1% and 5.5% for other pharmaceuticals.
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A.3 G erm any
Germany follows a framework of a relatively free market for 
pharmaceuticals, but this is combined with regulatory measures (such as reference 
pricing) which apply mostly to off-patent markets. This combination of free pricing 
and regulation make Germany a special and interesting case.
From the supply side, branded in-patent products are freely priced. Internal 
or external reference pricing for patent protected markets and profit controls do not 
apply in Germany. Reference Pricing is used in Germany for the reimbursement of 
off-patent molecules. Reference price is the highest price level at which a product 
can be reimbursed. Any upward difference in the price has to be paid out-of-pocket 
by the patient. Reference prices are reviewed annually. The reference price is 
usually determined at the therapeutic class level (although it used to be determined 
at the molecule level). In particular, drugs are grouped into three groups. The first 
group includes all drugs of the same chemical substance (such as branded products 
and their generic bio-equivalents). The second group includes different molecules 
which are therapeutically and pharmacologically comparable, for instance me-too 
drugs and generics. The third group includes drugs of different chemical substances 
which are considered therapeutically comparable. In-patent products are subject to 
the reference price, unless they are considered as having contributed to therapeutic 
improvement. In order for a product to be reimbursed, its price must not exceed that 
of the most expensive product in the lowest third of the reference group. Pricing is 
free for in - patent products. Patients under 18 years of age do not pay out of pocket 
for prescription pharmaceutical products. Adults are reimbursed at the 100% of the
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price of the drug, but are subject to co-payments. For drugs costing less than 5 Euros 
there is no co-payment. Products prices between 5 and 50 Euros are subject to a 5 
Euro flat co-payment fee. Drugs priced between 50 and 100 Euros are subject to a 
10% co-payment, while drugs whose price exceeds 100 Euros are subject to a flat 10 
Euro co-payment. The VAT rate for outpatient prescription drugs was increased 
from 16% to 19% in January 2007.
On the demand side, generic substitution is mandatory for pharmacists, 
which have to dispense generic drugs instead of branded products, unless otherwise 
explicitly stated in the prescription by the physician. Although pharmacist mark-ups 
were regressive, this practice changed in 2004. Ever since, pharmacists receive a flat 
fee per prescription, plus a fixed rate of 3% of the wholesaler’s price. Also, the 
wholesalers’ margin has decreased from 7.3% in 1996 to 4% in 2004. Profit controls, 
external reference pricing and cost-plus pricing are not present in Germany.
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A.4 N etherlands
The Netherlands, alongside France, has a tightly regulated framework for the 
pricing and reimbursement of pharmaceutical products. This includes therapeutic 
clustering for the purpose of reference pricing. The recent implementation of tenders 
in outpatient markets also suggests that efforts to decrease off-patent medicine prices 
has been augmented.
For originator products, price caps, reviewed biannually, apply in the 
Netherlands. Reference pricing in the Netherlands takes place at the therapeutic 
class level. This means that when determining a reference price, it is not only an 
originator but also its generic alternatives which are included in the basket. Actually, 
other molecules of the same therapeutic class are also subject to the same reference 
price.
Generic policies are also tight and do not rely on competition. By law, 
generic prices had to be at least 40% lower than the corresponding originator price. 
A further reduction took place in 2008, making generic prices at least 50% lower 
than originator prices. This reflects the presence of price freezes and price cuts. 
Recent developments include the implementation of tenders for the provision of 
medicines in out-patient market by some of the main insurers. However this is 
limited to certain molecules.
On the demand side, physicians are encouraged to prescribe generic 
medicines. Some health insurance funds offer financial incentives to prescribe 
efficiently. If a product is prescribed by INN, pharmacists can (but are not obliged to) 
dispense the cheapest generic. However, if the physician has prescribed by brand
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name, the pharmacists must dispense that particular product. Pharmacists gain one 
third of the price difference between the originator and the generic product, which is 
a financial incentive for them to dispense generic drugs. Pharmacists are paid based 
on a fixed tariff on each prescription. Claw-backs for pharmacies were introduced in 
1998. The level of the claw-back increased gradually from 2% in 1998 to 6.82% in 
2002, with a maximum of €6.80 per prescription.
Patients are not subject to any co-payments in the Netherlands. Patients only 
pay out-of-pocket if the product dispensed is more expensive than the reference 
price, if this applies.
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A.5 Norway
Internal reference pricing was abolished in Norway in 2001. This was 
replaced by a price-capping system. All pharmaceutical products sold are subject to 
a maximum price, regardless of whether they are reimbursed by health insurance or 
not. Maximum prices are set according to an international reference pricing system. 
The price is set at the average of the three lowest prices of a group of European 
countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, 
Sweden, UK). New pharmaceuticals undergo pharmacoeconomic evaluation before 
reimbursement is approved. This is not connected to market authorisation. Products 
whose chemical substance has already been approved (e.g. generics) do not have to 
go through the same procedure for reimbursement approval, provided that they are 
not more expensive.
Generics are priced according to a stepped price model. Generic prices are 
gradually reduced over time. Initially, generics must enter the market at a price 
which is at least 30% lower than the originator’s price. Six months later, the price 
must be at least 55% lower than that of the originator. Finally, a year after generic 
entry, generic entry must be at least 65% lower than originator prices.
Patients have to pay out-of-pocket co-payments for pharmaceuticals 
purchased from pharmacies. The co-payment is 36%. Drugs for the treatment of 
serious contagious diseases are exempted from co-payments and are reimbursed 
100%. No other fixed co-payments exist. Patients also have to pay any difference 
between the reimbursement price and the price of the product, if they choose to
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purchase a product whose price exceeds the reimbursement price, unless the 
physician explicitly states in the prescription that the product should not be 
substitutes for medical reasons. The maximum out-of-pocket expenditure per person 
is NOK 1,740 per year. There is also a maximum co-payment per prescription, 
which is NOK 510.
Wholesaler mark-ups are not regulated, but on average they are between 5% 
and 7% for branded products, and much higher for generics. Pharmacy margin is 8% 
for up to NOK200 and 5% for above this threshold, by law. Discounts are not 
forbidden. VAT for pharmaceuticals in Norway is 25%, which is equal to the 
standard VAT rate and alongside Denmark is the highest for prescription medicines 
in the study countries.
Generic or INN prescribing is not compulsory in Norway. Patients can 
choose to purchase the more expensive product (instead of a generic alternative), but 
they have to pay the price difference out-of-pocket. Pharmacists are obliged to 
inform patients of the existence of a cheaper product of the same chemical substance. 
Pharmacists also have a financial incentive to promote generics, as many pharmacies 
are owned by wholesalers, which have a larger margin for generics rather than 
originators.
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A.6 Sweden
Sweden has been moving towards a relatively free pricing model for 
prescription medicines. Having abolished reference pricing in 2002 and moving 
towards a different approach of pricing and reimbursement of pharmaceuticals, the 
target for Swedish policy makers is to encourage a more competitive and less 
regulated type of market.
On the supply side, pricing of originator products is free in Sweden. 
However, cost-effectiveness of a product is taken into account by the medical 
products agency when reaching a decision about its reimbursement.
Reference pricing for reimbursement of generic products was implemented 
in 1993 and abolished in 2002. Until then, the reference price was used to set the 
reimbursement price of off-patent drugs. Generic competition is encouraged in 
Sweden by automatically accepting prices of drugs that do not exceed highest of the 
present price of a particular drug group. Prices are reviewed monthly and 
competitors do not know the price suggested by other competitors. This results in 
price cuts.
On the demand side, pharmacies are a state monopoly. Depending on the 
price of the product dispensed, the pharmacist’s margin on prescription drugs is a 
percentage of the wholesaler price plus a fixed margin. There are three bands, 
depending on the price, and the percentage decreases with price, while the fixed 
margin increases with price. Prescription drugs are not subject to VAT and claw­
backs are not present in Sweden.
Physician prescribing is done using the brand name rather with the ESIN. 
However, since 2002, generic substitution at the pharmacy level is mandatory.
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Pharmacists are obliged to substitute a product with the cheapest alternative. What 
drugs are considered as alternatives is determined by the Medical Products Agency. 
Physicians can object substitution, in which case the prescribed brand is dispensed. 
The patient can also choose not to have his drug substituted by the pharmacist, 
provided that he pays the price difference out-of-pocket.
Out of pocket patient co-payment rates are regressive, depending on total 
yearly expenditure. The co-payment rate starts at 100% and decreases gradually 
down to 0%. Co-payments are capped at SEK 1,800 out of pocket per patient per 
year. All children under 18 years of age are pooled together and are treated as one 
beneficiary when calculating co-payments.
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A.7 United Kingdom
The United Kingdom follows free-market approach in many aspects of the 
pharmaceutical market. It is actually the least regulated market in the European 
Union with regards to pharmaceutical pricing. Measures such as reference pricing 
and generic price controls which are very common in other European countries are 
not implemented in the United Kingdom.
On the supply side, in-patent drugs are freely priced in the United Kingdom, but are 
subject to rate-of-retum regulation, which in practice are “profit controls”. This is 
known as the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS). Returns of the 
investment in a developing a drug cannot exceed a certain percentage. In particular, 
the 2005 PPRS scheme has a target of 21% of return on capital. Firms with profits 
exceeding the agreed margin have to reduce their prices or pay back part of their 
profits to the Department of Health. Recommendations with regards to the use of 
drugs are made to the NHS by the National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence (NICE). NICE assesses the cost effectiveness of drugs and creates 
guidelines, but also rules in favour or against the use of particular molecules by the 
NHS, based on their cost per QALY.
Generic drugs are also freely priced, but a maximum price scheme was 
introduced in 2000, which sets upper limits to generics’ prices.
On the demand side, pharmacist and wholesaler margins are not regulated in 
the United Kingdom, so they are not used as a disincentive for the dispense of more 
expensive products, as in other European countries in which regressive margins 
apply. Prescription drugs dispensed from pharmacies have a zero-rate VAT, while
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OTC drugs are subject to VAT at the rate of 17.5%. Drugs prescribed in hospitals 
are also subject to 17.5% VAT. Claw-backs are deducted from pharmacy 
reimbursement levels. The size of the claw-back depends on the pharmacy size. On 
average claw-backs are around 10%.
Prescription of medicines is recommended to be done by INN (rather that by 
brand name). Pharmacists are obliged to dispense a branded product if this is 
explicitly mentioned on a prescription. Physician prescribing is monitored and 
primary care prescribers have a certain budget for prescribing purposes.
Patients are not burdened by percentage co-payments. Alternatively, they 
have to pay a standard prescription fee per item dispensed. Patients can be exempted 
from the obligation of prescription fees, depending on the disease the medication is 
supposed to treat, their age, their income and the method of delivery.
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